Key points:
- ‘Clean energy’ is used to describe energy technologies that can facilitate decarbonisation. But, in practice, its exact meaning is vague and often contradictory.
- No energy technology is completely clean, but certain energy types, particularly solar and wind, have fewer negative impacts and are better able to deliver on transition targets when supported by targeted policy, institutional, or financial support.
- Unclear definitions of ‘clean energy’ make it harder to measure true progress on the energy transition, distorting transition monitoring and investment reporting, weakening government accountability, and enabling disinformation to spread.
- This briefing is designed to help researchers, journalists and policymakers interrogate uses of the term by listing the key things to look out for when reading about ‘clean energy’.
- It offers a simple framework for assessing energy transition technologies, helping to separate real decarbonisation solutions from those that perpetuate or increase emissions – or incur other risks – to strengthen research and reporting.
- A transparent and precise set of metrics to evaluate energy sources will help decision-makers better identify the best generation types for decarbonisation and the policies needed to support them.
‘Clean energy’ is inconsistently defined, even in expert sources
The public push for cleaner energy systems is clear, but there is no one definition of exactly which technologies count as ‘clean energy’. Definitions can be vague, and there can even be differences in definitions across publications from the same organisation.
For example:
- The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2024 People’s Climate Vote report found that majorities in 85% of countries supported a quick transition to clean energy, but the report uses the terms ‘renewable energy’ and ‘clean energy’ interchangeably (Box 1).
- The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has used ‘clean energy’ to describe any options that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. For example, it referred to “cleaner energy alternatives that reduce greenhouse gas emissions” and “renewable and clean energy projects” in two 2025 reports on the Gulf and Arab regions. These definitions could encompass options such as nuclear, biofuels, and fossil fuels with carbon capture in addition to renewables, though there is no precise list of technologies.
- Three recent reports from the International Energy Agency (IEA) include different combinations of technologies under the ‘clean energy’ umbrella. The Advancing Clean Technology Manufacturing report focuses on “five key clean energy technologies – solar PV, wind, batteries, electrolysers and heat pumps”, and also cites nuclear and carbon capture and storage (CCS) as “technologies for the clean energy transition.” The Global Energy Review 2025 lists a different set of “five key clean energy technologies – solar PV, wind power, nuclear power, electric cars and heat pumps”, whereas the Clean Energy Transitions Programme 2024 includes many mentions of biofuels, but not nuclear.
While not exhaustive, these examples show that the definition of ‘clean energy’ is far from standardised, even across expert sources. As momentum for the energy transition accelerates, clarity lags, leaving policymakers, institutions and the public to navigate a ‘clean’ transition without clear information.
This briefing provides tools for researchers, journalists and policymakers to clarify definitions and make informed judgments about which energy options are appropriate, effective and credible in each context.
Box 1. What is the difference between ‘clean energy’ and ‘renewable energy’?
Understandings of which energy technologies constitute clean energy vary significantly, whereas renewable energy is a much more clearly defined category:
- ‘Clean energy’ often refers to any energy source that reduces carbon emissions compared to fossil fuel sources, or is believed or claimed to reduce them.
- ‘Renewable energy’ refers explicitly to energy sources that can be replenished faster than they are used. This includes solar, wind, tidal, geothermal, and hydroelectric power, as well as green hydrogen and biofuels.
Most definitions of ‘clean energy’ include renewables, but many also include non-renewable sources, such as nuclear energy and hydrogen produced from fossil fuels.
Disorganised definitions of ‘clean energy’ can obscure the real impacts of energy technologies
Grouping technologies under the ‘clean’ label can obscure their different climate and environmental impacts, economic and technological feasibility, and deployment timelines, and distort the true picture of the energy transition. Vague definitions can blur the line between emissions cuts and continuing polluting activities, potentially legitimising polluting or unfeasible technologies.
