Temperature overshoot and tipping points

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Key points:

  • Under the Paris Agreement, countries committed to limiting global temperature increase to 1.5°C or ‘well below’ 2°C above pre-industrial levels. However, even in an optimistic emissions scenario, the chance of limiting warming to 1.5°C by the end of the century is now virtually zero.
  • Our journey to achieving Paris Agreement goals will likely entail ‘temperature overshoot’, where warming exceeds a specified level (typically 1.5°C to 2°C) for 10 years or more before returning to that level in the future. 
  • Ninety percent of the mitigation pathways in the IPCC’s Global Warming of 1.5°C report that limit warming to 1.5°C by 2100 include temperature overshoot.
  • Pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C with limited or no overshoot require deep, rapid, and sustained reductions in emissions, as well as some carbon dioxide removal to compensate for sectors that cannot be decarbonised.
  • Even temporary overshoot increases the risk of Earth systems reaching ‘climate tipping points’, catalysing large and often irreversible changes. For example, deforestation in the Amazon could trigger a deforestation-drought feedback loop, rapidly transforming the region into a savanna.
  • Every increment of avoided warming can make a difference. Keeping overshoot as short and at as low a temperature as possible is critical to avoid sudden, cascading and irreversible climate impacts.
  • Without rapid emissions cuts now, we will need to rely more heavily on large-scale carbon dioxide removal to bring temperatures back down after overshoot, which comes with risks and uncertainties. 
  • Other proposed large-scale climate interventions, known as geoengineering, fail to address the root causes of climate change and introduce additional severe risks. 
  • Strategically targeting ‘positive socio-economic tipping points’ – which are conditions that accelerate the deployment of technologies or practices to reach net zero – could help drive decarbonisation and allow us to meet the 1.5°C target.

Surpassing the Paris Agreement limits

Last year, the Earth’s average temperature reached around 1.5°C warmer than pre-industrial times. The average warming for the decade between 2015 and 2024 was 1.24°C above pre-industrial times. The heating is predominantly a result of human activities1Human-cased warming is estimated to have caused 1.36°C of warming in 2024, relative to 1850–1900., primarily the burning of fossil fuels. This warming has had widespread adverse impacts on people and nature, which will worsen as the climate continues to warm. 

The Paris Agreement was adopted at COP21 in 2015 by most countries worldwide – countries that are collectively responsible for 98% of human-caused emissions – with the primary goal of avoiding the most devastating impacts of climate change. The agreement aimed to limit “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels” and to pursue efforts “to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels” by the end of the century. The US, currently responsible for 13% of global emissions, announced its withdrawal from the Agreement in January 2025.

It is now clear that achieving the Paris Agreement goals will mean stricter measures to reduce emissions. Net carbon dioxide emissions will need to fall by 48% by 2030 to keep warming to 1.5°C, according to the latest IPCC assessment, published in 2022. More recent estimates suggest emissions would need to fall >around 50% over the same timeline. The 2024 Emissions Gap Report finds that, even under an optimistic scenario where all NDCs and net zero pledges are met, the chance of limiting warming to 1.5°C by the end of the century is “virtually zero”. The 2023 Emissions Gap Report gave a 14% chance, as, at the time, there were more opportunities to scale down emissions. 

Countries had agreed to submit more ambitious national climate plans by 2025 as part of the Paris Agreement. However, as of October 2025, countries have only pledged to reduce their emissions by 1.6 billion tonnes more than in their previous NDCs, leaving a gap of 26.5 billion tonnes to stay within the 1.5°C limit.

The latest stocktake of the global carbon budget – the amount of carbon that can be emitted before we reach 1.5°C of warming – estimates that we will burn through the remaining carbon budget in about six years. Other estimates suggest that we may have only three years left to reduce emissions sufficiently to limit warming to 1.5°C, and that for a 50% chance of keeping warming to 1.5°C, greenhouse gas emissions would have needed to peak before 2025. Yet, emissions continue to rise and national commitments to reducing emissions remain insufficient. 

Every fraction of a degree of warming increases the odds of additional, and often extreme, impacts. As greenhouse gases build up in the atmosphere, heatwaves are becoming hotter and more frequent and rainfall is becoming more intense and variable. Consequently, droughts and floods are worsening globally, triggering crop failure, infrastructure damage and humanitarian crises.

As emissions continue to rise, it is increasingly likely that our journey to limiting warming will entail a period of ‘temperature overshoot’. Unprecedented efforts are needed, soon, to limit the amount of overshoot and the impacts of temperature rise. 

What is temperature overshoot?

Temperature overshoot is the term used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to describe scenarios, or ‘pathways’, in which the Earth exceeds a specified global warming level, typically between 1.5 and 2°C, before returning to that level at some point in the future. 

The magnitude (how much the specified level is exceeded) and the duration (how long it is exceeded for) differ across pathways. In most overshoot pathways, the duration of the overshoot is at least one decade and can extend to several decades, while the magnitude reaches up to 0.5°C. However, in ‘high overshoot’ pathways where the temperature overshoots by as much as 0.5°C, it is unlikely that warming could be returned to ‘well below 2°C’ by 2100. If we follow these high-overshoot pathways, we will not meet the goals of the Paris Agreement.

Most IPCC scenarios foresee some degree of temperature overshoot

Pathways with temperature overshoot are not exceptional. In the IPCC’s Global Warming of 1.5°C report, published in October 2018, 90% of the mitigation pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C by 2100 include a period of overshoot. 
The pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C with limited or no overshoot require deep, rapid and immediate reductions in emissions, with carbon dioxide removal (CDR) only used to compensate for historical emissions and in sectors where no mitigation measures are available.‘2Limited-overshoot’ pathways overshoot 1.5°C by no more than 0.1°C. In comparison, pathways that delay emissions cuts and overshoot the temperature targets rely more heavily on large-scale CDR to bring global temperatures back down by the end of the century.

Explaining 1.5°C scenarios with and without overshoot

Figure 1 illustrates three hypothetical overshoot scenarios for pathways that aim to achieve the 1.5 °C target. In the upper panel, the grey line represents a scenario with no temperature overshoot. The blue line represents a scenario with a low magnitude and short duration of overshoot. The red line represents a scenario with a high magnitude of temperature overshoot that persists for a long time. In the blue and red scenarios, temperatures return to 1.5°C by the end of the century

The lower panel shows emissions trends in each of the pathways. The scenario represented by the grey line reaches net-zero emissions, at which point temperatures stabilise at 1.5°C, by rapidly reducing emissions and without the need for negative emissions solutions. In contrast, the scenarios represented by the blue and red lines require negative emissions solutions, such as large-scale CDR, to reach net-zero emissions. In the red scenario of high and long-lasting overshoot, negative emissions solutions will need to be deployed far beyond the end of the century. 

The greater and longer the overshoot, the more negative emissions solutions will be needed in order to stabilise temperatures at 1.5°C.

Figure 1: Illustration of 1.5°C scenarios with and without overshoot

Source: Reversing climate overshoot, Nature Geoscience 16, 467 (2023).