So-called ‘clean’ energies can make national plans look ambitious, while, in reality, extending reliance on fossil fuels. For example:
- In the UK, blue hydrogen projects are reported as progress towards decarbonisation in the Climate Change Committee’s (CCC) 2025 report to Parliament. Blue hydrogen is produced using fossil fuels combined with CCS, and, when used for heat, can have a greenhouse gas footprint more than 20% greater than burning natural gas or coal. The high levels of carbon capture needed make its application expensive and difficult. Plus, the CCC recognised in a 2018 report that blue hydrogen “cannot get to zero carbon” due to residual emissions and incomplete carbon capture.1The UK CCC positions fossil hydrogen with CCS as a viable low-carbon option, but recognises it “cannot get to zero carbon” due to residual emissions and incomplete carbon capture. Even as a low-carbon option, its viability depends on achieving very high CO₂ capture and upstream methane capture. These both entail high costs that make application of these technologies at levels required difficult in practice.
- In the US, the Department of Energy (DoE) signed an agreement in 2010 for the construction of the Petra Nova CCS system at one of the country’s largest coal-burning plants. The DoE provided USD 190 million for the project, of which USD 167 million was supplied through the Clean Coal Power Initiative (CCPI). Despite its ‘clean’ funding, the project will prolong fossil fuel production – it is designed to capture only 10% of the plant’s emissions, with the captured CO₂ piped into oil plants and used to produce more oil, according to Forbes. Its economic feasibility also depends on continued oil use at high prices.
Unclear definitions hinder accountability, making it harder to accurately assess whether technologies align with the pace and priorities required for the energy transition and to compare across sectors or countries. This impacts a wide range of policy priorities, from energy security to industrial strategy and long-term fiscal pressures.
In some places, broad terms like ‘clean energy’ take on the qualities of a marketing label, used to promote energy options in an optimistic way without reflecting their real impacts. The UN warns that using misleading labels without standard definitions can be a tactic of greenwashing (Box 2).
At the other end of the spectrum, the term ‘clean’ can be used to undermine low-carbon, renewable energy by setting unrealistic expectations for an energy solution with zero impacts. For instance, the Institute for Energy Research2Greenpeace has reported on links between The Institute for Energy Research and the oil and gas industry. argues that the media is misleading the public into believing wind and solar are environmentally ‘clean’ energy sources by downplaying resource use.3Common false claims and disinformation tactics have been gathered and debunked by Columbia’s Sabin Center for Climate Change Law and Climate Action Against Disinformation. These seemingly common-sense claims can be used to undermine the most sustainable and low-carbon energy options.
Box 2. Eight key things to look out for when reading about clean energy
When reading a source that uses the term ‘clean energy,’ it is important to examine how it is being used. This checklist can help to determine whether it is being used precisely and transparently, or in ways that obscure real impacts:
- Check whether ‘clean energy’ is defined and which technologies are being grouped under the ‘clean’ umbrella
‘Clean energy’ can encompass a wide mix of solutions with varying emissions-reduction potential, trade-offs and levels of viability. Examine which technologies are explicitly included, which are implied, and what is left unmentioned. When ‘clean energy’ is left undefined, the inclusion or exclusion of specific technologies cannot be assumed – those with ‘hidden’ or indirect emissions, or with other significant environmental impacts, may be included.
- Check whether the ‘clean energy’ technologies discussed rely on the continued use of fossil fuels
Assess whether the technologies align with IPCC timelines for a rapid fossil fuel phase-out – reducing emissions by 50% by 20304 According to the IPCC special report on Global Warming of 1.5ºC, modelled pathways with limited to no overshoot of 1.5°C warming required 45% reductions in net anthropogenic CO2 emissions by 2030 (from 2010 levels), and net zero emissions by 2050. – or risk locking in fossil fuel infrastructure or supply chains, or diverting resources or attention away from the transition.
- Check for emissions and environmental impacts that may be omitted
Be aware of the types of emissions and impacts that are addressed, as they may only be a partial accounting. This can include checking whether the technology produces non-CO₂ emissions, such as methane or nitrous oxide; examining scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions from the technology’s full life cycle; or checking whether other hazardous wastes have been excluded.
- Check for the specification, or lack thereof, of subcategories
Some energy technologies function as umbrella categories, grouping subtypes with different emissions profiles, impacts and feasibility. When umbrella technologies are mentioned, check whether sublabels are clearly applied or are collapsed into a single category. Notably, hydrogen can be categorised by different colours, such as green, blue and grey, each with very different CO₂ emissions profiles.
- When using multiple sources, check for comparability
Data and facts on ‘clean energy’ may be based on very different definitions, which can distort conclusions and make it hard to compare or combine datasets. Be alert to whether sources can be compared meaningfully.
- Check whether technologies are suitable for the political, economic, and environmental context
Assess whether the technologies are suited to the jurisdiction, sector, goal, or timeline in question. Check for the absence of critical support, such as insufficient supply chain investment, circular economy strategies, waste disposal, energy grid upgrades, contract flexibility and administrative capacity, which can all jeopardise successful deployment.
- Check the proposed timeline and look out for unproven technologies
Some technologies are popular ideas but are not feasible for meeting near-term decarbonisation targets. For example, green hydrogen or direct-air capture (DAC). Look out for timeline mismatches and be critical of overly optimistic assumptions, such as rapid technological development, cost decreases and construction timelines.
- Assess whether ‘clean’ is creating a false facade of progress
If invoked without specification, a vague label can mask specific technologies. When ‘clean energy’ goes undefined, it becomes easier to imply alignment with climate goals without committing to meaningful change. Be aware of which actors might gain from using an ambiguous ‘clean’ label and check what ‘clean’ might be masking.
Energy technologies are not a ‘clean’ vs ‘dirty’ dichotomy
All energy solutions come with a mix of advantages and caveats, although some are much better at achieving decarbonisation goals with fewer negative impacts than others.
Pros and cons can be analysed across multiple dimensions, making it challenging to compare technologies.
Stakeholders also have different priorities, meaning they weigh wins and trade-offs differently. For example:
- Large-scale hydroelectric power has low operational emissions and has contributed to decarbonising national energy mixes, but is opposed by environmental groups concerned about land use, environmental justice and biodiversity impacts, such as WWF and International Rivers.
- Nuclear advocates emphasise its reliability and ability to meet baseload energy demand, while opponents stress waste management and safety concerns, construction and decommissioning costs, and grid incompatibility with renewables.
The challenge is not to search for a flawless option, but to use clear and consistent criteria to evaluate what each technology can realistically deliver, where, and at what cost.
What makes an energy technology ‘clean’?
Zero Carbon Analytics has identified six key dimensions to assess energy transition technologies. These look at the factors that impact deployment, sustainability outcomes and emissions reductions:
- Life-cycle emissions: Energy technologies produce emissions at different stages of their life cycles, known as upstream, operational, and downstream emissions, reflecting fossil fuel use and fugitive emissions from construction, operation and decommissioning. Looking at the full lifecycle of a technology – not just emissions from operations – is essential to get a complete picture of its emissions.
- Environmental and health impacts, beyond emissions: Technologies place demands on land, water, and ecosystems, impacting communities and the environment. These considerations, including human health, land use and biodiversity, and resource inputs and waste, are vital to judging whether technologies align with a just and sustainable transition.
- Dispatchability and the grid: Dispatchability is the technical and commercial ability of an energy technology to adjust its output in response to changing demand, including how quickly it can ramp up or down production. Grids and market structures need to be updated to ensure reliability as variable generation from renewables expands.
- Commercial viability: Energy technologies need to be built at speed and scale under real economic and financial conditions. Each energy technology presents different delivery and financing risks, which must be accounted for for deployment to be successful.
- Economic viability: There are various important cost factors to consider, including the levelised cost of electricity (LCOE – the average net cost of electricity generation over the lifetime of a generator), price volatility, and how financial burdens and externalities are spread across society.
- Political viability and policy support: Deployment outcomes for energy technologies also depend on governance and regulatory conditions, including permitting processes, grid readiness, supply chains, and institutional capacity. Technology evaluation involves considering how the characteristics of low-carbon technologies, such as costs and timelines, are supported by their regulatory and political contexts.