Increasing overshoot means increasing climate impacts

Every increase in the magnitude and duration of overshoot increases the severity, frequency and duration of climate impacts, such as heatwaves, droughts and floods. In one analysis, the frequency of agricultural drought increases from 24% in a 1.5°C scenario with little to no overshoot to 31% in an overshoot scenario that reaches just below 2°C by the end of the century. In the same scenarios, the frequency of major heatwaves increases from 29% to 44%. Brazil, North Africa, and southern Africa are projected to be the most severely impacted by heatwaves exacerbated by temperature overshoot. 

Sticking to the 1.5°C target also brings economic benefits – climate impacts from temperature overshoot will lead to higher mitigation costs and economic losses later in the century.3While higher initial investments are needed to keep temperatures down, this is outweighed by the economic benefits later in the century. 

For nature, exceeding a temperature threshold for even a short amount of time may push species beyond their tolerance limits, causing extinction, migration and knock-on effects for entire ecosystems. As different parts of the world warm and cool at different rates, species worldwide will be unevenly exposed to dangerous conditions. Temperature overshoot will be particularly critical for species already living close to their thermal limits, such as those in the tropics.

The IPCC estimates that the area of global land at risk of changing from one ecosystem type to another – such as a forest changing to a grassland – is 50% lower at 1.5°C of warming compared to 2°C. Some of the world’s most important ecosystems, such as the Amazon Basin, the Pantanal and the Coral Triangle, could be irreversibly transformed with just a few years of overshoot. 

In the ocean, overshoot is projected to decrease ecosystem habitability for centuries to come. If we do not curtail emissions now, marine ecosystems in the Indo-Pacific, Caribbean and West Africa could experience sudden collapse as early as the 2030s, with knock-on effects for the people who rely on these ecosystems for food and income from tourism. 

Every increment of warming counts

2025 has been hot. It is on track to be the second or third warmest year on record. It is also likely to be the second year since pre-industrial times where the average global temperature exceeded 1.5°C. This occurred for the first time in 2024, which was recorded as the warmest year on record since pre-industrial times and broke multiple heat records on land and in the sea. Although a breach of the Paris Agreement target would require average annual temperatures to be above 1.5°C for at least 20 consecutive years, the fact that we are increasingly seeing individual years surpass this threshold implies that we are getting closer. 

A ‘safe’ limit to global warming does not exist, and we are already seeing devastating impacts at current warming levels. IPCC scientists urge that 1.5°C shouldn’t be viewed as a guardrail. The target of 1.5°C was chosen as a threshold beyond which the impacts of warming become increasingly intolerable to humans and nature. This assessment was made based on criteria such as food security, extreme weather events, health, biodiversity loss, water supply and economic growth. 

But, what is considered an acceptable level of damage from global warming is highly subjective. At just 0.56°C of warming, 506 people died from climate change-induced heat stress in Paris during the summer of 2003. At 0.95°C of warming, wildfires in Australia in 2019-2020 led to the death or displacement of three billion wild animals and caused AUD 4-5 billion in losses to the Australian food system.     

While we have not permanently surpassed the 1.5°C target, we are already experiencing significant impacts of global warming. In 2024, climate change was responsible for an additional 41 days of dangerous heat, and extreme weather events worsened by climate change resulted in the death of thousands of people and billions in damages. These represent only a tiny fraction of all impacts resulting from human-caused warming.

We should do everything in our power to keep warming down as much as possible. As emphasised by IPCC scientist Prof. Mark Howden in 2018: “Every half a degree matters. Every year matters. Every choice matters.”

What are climate tipping points?

Overshooting temperature targets, even temporarily, risks the creation of positive feedback loops – self-perpetuating cycles that speed up warming. These positive feedback loops can trigger climate ‘tipping points’, after which an Earth system transforms into an alternative stable state, completely different to its original state. A single tipping point can have cascading and catastrophic effects at regional and global scales. 

For example, the Amazon is drying and burning due to human-caused warming, which reduces tree cover. Reduced tree cover, exacerbated by deforestation, causes further reductions in rainfall due to decreased evapotranspiration, whereby moisture is evaporated into the atmosphere from trees. Over time, this deforestation-drought feedback loop could pass a tipping point, transforming the region from a rainforest into a savanna. This would switch it from one of the most important global carbon sinks to a carbon source and could trigger potentially catastrophic changes to global rainfall patterns, impacting agriculture.  

The transformation of the Amazon is a fast-onset tipping point, in that when the tipping point is transgressed, the change in the climate system would occur rapidly – in a matter of decades. For these tipping points, overshoot could cause sudden and irreversible changes to the system. Scientists are uncertain when the Amazon’s tipping point might be crossed. Some estimates suggest this could happen at 40% forest loss, and around 26% of the Amazon was already deforested or degraded as of 2022. Some scientists believe that the first warning signals of this shift are already here. 

Other tipping points are slow-onset tipping points, whereby the change to an Earth system occurs over a much longer timescale, like over many centuries. For these tipping points, briefly overshooting temperature targets might not cause immediate and irreversible changes to the climate system, as long as the overshoot is not longer than the time needed for the system to recover. One example is the melting of the Greenland ice sheet. While we may be close to this tipping point, it is estimated that ice sheet loss could be mitigated as long as temperatures are brought back down to 1.5°C or lower relatively quickly once the tipping point is reached.Even temporary overshoot increases the risks of surpassing critical tipping points by 72% compared to scenarios with no overshoot. Keeping the magnitude and duration of overshoot as low as possible is critical and rapid decarbonisation is key: While delaying emissions reductions to beyond 2030 could still allow us to meet 1.5 °C by the end of the century, this would result in higher temperature overshoot over many decades, with the potential for adverse consequences.

Boundaries for keeping the Earth habitable

Humans have altered the Earth, such as by depleting the ozone layer, reducing biodiversity, changing land cover and warming the atmosphere. Scientists have tried to estimate how far these processes could continue to be altered until a global tipping point is reached, causing the Earth to transform irreversibly into a state that could endanger humanity and render the planet uninhabitable.

Planetary system boundaries

The concept of planetary system boundaries involves tracking changes to nine crucial processes, identified by scientists as responsible for keeping the Earth habitable (Figure 2). These processes are ranked on a scale from ‘safe operating’, meaning the process happens in a way that is safe for humanity, to ‘high-risk’, i.e. the process poses a high risk to humanity.Of the nine identified planetary boundaries, the Earth is now outside the safe zone for seven: Climate change, biosphere integrity (the quality of living organisms and ecosystems, impacted by, for example, decreasing species diversity), land-use change, biogeochemical flows (for example of nitrogen and phosphorous – aggravated by agribusiness and industry), novel entities (the release of novel chemicals such as plastics), freshwater change and ocean acidification. The safe space for ocean acidification was added as breached in September 2025, reflecting worsening trends.   

Figure 2: Planetary system boundaries 

Source: Seven of nine planetary boundaries now breached – ocean acidification joins the danger zone, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (2025)

There is great scientific uncertainty regarding how much longer we can continue to push these boundaries before the total collapse of the Earth’s system happens. However, if we rapidly decarbonise, we could reduce this risk and stabilise the Earth within a safe operating space. 

Earth system boundaries

Scientists have also proposed a set of ‘safe and just’ Earth system boundaries that quantify the safety of humans and the stability of the planet (Figure 3). Safe boundaries are those “where biophysical stability of the Earth system is maintained and enhanced over time, thereby safeguarding its functions and ability to support humans and all other living organisms”. Just system boundaries minimise the exposure of countries, communities and people to significant harm, including “loss of lives, livelihoods or incomes; displacement; loss of food, water or nutritional security; and chronic disease, injury or malnutrition”. 