Using these six dimensions, we scored different energy technologies to compare their strengths and weaknesses, and identify where further support is needed for their effective development.5Table 1 assumes that some VRE will be needed in a net -zero world, and therefore non-VRE energy technologies are also judged by their compatibility with VRE. It evaluates the impacts of new developments for each technology. The scores in this table are generalised across various contexts and therefore do not represent every single application of these energy technologies.
The analysis found that solar and wind perform strongly across the dimensions. These technologies show the fewest major barriers to deployment and no severe constraints, indicating high political and commercial viability, relatively low externalities, and comparatively low deployment costs. Where challenges do exist, they are more feasible to overcome, and entail the most benefits and the fewest trade-offs.
Table 1
Deep dive: ZCA’s six key dimensions to assess clean energy transition technologies
1. Life-cycle CO₂ emissions
Energy technologies are associated with CO₂ emissions at different points across their life cycles, and all must be accounted for to get a true picture of their emissions profile. These are commonly understood as upstream, operational, and downstream emissions, reflecting emissions that arise as technologies are produced, deployed, used and retired. Activities like building infrastructure, producing inputs like fuels, processing outputs and waste, and accidental leaks can all produce emissions.
Non-fossil fuel electricity technologies have significantly lower median life-cycle emissions than even the best-performing fossil fuel options, according to the National Laboratory of the Rockies (Figure 1).6 Formerly the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). Wind, nuclear, hydropower, tidal, geothermal, and solar all cluster at the very low end of total life-cycle emissions, with values below 50 grams of CO₂-equivalent per kilowatt-hour (gCO₂e/kWh).
By contrast, natural gas, even though it is sometimes seen as a cleaner transition fuel, remains over ten times more emissions-intensive throughout its life cycle than solar PV, the highest-emitting non-combustion energy source.
Figure 1
2. Environmental and health impacts, beyond emissions
Beyond emissions, energy technologies use land, water, and other natural resources, with impacts on ecosystems and communities. Key considerations include pollution and waste, resource requirements (including land use and renewability), effects on ecosystems, and animal and human displacement. These factors are crucial for assessing the broader environmental and social footprints.
Health Burden
The health burden varies substantially across technologies, especially when indirect deaths from air pollution, radiation exposure and climate change are taken into account.
Non-combustion technologies such as wind, solar, and nuclear are associated with far lower mortality rates from air pollution and accidents than combustion technologies, including coal, oil, biomass, and gas. Scientific research has shown that substituting fossil fuels with non-fossil energies would prevent 3.6 million premature deaths globally every year, as well as prevent health complications such as premature births, childhood-onset asthma and cancer.
The negative health impacts of nuclear energy extend beyond mortality from direct accidents. Our World in Data finds that nuclear has a mortality rate comparable to that of solar and wind, but these estimations are based only on death toll statistics from the Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters. Studies have shown increased risk of cancer among uranium miners and in communities near mines, as well as an increased cancer rate among residents living within 30km of nuclear power plants.
The negative impacts of fossil fuels are also higher when the full costs of air pollution and climate-driven extreme weather are factored in. Fossil fuel-generated air pollution costs are estimated at USD 2.9 trillion globally per year, according to Greenpeace, 3.3% of global GDP. Natural disasters cost USD 320 billion in 2024, per German insurance firm Munich RE. By 2050, the global cost of climate change is estimated to range from USD 1.7 trillion to USD 3.1 trillion per year.
Land use
Land-use concerns can be measured by looking at land efficiency and habitat impacts. Nuclear, geothermal, wind (footprint) and biomass from residues are the most land-efficient power sources per unit of output, while dedicated biomass, wind (spacing) and ground-mounted PV are the least efficient (Figure 2).
However, land use and its impacts vary by specific technology and location and should be evaluated in context:
- The land impact of wind varies depending on how it is calculated, as it involves large sites where only a small area is directly occupied by turbines and access roads. When looking only at these components, wind is the third-most land-efficient source, after geothermal.
- Conversely, biofuels (excluding residue-based biofuels7‘Residue-based biofuels’ can refer to sources such as crop wastes or unused animal parts, which can reduce the food versus fuel conflict. Algae-based biofuels are another option that do not use arable land, though this technology has struggled to become commercially viable and struggle to achieve market penetration.) use arable land that could otherwise be used for food production, potentially exacerbating food insecurity.
- Hydropower raises notable land-use concerns, particularly large reservoir dams. Projects can flood extensive areas of wildlife habitat, agricultural land, and culturally or ecologically significant landscapes, displacing local communities and disrupting aquatic ecosystems, as illustrated by the Koukoutamba Dam in Guinea.8The Koukoutamba Dam will flood land that was previously designated as a biodiversity offset for mining activities, which could result in the deaths of an estimated 1,500 of 4,000 critically endangered Western Chimpanzees living in the area (by drowning, through conflict between groups as ranges diminish, or as an impact of new project infrastructure). Simultaneously, it would help decarbonise Guinea’s mining sector, which is heavily reliant on fossil fuels and help expand a centralised electricity grid.
- Geothermal can elevate the risk of seismic activity, landslides and subsidence, depending on the site’s geological features and management.
- The land impacts of solar energy vary depending on whether panels are installed on roofs or on the ground, pre-installation land use, and the materials used to make the panels. Solar can produce 23 times more electricity per unit of land than biofuels. The land under and around solar panels can be used to grow crops, raise livestock, or support biodiversity – a practice called agrovoltaics – thereby mitigating land demands.
Figure 2
Resource inputs and waste
Every energy technology requires material and mineral inputs (measured as ‘mining needs’), but the types, numbers, and quantities vary. This is both a sustainability concern and an environmental justice issue, particularly for developing and low-income regions rich in mineral resources and low in materials governance.
Waste is produced during the construction and mining stages, through operations, and during decommissioning. But these processes are not equal: when measured by unit of electricity generated, operational waste takes a far greater toll than the others. For example:
- Solar generates more construction and mining waste and more decommissioning waste than coal, nuclear, gas, wind, yet its total waste footprint is around 9x smaller than gas, and 60x smaller than coal (Figure 3).
- Coal and gas lead in both total waste generated and mining needs per unit of electricity, even when adjusted for their higher capacity factors.9A power plant does not run 100% of the time. Therefore, capacity factor is the ratio of the amount of electricity produced in a given time (e.g. one year, or the plant’s lifetime) to the maximum theoretical
- Among low-carbon technologies, solar and wind have the highest mining needs – particularly given their lower capacity factors10In this study, the capacity factor of wind turbines is set at 40%, solar is 18%, and hydropower is 52%. – requiring copper, aluminium, zinc and rare-earth elements such as neodymium, closely followed by hydropower, then nuclear.
Figure 3
However, not all wastes are equal. Some waste is harder to manage and potentially more damaging, whilst others can be reduced through improved maintenance, decommissioning and recycling.
- Radioactive waste from nuclear power requires careful, long-term treatment to manage health and environmental risks, the intensity of which is determined by its radioactivity. As of yet, there is no permanent solution for dealing with spent nuclear fuel, and the most advanced disposal facility, at Onkalo in Finland, has yet to be licensed. One study found that small modular reactors were likely to produce more radioactive waste than conventional, Generation II reactors.
- Solar also produces some toxic waste, though the risk level is significantly lower, and 95% of the materials used in solar panels are recyclable, though commercialisation of recycling is lagging.
Water usage is also an input concern. A compilation of studies of the water use of different technologies found that (Figure 4):
- Biomass and reservoir hydropower consume the most water across their lifecycle, followed by oil, nuclear and coal.
- Among renewables, solar PV, wind, and run-of-river hydropower are more likely to consume the lowest volumes of water over their lifetimes.
- Concentrated solar and geothermal are likely to consume intermediate volumes.
Hydrogen is also anticipated to strain local water supplies.
Figure 4
3. Dispatchability and the grid
Dispatchability is the ability of an energy technology to adjust its output in response to changes in power demand. In addition to switching facilities on and off, it includes the speed at which energy production can ramp up or down.
- Dispatchable energy technologies include traditional fossil fuels, biofuels, geothermal and hydropower with reservoirs. For hydropower, dispatchability depends on rainfall and snowfall; for bioenergy, it depends on the biofuel technology deployed, with biogas being more dispatchable than other biomass feedstocks due to its longer ramp-up times.