This framework differs from previous frameworks in that the impacts on people are measured in comparable units to impacts on the planet. While other frameworks only assess how human activities have impacted Earth systems, using comparable units allows for a better understanding of the harm that changes to Earth system boundaries will do to humans. The framework focuses on all species, not just humans, attempting to “define the environmental conditions needed not only for the planet to remain stable, but to enable societies, economies and ecosystems across the globe to thrive”. The framework also incorporates information on climate, the biosphere, and other Earth system tipping points into the Earth system boundaries

Figure 3: Safe and just Earth system boundaries

Source: Safe and Just Earth System Boundaries published in Nature, Global Commons Alliance (2023).  

According to this framework, the ‘just’ Earth system boundary for climate is 1°C, while the ‘safe’ boundary is 1.5 °C. The Earth has already heated by more than 1.2 °C, meaning current global warming, while still in the ‘safe’ zone, is unjust (Figure 3), emphasising the need for urgent action. As the framework incorporates interspecies justice, intergenerational justice and intragenerational justice (including race, class and gender), it can be used to inform sustainability targets and practices. 

However, these frameworks have been criticised, with some suggesting that they are too simplistic or that they do not distinguish between thresholds, that can be breached, and hard limits, that cannot be breached. They may also shift political focus to the wrong areas or dampen political action. Others warn against allowing one group of scientists to define what constitutes a safe set of boundaries for everyone on the planet, which could be viewed as divisive. 

Relying on carbon removal is risky – emissions cuts must come first

To bring average global temperatures back down to between 1.5 and 2°C, overshoot scenarios rely to different extents on CDR. This includes nature-based solutions, such as afforestation (planting forests) and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). Other solutions include direct air capture (DAC) and storage, where CO2 is directly captured from the air and then stored for the long term. 

However, there are major risks and uncertainties with these approaches. With nature-based CDR and BECCS, there is a risk that ecosystems could be replaced with bioenergy crops or plantations, endangering wild plants and animals. Food crops could be supplanted, threatening food security. DAC technology is still in its infancy. These technologies are also not proven to be effective at the scale needed. 

These uncertainties and risks emphasise that climate action needs to be boosted in the near-term to reduce our reliance on these approaches for bringing temperatures back down later in the century. 

Geoengineering cannot replace rapid and deep emissions cuts

Rapid and deep emissions cuts provide the best chances of limiting temperature overshoot and avoiding tipping points. At the same time, approaches that remove carbon from the atmosphere can help to offset emissions that cannot be reduced and mitigate overshoot. 

Technologies that aim to intervene with Earth systems at a large scale to counteract the effects of a warming climate, referred to as geoengineering, have also been increasingly proposed in recent years.4CDR is also defined as a geoengineering approach by the IPCC. A prominent solution is solar radiation management (SRM), which aims to reduce the amount of sunlight absorbed by the Earth by reflecting it back into space or preventing it from reaching the Earth’s surface altogether. This would result in reduced warming, but would have no impact on greenhouse gases that are being released into the atmosphere or that are already there, meaning it does not tackle the underlying causes of climate change and instead introduces new and additional risks. 

Research remains in early and theoretical stages, with many unknowns and potential unintended consequences. Studies suggest that SRM would have significant impacts on water cycles, could modify monsoon systems, and could lead to drought in some tropical regions. SRM could also impact renewable energy generation, which is crucial for mitigating emissions. Additionally, as its deployment would impact the climate of the entire planet, SRM comes with substantial geopolitical risks. 

SRM approaches would have to be implemented continuously until emissions are reduced to safe levels to prevent warming. If they are stopped before this happens, this would result in very rapid warming, and “severely stress ecosystem and human adaptation”, according to the IPCC. The IPCC is very clear that, even in best-case scenarios, SRM is a supplement to rapid and deep emissions cuts. 

Positive tipping points can help us reach net zero

In contrast to climate tipping points, positive tipping points – otherwise known as positive socio-economic tipping points – occur when a set of conditions is reached that can accelerate the deployment of technologies or practices to achieve net zero. For instance, a new technology begins to outcompete an old technology. Sales of the new technology facilitate further development, which in turn reduces its costs, allowing the new technology to become widespread and replace the old. An example of this is the rapid development of renewable energy, where over just 10 years, solar and wind technologies have become the cheapest source of power in many parts of the world.   

Targeted interventions in socioeconomic, technological and political systems can be used to advance climate change mitigation, and strategic investment can help bring down the costs of technologies that facilitate decarbonisation. For example, oil and gas companies have been accused of having overly optimistic projections of long-term oil prices, resulting in an inflated picture of future economic performance. Updating the accounting standards or disclosure guidelines for these companies could cause prices to decrease, thereby curbing investment and catalysing investment into renewables. 

The focus on these positive tipping points should not distract us from the need to rapidly decrease emissions. Rather, these positive tipping points should be viewed in the context of driving strategic interventions to encourage decarbonisation.

This briefing was originally published in December 2023. This updated version was published in October 2025.

Net-zero progress overblown by inconsistencies in land carbon accounting

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Key points:

  • Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) – which outline national governments’ commitments to emissions reduction – account for land-based carbon removal using different methods to the IPCC. 
  • When the methods are harmonised, NDCs reduce the budget for limiting warming within Paris Agreement goals by 15-18%, equivalent to bringing forward the deadline for net zero by five to seven years. 
  • This means governments need to set far more ambitious mitigation targets to achieve net zero as defined by the IPCC, than covered by their current methods.
  • Differences in how emissions are reported from managed and unmanaged land in NDCs compared to the IPCC introduces opportunities for bias or misrepresentation, obscuring countries’ true climate impacts.
  • The amount of land designated for land-based removals in NDC pledges – about 1 billion hectares or the equivalent of around two-thirds of global arable land – is also impossible without complex trade-offs for food security, biodiversity and human livelihoods.
  • IPCC models give unrealistically optimistic estimates of land-based removal potential because they don’t consider land availability constraints, conflicts and human rights issues, or the erosion of land carbon sinks.
  • By comparison, a recent analysis modelling the social and ecological risks of land-based carbon removal potentially reduces the amount of land available for carbon removal by up to 79% compared to IPCC estimates.   
  • This discrepancy suggests that status quo estimates of land-based carbon removal used to inform global and national climate ambition may be overblown and misleading.

Emissions reduction in NDCs

Under the Paris Agreement, adopted in 2015, countries around the world agreed to submit climate action plans called Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) every five years starting in 2020 to address greenhouse gas emissions.1Each new NDC submitted needs to be more ambitious than the last. NDCs translate global agreements into specific national targets and are the key mechanism for countries to show their commitment to reducing emissions – through, for example, phasing out fossil fuels, deploying renewable energy, decarbonising industries and electrifying transport.

Another approach to reducing emissions involves harnessing the ability of landscapes to capture and store carbon – a greenhouse gas inventory sector referred to as land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).2LULUCF excludes non-carbon-dioxide agricultural emissions, such as methane from livestock. Natural landscapes around the world store significant amounts of carbon in plants and soil – global forests absorb an average of 7.6 billion metric tonnes of carbon dioxide per year, equivalent to around one and a half times the annual emissions of the US. 

In the LULUCF component of their NDCs, countries pledge to plant new forests (afforestation), restore degraded forests (reforestation), protect existing forests and implement sustainable forest management and soil conservation techniques. To a much lesser degree, they also project the use of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), whereby trees, crops or algae will, in theory, be grown to capture carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and then converted into energy, such as biofuels, with the emissions stored below ground.

These forms of carbon dioxide removal are appealing to governments and industries because they don’t necessitate immediate, large-scale changes to a country’s industrial and energy sectors.  However, although most IPCC pathways that aim to limit warming to Paris Agreement targets of 1.5°C or 2°C include carbon sequestration in land sinks, enhancing these sinks alone is insufficient to achieve the necessary carbon reductions. Ambitious and timely NDC commitments this decade could close the emissions gap needed to keep temperatures within targets but require a rapid shift away from traditional fossil fuels in addition to land-based removal. 

Due to several scientific and political reasons outlined below, the potential contribution of land carbon sequestration to emissions reductions is significantly overestimated in NDCs and scientific models. This overestimation renders the commitments outlined in NDCs unrealistic and endangers the goals of the Paris Agreement. While several publications have explored this issue, no comprehensive, easy-to-read resource has been created to synthesise the findings. The goal of this briefing is to provide a concise summary of the various reasons NDCs disproportionately rely on land for carbon removal and to outline the potential implications for the Paris Agreement.

Land carbon fluxes are the most uncertain component of the global carbon budget

Countries annually report their progress on the emissions reductions pledged in their NDCs through National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (NGHGIs), following guidelines established by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 

Collective progress towards the Paris Agreement goals is assessed every five years in the Global Stocktake, which provides benchmarks for countries for their NDC submissions. If NDCs are insufficient or lack ambition, there is a significant risk that the world will exceed the Global Carbon Budget – the total amount of carbon dioxide that can be emitted while keeping within global temperature targets, leading to temperature increases beyond the targets agreed upon in the Paris Agreement.

Because of the complex interactions of various human-driven effects on greenhouse gas fluxes from land – such as deforestation for agriculture – land carbon fluxes are the most uncertain component of the global carbon budget. At the national level, accurately tracking changes in forests and other land uses is also challenging due to variations in the quality and scope of land-use data, different reporting methods used, and difficulties in separating the influence of humans and climate on the environment as well as in reporting carbon movements in different ecosystems, with estimates relying significantly on simplified models. This means that estimates of emissions from LULUCF are less precise than those from fossil fuels, which are grounded in empirical data.

As a result, the Paris Agreement allows flexibility for countries to determine how they account for emissions and removals from the LULUCF sector, such as the use of different accounting and monitoring methods or different definitions of land-use types in their climate targets. In addition, developing countries are encouraged to gradually adopt economy-wide emission reduction targets depending on their economic and developmental needs. In comparison, developed countries are required to specify a specific, measurable and economy-wide reduction in overall emissions – for example, a 40% emissions reduction compared to 1990 levels.

NDC net-zero may not mean net-zero global emissions

The use of different carbon accounting methods for land-based removal between NDCs and model-based methods, such as those used by the IPCC, makes it hard to measure the emissions and temperature outcomes of current national commitments under the Paris Agreement. 

While both NGHGIs and the models used by the IPCC to assess the pathways necessary to achieve specific climate targets aim to identify greenhouse gas fluxes from land, they differ in how they account for the role of human activity in these fluxes. This affects the extent to which each approach attributes these fluxes to a country’s mitigation efforts.3One outcome is that estimates of land-use change due to afforestation or reforestation are in close agreement between NGHGIs and IPCC models, but differ for managed forests.

This is especially problematic for countries that rely heavily on the land sector and forest management to achieve their NDCs, leading to over- or under-estimating true emissions and creating inconsistencies between national inventories and the global carbon budget.

A recent analysis illustrated how current NGHGIs for NDCs can make national emissions appear lower than the method applied by the IPCC in assessing alignment with the Paris Agreement. It concluded that once the methods are harmonised – such as by adjusting fluxes from land use – our overall carbon budget is reduced by 15-18%, which is equivalent to bringing forward the deadline for net zero up by five to seven years. What this means is that governments need to set far more ambitious mitigation targets to achieve net zero, as defined by the IPCC.

Unmanaged land is a blind spot in carbon accounting

Discrepancies in the LULUCF emissions estimates between IPCC models and NDCs arise partly because countries are not required to report emissions from unmanaged land – such as emissions from wildfires in remote forests where human intervention is minimal or absent – as these are considered natural rather than human-caused emissions. This has resulted in some highly forested countries designating large areas of forest as unmanaged. But as emissions are still released from these unmanaged areas, excluding them leads to an incomplete picture of the carbon cycle and a country’s total emissions.

This has introduced opportunities for bias or misrepresentation. For example, Canada does not include emissions from forest wildfires in its inventory, as around 34% of its forests are classified as ‘unmanaged’. This means that emissions from natural disturbances, such as wildfires, in these forests are not accounted for.4The Canadian government does not have a database for the net carbon flux in unmanaged lands in the country, making it difficult to track carbon emissions and evaluate whether Canada’s landmass is sequestering enough carbon to offset its emissions. Additionally, fires within its managed forests are also classified as natural disturbances rather than human-caused disturbances, and so are also excluded from the inventory.

This oversight leaves significant emissions unaccounted for, obscuring Canada’s true climate impact. Around 114 million metric tonnes of emissions was excluded per year from its inventory between 2005 and 2021 – equivalent to around half the total carbon dioxide emissions from gas in Canada in 2023.5This is compounded by the fact that Canada classifies removals from mature forests as human-caused. In 2023, a year of record-breaking wildfires, natural disturbances released an estimated 640 million metric tonnes of carbon from Canada’s forests, which is more than Canada’s carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels in 2022.

Managed land can lead to overestimates of climate progress 

Flexible guidelines also mean that there is variation in what constitutes managed and unmanaged land. Under the Kyoto Protocol adopted in 1997, countries agreed to count greenhouse gas emissions and removals from land activities towards their climate targets only if they result from direct human actions. However, the IPCC later noted that as human activities and environmental changes are closely linked, they are not practical to separate in greenhouse gas inventories – for example, forest loss from both logging and climate-induced drought. Therefore, ‘managed land’ was introduced as a proxy for human effects in NDC guidelines, with all greenhouse gas fluxes occurring on managed land being counted regardless of whether they are driven by humans or the environment. This is not a feature of the IPCC’s models that are used for estimating carbon fluxes, which clearly distinguish between emissions from managed and unmanaged forests. 

This means that countries can classify natural forests as managed land in their NGHGIs, enabling them to report natural carbon removal as emissions reductions. Including natural land as managed land can also give a misleading picture of a country’s actual climate efforts by overestimating carbon removals and making progress seem greater than it is. This is further aggravated by the fact that some countries – particularly those that are afforded flexibility in emissions accounting – also report implausibly high forest sinks, have incomplete assessments or have inconsistent estimates across reports. Some forest-dense countries are claiming credit for the carbon that their unmanaged forests are sequestering, using this as a means to justify fossil fuel extraction while also making net-zero claims.