- Non-dispatchable energies include wind, solar and tidal. These are known as variable renewable energies (VREs) as they depend on weather and natural conditions to generate power, resulting in fluctuating electricity output and a lower ‘capacity factor’ – the tendency to operate at a lower capacity than full.
Non-dispatchable energies require flexible electricity grids. Older grids, built for fossil fuels with the assumption of high dispatchability, need to be adapted through measures such as smart grids, energy storage and demand-side response to ensure energy is available when needed.
Nuclear energy is often categorised as dispatchable, though in practice this is not necessarily feasible or economically viable. The simplest and most economical way to run a nuclear plant is 24/7 at consistently high base load levels. Modern nuclear plants do have the manoeuvring capacity to match the grid’s energy needs,11Requirements for energy output manoeuvrability are determined based on what grid operators need to maintain system stability, and the flexibility nuclear operators can achieve while still operating profitably. The European Utilities Requirements dictate that nuclear plants must be capable of daily load cycling operation between 50% and 100% of their rated power (with a rate of change of electric output of 3-5% of their rated power per minute). which could make them suitable for grids with VREs, but this would entail an economic loss for the nuclear operator. As a result, additional subsidies are needed to increase compatibility between nuclear and VREs, such as contracts for difference to guarantee a fixed price for nuclear output.12Contacts for difference are where the government promises to pay an energy company a steady price for its electricity, even if market prices go up or down. This can reduce the cost of reducing output to make space for VRE, though with potential trade-offs, such as costs to the state.
A 2025 study of the EU power grid found that even the more flexible Gen III+ reactors are economically grid-incompatible with VREs, with grid infrastructure, flexible demand in multi-energy systems, and storage being more cost-efficient options for integrating renewables.
4. Commercial viability
The success of an energy project depends on whether technologies can be deployed within relevant timeframes, given real-world economic and financial constraints.
Barriers include technological maturity, supply-chain capacity, financial instability and construction timelines. Long construction and development timelines also introduce significant financial risk, particularly for large-scale and capital-intensive technologies, affecting investment decisions and slowing deployment.
For example:
- While nuclear energy can have lower operating costs than other continuously operating technologies, it is more expensive to construct and requires greater financial and macroeconomic stability.
- In the maritime and aviation industries, which are considered hard-to-abate sectors, biofuels are a commercially attractive option for meeting short-term emissions goals due to their minimal investment requirements. However, reaching net zero with biofuels will require carbon offsetting, carbon capture, or the transition to green hydrogen, all of which are currently unfeasible – carbon removal faces geological and scaling constraints; carbon capture is not commercially viable, and green hydrogen faces technological hurdles that require substantial and often risky investment and policy support.
- For VREs, IRENA advises that supportive grid investments must be made 3-5 years before renewable energy investments to ensure sufficient capacity for VREs and to improve investor confidence.
- Geothermal entails high risk for companies. Risk mitigation mechanisms, like insurance, government incentives, and geothermal resource mapping can be critical to improving commercial viability.
- For green hydrogen, subsidies totalling an estimated USD 1.3 trillion and demand-side policies might be necessary to help the technology reach commercial maturity.
5. Political viability and policy support
Institutional and governance contexts shape the successful deployment of energy technologies. Regulatory readiness and policy support influence factors such as supply chains, permitting, electricity grids, funding availability, and the ability to adapt contracts to changing costs and conditions. Delays or uncertainty can freeze projects, and even otherwise viable solutions may face costly delays or be abandoned without sufficient institutional support.
For example:
- Unclear regulation is holding back the expansion of certain emerging technologies, for example, production standards for green hydrogen and sustainability criteria for advanced biofuels.
- Nuclear expansion is hindered in most contexts by underdeveloped waste management, which is amplified in countries new to nuclear or opting for newer reactor types.
- Proper environmental regulations and impact assessments can lead to costly delays or project cancellations, particularly for technologies with significant negative environmental impacts, such as hydropower.