Land-based removal plans are unrealistic

The lack of stringent accounting guidelines has led to a significant over-allocation of land for carbon removal in NDC pledges, beyond what is technically feasible or safe. The Land Gap Report calculated that there is about 1 billion hectares of land for land-based carbon removal included in NDC pledges to 2060 – equivalent to around two-thirds of the world’s arable land and a land area bigger than China. Such large-scale commitments would be impossible without catastrophic impacts, including the displacement of food production and threats to biodiversity. 

Pledges for land-based removal in NDCs rely heavily on planting new forests or plantations, with about half of the land proposed for carbon removal in NDCs requiring changes in present land use. Land-use change is already the biggest driver of biodiversity loss, which is essential for ecosystem resilience and the provision of ecosystem services such as food and water security and carbon sequestration.6Agricultural land is already under significant pressure from rising global food demand, expanding populations and the need to balance land use with biodiversity conservation and climate mitigation efforts. A 2022 analysis estimated that afforestation and bioenergy production could place an additional 41.9 million people at risk of hunger by 2050 due to higher food prices and displacement of agricultural land

In addition to the risks around increased competition for land use, estimates suggest that the ‘safe limit’ for expanding agriculture has already been passed, resulting in ecosystem degradation. Figure 1 shows that global cropland already exceeds the planetary boundary for sustainable land use, with land-use changes in pledges and current and projected BECCS projects adding nearly an extra two-thirds to the current land-use change area. There is very little land left that can be used for carbon dioxide removal without complex trade-offs. To be genuinely effective, carbon removals plans need to factor in ecological limits and support biodiversity.

Figure 1. Land for mitigation crosses planetary boundary thresholds
Source: The Land Gap Report, 2022.

Even if the estimates of removal potential from land in NDCs were technically feasible, a 2023 analysis calculated that current NDCs are insufficient for meeting Paris Agreement targets – actions outlined in NDCs are due to result in warming of 2.5-2.9°C by 2100.

Limitations in IPCC models of future land carbon removal 

While NDCs focus on near-term actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) used by the IPCC project long-term scenarios for achieving climate goals. IAMs assess the interactions between climate, energy, land use and economic systems to understand the long-term implications of different policy choices and emissions trajectories, offering different pathways that illustrate how various strategies can achieve climate targets. IPCC pathways offer a framework for countries to set their emissions reduction targets and to align their NDCs to demonstrate their commitment to international climate agreements.

However, recent research argues that the methodologies in IPCC models are over-relying on land-based removal by building in assumptions about land use that are unrealistic. The models do not reflect real-world conditions such as land availability, lack nuance by failing to capture the complexities of human systems and ecosystems, and expose vulnerable communities to avoidable risks. As IPCC reports are the primary mechanism informing the UNFCCC, inappropriate models have the potential to lead to misguided policies and ineffective climate action, ultimately hindering efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and meet international climate goals.

Hidden assumptions mean models over-rely on land

A key challenge with the representation of land-based carbon removal in IAMs is the assumption that significant emissions generated in the near term will be offset in the distant future through decades of land-based removal. 

Because of their emphasis on cost-effectiveness, least-cost pathways and supply-side technologies, IAMs often assume that large-scale BECCS and afforestation projects can be implemented easily, without considering competing demands for land. This leads to overestimations of the amount of land available for future carbon removal in the LULUCF sector. To demonstrate this, a 2018 study assessed the rate at which land uses change in IAMs and found that in scenarios limiting warming to 2°C by 2100, cropland for BECCS is projected to expand by 8.8 million hectares per year. This expansion rate is more than three times as fast as the historical expansion of soybean, which is currently the fastest-growing commodity crop and a significant driver of deforestation in the Amazon. 

IAMs also have idealised assumptions that do not fully consider the technical, social and economic barriers to scaling up such efforts, such as land tenure issues, governance challenges, the potential for conflict over land use​ and human rights issues, including rights to food, water and a healthy environment. 

IAMs are built on assumptions of ‘empty land’ that do not consider nomadic or Indigenous lifestyles or non-forest ecosystems, such as savannas, and also broadly assume that forests can be converted to cropland for bioenergy. BECCS only features in the NDCs of seven countries, totalling 80 million hectares of land, but it is much more prominent in modelled IPCC pathways, with a median land demand of 199 million hectares (ranging from 56 million to 482 million hectares) in 1.5°C-consistent pathways. However, given such a significant land demand for BECCS from a small number of countries in current NDCs, a land demand of 199 million hectares in future pathways is likely to be an underestimate if BECCS becomes as widespread as in modelled pathways.

The models have also been criticised by researchers for being opaque, with specific value judgments about the future buried in the mathematics of the model. By assuming that the financial costs of mitigation technologies will fall in the future – through applying a high discount rate in the model – solutions like BECCS, which has not yet been proven to work at scale, can appear more cost-effective than proven, readily implementable actions. As BECCS is considered ‘carbon neutral’ in the models, many IAMs also favour large-scale BECCS over renewable technologies to meet the requirements of one of the more ambitious climate pathways that assumes significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.7The RCP 2.6 emissions pathway in the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report.

A 2024 analysis found that a high discount rate in IAM models favours high overshoot scenarios – where global average temperatures temporarily exceed a warming target before dropping back down to, or below, the target in the future – rather than scenarios that would mitigate long-term warming effects. This is because of the short timescale over which economic adaptation is assessed in the models. These high overshoot scenarios result in a heavy reliance on land-based carbon dioxide removal in the future as emissions are not reduced fast enough to limit warming. Overshoot is estimated to be cheaper than longer-term solutions and is therefore favoured by the models. However, overshoot comes with various risks and uncertainties, such as species extinction and ecosystem collapse, and has potentially irreversible consequences. Overshoot also raises moral concerns, as climate-related impacts disproportionately affect vulnerable populations, especially in low-income countries.

Reliance on land carbon removal raises sustainability risks

A recent analysis proposed thresholds for land-based sequestration that account for social and ecological risks, thereby developing realistic and sustainable estimates for land-based CDR while accounting for environmental and resource limits (Table 1).​ The analysis estimates that the sustainable potential of LULUCF measures for carbon removal, including limited reforestation, forest restoration, reduced forest harvest, agroforestry and silvopasture, and BECCS is  3.3 billion-3.8 billion tonnes per year.8Values obtained from Supplementary Table S1 in the report.

The study finds that at high sustainability risk – the point at which multiple ecological and social sustainability limits are likely to be overstepped with potentially irreversible consequences – the value is 6.4 billion tonnes per year. These estimates of sustainable – and hence feasible – removal potential are more conservative than the average estimates in the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report – 15.6 billion metric tonnes of carbon dioxide per year between 2020 and 2050 for BECCS, forest and ecosystem protection, restoration and management, and agroforestry, as well as the Emissions Gap Report which included estimates of 5.9 billion tonnes per year by 2030 and 8.4 billion tonnes by 2035 for forestry-related land management,9Values obtained from Table 6.2: Sectoral mitigation potentials in 2030 and 2035. and the State of CDR Report at 7 billion-9 billion metric tonnes by 2050 from forestry-related removal, BECCS, ecosystem restoration and novel technologies such as direct air capture. Compared to IPCC estimates, a low sustainability risk scenario potentially reduces land available for carbon removal by around 79%.10This is a rough calculation assuming a direct comparison between land-use footprint in the IPCC technical mitigation potential and the analysis in Deprez et al. (2024) and was calculated as the difference between the IPCC estimates of 15.6 billion metric tonnes and the lower sustainability risk estimate of 3.3 billion tonnes.

Overall, the greatest risks are linked to scenarios with slower emission reductions and higher reliance on future carbon removal technologies. This highlights the need to reduce emissions quickly and significantly and not rely on future carbon removals – including from land – in order to avoid the worst outcomes.

Table 1. Sustainability risks for land-based carbon dioxide removal for the five IPCC Illustrative Mitigation Pathways compatible with the Paris Agreement.
Data source: Sustainability limits needed for CO2 removal, 2024.  
A/R refers to afforestation/reforestation. BECCS & A/R larger footprint assumes a low capture rate and conversion efficiency, while BECCS & A/R medium footprint assumes a medium capture rate and conversion efficiency.
Models do not account for land’s declining ability to store carbon

As IAMs are global in scale, their assumptions are simplified and generalised, and therefore they can miss key local dynamics, leading to ill-suited projections at the regional level​.11The IPCC recommends that these models are interpreted in the context of their assumptions. IAMs often oversimplify ecosystems, which do not always behave linearly in response to human activities or climate change. For instance, land-use changes can trigger feedback loops that are difficult to capture accurately in simplified models. A 2024 analysis found that IAMs tend to underestimate the risks associated with the interaction between wildfire disturbances and climate change, particularly regarding their impact on the ability of forests to sequester carbon, risking an overly-optimistic estimate of how much carbon forests can remove and store, and inaccurate predictions of future emissions​.

This is significant because land and ocean sinks are increasingly absorbing less carbon with rising temperatures. In higher emissions scenarios, the interaction between climate change and the carbon cycle becomes more uncertain due to the risk of positive feedback loops – such as forest fires and permafrost thaw – amplifying climate change impacts. These types of ecosystem responses are not fully integrated into models simply because of their sheer complexity. While models have tended to predict a slow erosion of natural carbon sinks over the next 100 years or so, other estimates suggest that the impact from feedback loops is happening much sooner than anticipated.

  • 1
    Each new NDC submitted needs to be more ambitious than the last.
  • 2
    LULUCF excludes non-carbon-dioxide agricultural emissions, such as methane from livestock.
  • 3
    One outcome is that estimates of land-use change due to afforestation or reforestation are in close agreement between NGHGIs and IPCC models, but differ for managed forests.
  • 4
    The Canadian government does not have a database for the net carbon flux in unmanaged lands in the country, making it difficult to track carbon emissions and evaluate whether Canada’s landmass is sequestering enough carbon to offset its emissions.
  • 5
    This is compounded by the fact that Canada classifies removals from mature forests as human-caused.
  • 6
    Agricultural land is already under significant pressure from rising global food demand, expanding populations and the need to balance land use with biodiversity conservation and climate mitigation efforts. A 2022 analysis estimated that afforestation and bioenergy production could place an additional 41.9 million people at risk of hunger by 2050 due to higher food prices and displacement of agricultural land
  • 7
    The RCP 2.6 emissions pathway in the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report.
  • 8
    Values obtained from Supplementary Table S1 in the report.
  • 9
    Values obtained from Table 6.2: Sectoral mitigation potentials in 2030 and 2035.
  • 10
    This is a rough calculation assuming a direct comparison between land-use footprint in the IPCC technical mitigation potential and the analysis in Deprez et al. (2024) and was calculated as the difference between the IPCC estimates of 15.6 billion metric tonnes and the lower sustainability risk estimate of 3.3 billion tonnes.
  • 11
    The IPCC recommends that these models are interpreted in the context of their assumptions.

Principles for just and equitable oil and gas phase out

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This paper was produced in collaboration with Strategic Perspectives.It intends to contribute to the next steps of the global debate of how to transition away from fossil fuels as agreed at COP28 by proposing scenarios, recommendations and reflections on targets for phasing out the extraction of oil and gas.

Upcoming meetings of the G7 and G20 can discuss what a fossil fuel phase out in “a just, orderly and equitable manner” means, building momentum for countries to include fossil fuel phase out commitments in their updated climate targets, ahead of the climate summit in Brazil in 2025.

Key points:

  • Feasible 1.5°C scenarios require both oil and gas production to decline by 65% by 2050 compared to 2020 levels, but current projected production is set to be 260% and 210%, respectively, above what would be required to keep warming below this.
  • Orderly transition plans for the sector are long overdue, but are the natural next step after the COP28 consensus to transition away from fossil fuels in Dubai.
  • Countries and companies aiming to fully use their oil and gas resources chase diminishing returns and risk USD 1.4 trillion in stranded assets.
  • By delaying a managed decline of fossil fuel production, countries are increasing the costs of achieving a just and equitable transition.
  • Instead of competing for the perceived benefits of oil and gas extraction, countries can collaborate to agree on principles for a just and equitable fossil fuel phase out that reduces the economic and social impacts of any delays.
  • Multilateral forums such as the G7 and G20 are best placed to provide the vision and leadership on how to phase out oil and gas production. COP30 can become a significant milestone to show what a just and equitable transition looks like at a global level.
  • Most approaches to achieve a fossil fuel phase out share significant commonalities around the principles of justice and alignment with the Paris climate agreement and climate science.
  • With USD 2.4 trillion green transition investment required annually through 2030 in emerging and developing economies (other than China), climate finance is the key enabler of phase out planning.
  • All countries should halt the opening of new oil and gas fields while a coordinated global phase out of fossil fuels is negotiated.

The scientific urgency to act

The scientific evidence is unequivocal, the next years are crucial to keep the 1.5°C temperature goal enshrined in the Paris Agreement within reach. The UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has stated clearly that global greenhouse gas emissions need to peak before 2025 and be reduced by 43% by 2030.

Fossil fuels are the major contributors to global warming, a fact finally recognised by all countries at COP28, which agreed to “Transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade, so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science”.1UNFCCC “Decision CMA.5, Outcome of the First Global Stocktake.” UNFCCC, 2023.

There is a clear urgency to set transition pathways to drastically reduce fossil fuels: Projected cumulative future CO2 emissions from existing fossil fuel infrastructure would already exceed the remaining 1.5°C carbon budget, unless they are abated.2IPPC, “Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report: Summary for Policymakers.” IPCC, 2023.

Business as usual is thus not an option. To stay within a 1.5°C carbon budget, 40% of ‘developed’ reserves of coal, oil and gas would need to be left unextracted. Developed oil and gas fields alone account for more than four fifths of the 1.5°C budget.3Trout, K. et al. “Existing fossil fuel extraction would warm the world beyond 1.5°C.” Environmental Research Letters, 17, no. 6 (2022).

Oil and gas production should decline by 15% and 30%, respectively, by 2030 and 65% by 2050, compared to 2020 levels, according to analysis of feasible 1.5°C scenarios by the International Institute for Sustainable Development.4Bois von Kursk et al, “Navigating energy transitions: Mapping the road to 1.5°C.” IISD, 2022.