- Geothermal faces long permitting (7-10 years) and complex mineral rights frameworks that significantly slow geothermal rollout, particularly in OECD countries.
Public resistance can also be a barrier to new energy development, even where approval for the energy transition is high. This can arise from fears of negative impacts on wildlife, important landscapes, and local economies, as well as the absence of avenues for public participation. For example, some places have seen strong local resistance to the development of wind and hydropower. The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2025 cites examples of public and local opposition to nuclear deployment globally.
Policies that support sustainable, equitable decarbonisation also impact the viability of certain energy projects. For example, carbon pricing may make new investments in CO₂-emitting energies, such as grey hydrogen, too risky in the long term.
Economics
Energy costs can be compared across technologies using the levelised cost of energy (LCOE), the cost to produce one unit of energy averaged out over the lifetime of the generation technology.
- IRENA finds that the LCOE of solar and wind energies has fallen dramatically since 2010, with wind and solar – both PV and concentrated – now undercutting that of fossil fuels (Figure 5). In 2024, over 90% of new utility-scale renewables were cheaper than the cheapest fossil-fuel alternative.
- Battery storage prices have fallen by 93% since 2010. Solar PV plus battery projects achieved a weighted average LCOE (USD 0.079/kWh) lower than coal and aligned with natural gas.
- Coal has an LCOE of USD 0.073/kWh. The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis found that adding CCS to coal could more than double the LCOE.
- The LCOE of gas was USD 0.085/kWh, higher than that of all renewables except concentrated solar and bioenergy.
- According to the IEA, nuclear has a relatively high LCOE compared to renewables, at USD 105 kWh,13Stated policies scenario. with newer, safer Gen III/+ nuclear technologies having higher LCOEs. Decommissioning costs are high, ranging from USD 500 million to USD 2 billion over 15 to 20 years, with waste management facilities at around USD 4 billion over 30 years, often funded by government resources.
- Improvements in the cost of green hydrogen are dependent on anticipated electrolyser advancements, which are not guaranteed. Without carbon pricing, green hydrogen costs seven times as much as natural gas.
Figure 5
Comparisons of energy costs should also account for other costs and how they are distributed across society, including price volatility, required grid upgrades, and market externalities such as impacts on public health.
Fossil fuels are vulnerable to fuel market volatility,14Fuel market volatility is also a problem faced by biofuels, the LCOE of which faced upward pressure fdue to this in 2024. which can influence energy costs and be a heavy burden on consumers and countries. This was seen following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the start of the Iran War, both of which resulted in energy shocks that pushed energy prices up globally.
Research shows that surpassing a certain energy mix of renewables, particularly hydropower, solar, and wind, reduces overall price volatility, including that posed by geopolitical risks. Geothermal and some bioenergies also produce this effect, but to a weaker degree.
It is important to note that LCOE is sensitive to financing conditions, a key barrier in developing markets with higher risk premiums, as reflected in sovereign credit ratings, which in turn lead to higher financing costs. IRENA finds that although the LCOE for onshore wind is similar in Europe and Africa, in Europe it is primarily driven by capital expenditures, whereas in Africa it is driven by financing expenditures. Stable policies and revenue frameworks are essential for lowering risk and attracting investment.
Multi-criteria assessment of energy technologies reveals the overall advantages of wind and solar
Assessing technologies against these six criteria reveals that wind and solar energy offer the strongest overall performance, combining very low life-cycle emissions, declining costs, low water use, and minimal health impacts. Their principal limitation is intermittency, which can be mitigated through grid modernisation, energy storage, and demand-side flexibility.
Clean coal, gas and most types of hydrogen will perpetuate reliance on fossil fuels – aligning these technologies with net zero introduces feasibility hurdles and high costs.
Other low-carbon technologies face more significant constraints. Nuclear power entails high costs and long development timelines, plus significant waste management and health concerns. Large-scale hydropower can have substantial ecological and social impacts, while bioenergy competes with food production for land and water resources.
However, the suitability of different technologies will depend on context. Most low-carbon technologies can play a role in providing reliable, secure, and affordable energy, provided their more substantial risks are appropriately managed.