Fig. 1: Oil and gas production from new and existing fields vs a 1.5°C aligned pathway

Existing fossil fuel extraction projects are already sufficient to meet demand in scenarios where warming is limited to 1.5°C.5Green F.et al. “No new fossil fuel projects: The norm we need”, Science, May 2024. Any new oil and gas extraction projects would exceed this, putting the temperature goal of the Paris climate agreement at risk.

Unless meaningful policy measures and finance decisions are taken, governments could produce around 110% more fossil fuels in 2030 than would be consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C.6SEI, Climate Analytics, E3G, IISD, and UNEP. “The Production Gap: Phasing down or phasing up? Top fossil fuel producers plan even more extraction despite climate promises.” UNEP, 2023. This makes it evident that current trajectories for oil and gas production are completely incompatible with the goals of the Paris Agreement. Instead, all countries can be encouraged to set out their plans to transition away from fossil fuels in their next round of updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), due in 2025.

Without action, oil and gas production is forecast to be 29% and 82% higher, respectively, than the median 1.5°C pathway in 2030. By 2050, the respective percentages will grow to 260% and 210%.

Fig. 2: Oil and gas production forecasts and scenarios

Defining just, orderly and equitable transition pathways is thus imperative. This discussion is happening at a time when extreme climate events are breaking records, making it evident to citizens and leaders that climate action is inevitable and urgent. These extreme climate events affect vulnerable communities the most and become a great obstacle in reducing inequalities.

The economics continue to be made to favour oil and gas production and consumption. Global fossil fuel subsidies amounted to USD 1.6 trillion in 2022, according to the OECD and IISD.7OECD & IISD “Fossil Fuel Subsidy Tracker.” Accessed June 2024. It is high time to implement the agreement at COP28 to “Phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that do not address energy poverty or just transitions, as soon as possible”.8UNFCCC “Decision CMA.5, Outcome of the First Global Stocktake.” UNFCCC, 2023.

A transition away from fossil fuels is still hindered by countries each trying to benefit from their resources the longest rather than working towards a collectively managed transition. But this approach is misguided as the economic benefits of fossil fuel production will be limited and diminishing as the energy transition accelerates. If all countries seek to maximise oil and gas production in the face of falling demand, the economic and social costs of the transition will increase.

Oil firms and investors also face significant risks from the energy transition, with the total value of stranded assets under a scenario where warming is limited to 2°C estimated at USD 1.4 trillion.9Semieniuk, G., Holden, P.B., Mercure, JF. et al. “Stranded fossil-fuel assets translate to major losses for investors in advanced economies.” Nat. Clim. Chang. 12, 532–538 (2022).

Instead of competing for the perceived benefits of oil and gas extraction, countries can collaborate to agree on principles for a just and equitable fossil fuel phase out that reduces the economic and social impacts of any delays. Without coordination and effective policies, these climate impacts will end up being disproportionately borne by the poorest, most marginalised and least able to transition. Some initiatives such as the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance and the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty have proposed approaches to this end.

Multilateral forums such as the G7 and G20 can discuss what a fossil fuel phase out in “a just, orderly and equitable manner” means, building momentum for countries to include fossil fuel phase out commitments in their updated climate targets, ahead of the climate summit in Brazil in 2025. Following the scientific evidence would require immediately halting the opening of new oil and gas fields as a first step.

Methodologies to define a just and equitable transition

A variety of approaches have been identified to achieve a fossil fuel phase out, many of which share significant commonalities around the principles of justice, fairness and alignment with the Paris climate agreement and climate science.10While broad agreement on the importance of an equitable phase out between countries, different methodologies have been proposed for assessing the responsibilities and capabilities of individual countries. Proposed criteria include each country’s development according to the Human Development Index, accrued benefit from past fossil fuels production, historical cumulative per-capita production, GDP per capita, and share of GDP per capita derived from non-oil and gas sectors. See Calverley, C. & Anderson K. “Phaseout Pathways for Fossil Fuel Production Within Paris-compliant Carbon Budgets”, University of Manchester, 2022; Civil Society Equity Review, “An Equitable Phase Out of Fossil Fuel Extraction”, Civil Society Equity Review, 2023; Muttitt, G. and Kartha, S. “Equity, climate justice and fossil fuel extraction: principles for a managed phase out”, Climate Policy, vol 20 (2020); Pye, S. et al “An equitable redistribution of unburnable carbon”, Nature Communications, volume 11 (2020). The majority cite one of the foundational principles of the UNFCCC process – that of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.

As an example, assessing countries by their ability to finance the transition – measured in GDP per capita and the extent to which government income comes from oil – shows that countries like the UK, US and Canada would face relatively low challenges to transition (according to these criteria) and have significant financial capacity for it. Whereas countries like Iraq, Congo and Equatorial Guinea face significant challenges and have little financial resources to mitigate the impacts of the transition (see Figure 3).

Fig. 3: Transition capacity of selected countries by GDP per capita and oil share of government revenue

A recent study, endorsed by over 200 organisations including Climate Action Network International and the International Trade Union Congress produced a comprehensive approach to assess which countries are least socially dependent on fossil fuel extraction. The study – the Civil Society Equity Review11Civil Society Equity Review, “An Equitable Phase Out of Fossil Fuel Extraction.” Civil Society Equity Review, 2023. – identifies three criteria:

  1. the share of primary energy consumption that is met from domestically extracted fossil fuels,
  2. the share of government revenues that comes from fossil fuel extraction, and
  3. the share of the workforce employed in fossil fuel extraction.

Underpinning this analysis is the principle that the pace of the phase out should be driven by reducing the social costs and maximising the social benefits of transition, rather than purely by a country’s stage of development or historic responsibility.

The two tables below highlight options of what just, orderly and equitable transition pathways could look like. They can form the basis for a discussion in multilateral forums such as the G7 and G20 and UNFCCC on what criteria should be used to assess a just phase out of fossil fuel production.


Table 1: Equitable oil and gas phase out assessed on country’s non-oil and gas GDP per capita
Table 2: Equitable oil and gas phase out using the Civil Society Equity review framework (selected countries)

The role of financing in the transition

As well as defining what just and equitable approaches mean, agreement on the financial support to get there would be critical to a successful implementation. Multilateral conversations can therefore focus on developing principles and pathways that are just and equitable, matched by financial support for those countries that need it. This would reflect countries’ capacities and constraints, the necessity to provide finance, as well as predictability for workers and communities.

A range of proposals are on the table on climate finance, among them the necessity for Developed Countries (defined as Annex I countries under the UNFCCC) to provide support and the suggestion that countries with the greatest ability to pay (defined as those with per capita capacity above the global average) contribute. More recently, there have been calls for the fossil fuel industry to pay for climate finance, as proposed by the EU, and the idea of a fossil fuel levy by incoming COP29 presidency Azerbaijan.12John Ainger, Jennifer A Dlouhy and Akshat Rathi, (2024, May 30) “COP29 Host Azerbaijan Working on Proposal to Levy Fossil Fuels.” Bloomberg News.

A broader reform of financial systems that includes the international financial institutions is also under way – and will be critical – but progress has been too slow given the resources needed. The economic and financial opportunities resulting from a transition to climate neutrality can only be unlocked in low-income countries with access to sufficient finance and if debt no longer stands in the way of sustainable development.

The scale of existing climate finance is estimated at USD 1.3 trillion annually, according to the Climate Policy Initiative.13Buchner, B. et al, “Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2023.” Climate Policy Initiative, 2023. This is still less than the USD 1.5 trillion paid in direct fossil fuel subsidies among 82 of the largest economies in 2022 (OECD).14OECD, “Cost of Support Measures for Fossil Fuels Almost Doubled in 2022 in Response to Soaring Energy Prices.” OECD, 2023. It is also just over half of the USD 2.4 trillion green transition investment required annually through 2030 in emerging and developing countries (other than China), according to the UN’s high level expert group on climate finance.15Independent High-Level Expert Group on Climate Finance, “Finance for climate action: Scaling up investment for climate and development.” LSE, 2022.

The G20 and G7 can play important roles in the process of creating financial mechanisms to allow low-income and vulnerable countries to decarbonise their energy systems and adapt to the impacts of an increasingly extreme climate. COP29 should result in a new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance that addresses mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage.16UNFCCC, “From Billions to Trillions: Setting a New Goal on Climate Finance.” UNFCCC, 2024.

Timelines for planning the energy transition

Managing local needs and collective action requires a combined bottom-up and top-down approach to define a just, orderly and equitable transition away from fossil fuels. The run-up to COP30 is the time to make progress on setting out pathways to transition away from fossil fuels. The G7 and G20 summits in June and November 2024, respectively, offer key touchpoints to lay the foundations for global action on the transition away from fossil fuels. These summits offer the opportunity for major economies to signal their intent to phase out oil and gas production, and begin building international consensus around how to ensure that it is just and equitable.

Agreements at these summits could lay the groundwork for a bottom-up approach, where countries commit to end the expansion of oil and gas extraction, set fossil fuel phase out dates as well as demand reduction goals for 2035 in their next NDCs, to be submitted 9-12 months ahead of COP30.

The top-down approach can be guidance on what “just, orderly and equitable” means internationally, building on the progress made through countries’ individual commitments. It is vital that new, fossil-free economic models are established globally and alternative income sources found for fossil-dependent economies. This approach should also aim to address any shortcomings in bottom-up targets and ensure these are aligned with what is required to limit warming to 1.5°C and achieve a just transition.

The G7 and G20 have an opportunity to give an impetus to this debate, not least as the high-income countries among their members have a historic responsibility to lead on emissions reduction and provide financial support. Their leadership could pave the way for a broader debate and action in the UNFCCC context.

Leadership needed from the G7 and G20

Widespread support for immediate government action to address climate change exists in most countries, with 71% of people in G20 countries agreeing that action is necessary. Concerns about escalating weather extremes, care for future generations, and dissatisfaction with government inaction are significant elements of messages that drive support for climate action. Research indicates majority support for policies like ending fracking (61%) and phasing out fossil fuels (56%) across G20 countries.17Potential Energy “Later is Too Late.” Potential Energy, 2023.

With sufficient global leadership, societal support can be built on the imperative of phasing out fossil fuels to avert current and future climate impacts to protect people and nature. Progressing the debate will be facilitated by global leadership on:

  • Affirming the scientific finding that any new oil and gas projects are incompatible with and threatening the 1.5°C warming goal.
  • Highlighting that both supply-side and demand-side policies need to contribute to a transition away from fossil fuel use, in line with science.
  • Recognising the IEA Net Zero Emissions scenario findings that a number of higher-cost projects would need to be retired before the end of their commercial life due to falling demand in the 2030s.18IEA “Net Zero Roadmap: A Global Pathway to Keep the 1.5°C Goal in Reach.” IEA, 2023.
  • Acknowledging that the UNFCCC must play a vital role in agreeing on terms for a just, orderly and equitable transition away from fossil fuels, in line with climate science, based on principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities; supporting just transitions for workforce; reducing extraction fastest where social costs of transition are least and ensuring respect for human rights and biodiversity.

Furthermore, in terms of practical steps, the G7 and G20 can play a crucial leadership role by committing to:

  • Ending the licensing of new coal, gas and oil projects,
  • Setting clear end dates for coal, gas and oil use per sector,
  • Committing to phasing out coal by 2030 (G7) or 2035 (developing countries) and setting out how much demand and supply will be reduced for coal, gas and oil by 2035 in their upcoming NDCs,
  • Supporting other countries on their just and orderly transition away from fossil fuels,
  • Phasing out fossil fuel subsidies as soon as possible, as agreed at COP28,
  • Showing leadership as the G7 on the overall finance reform to accelerate a just energy transition in low-income countries, especially through access to renewable energy,
  • Using the G20 to set out concrete steps on the financial reforms and financing mechanisms required to share the costs of the transition fairly, committing to scaling up finance as a matter of urgency with tangible outcomes, including through innovative sources of finance such as a tax on fossil fuel companies’ revenues.

Towards a science-based definition of ‘unabated’ fossil fuels

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Key points:

  • Unabated fossil fuels refers to the use of coal, oil and gas without substantial efforts to reduce the emissions produced throughout their life cycle.
  • However, there is no rigorous definition of the term that is widely agreed on.
  • Despite this, the term ‘unabated’ in relation to fossil fuels has become central to international negotiations at the G7, G20 and UN climate summits, and is set to be a key point of debate at COP28.
  • Without a rigorous definition, the use of inadequate technologies and weak policies on abatement could fail to curb fossil fuel emissions, undermining global efforts to limit temperature rises.
  • A science-based definition of abatement should include near-total capture of emissions, permanent storage of captured carbon dioxide, the near-total elimination of upstream and transport emissions, and rigorous monitoring and reporting processes for fossil fuel companies and projects.
  • To limit warming to 1.5°C, the use of fossil fuels that do not meet these stringent requirements must be rapidly and substantially reduced to a minimum by 2050.

Abated vs unabated fossil fuels

Abated fossil fuels refer to the use of coal, oil and gas where the emissions from their extraction are minimised, and emissions from their use are almost completely prevented from entering the atmosphere through technologies like carbon capture and storage. Unabated fossil fuels are the use of coal, oil and natural gas where this does not take place – which currently account for 99.9% of fossil fuel emissions.1Global CCS capacity represents 0.1% of global fossil fuel emissions https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/ccus-projects-explorer & https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/22/files/GCP_CarbonBudget_2022.pdf.

At this year’s COP28 summit, the term ‘unabated’ is set to be key to negotiations on phasing out fossil fuels. The concept was first used in major international agreements on climate and energy two and half years ago, and since then it has been mentioned repeatedly in G7, G20 and UN Framework Convention on Climate Change agreements and communiques. Despite this, the term has not been officially defined, and countries have signed agreements that refer to unabated fossil fuels without agreeing on its meaning.

The absence of a clear definition presents a huge threat to efforts towards mitigating climate change, and risks a situation where governments and companies pursue policies that are far removed from what is needed to achieve the Paris Agreement goal of limiting warming to 1.5°C.

What is carbon capture and storage?

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology separates carbon dioxide from other gases, and then transports and stores it. CCS is mostly used to refer to the removal of carbon dioxide from large single-source emitters, such as power stations or industrial facilities.

‘Unabated’ fossil fuels in international diplomacy

2021

The term ‘unabated’ was first used in major climate and energy negotiations in the concluding statement of the G7 climate and energy ministers meeting in the UK in May 2021, when governments committed to end direct support for unabated thermal coal power. The same promise was made by the G20 in October that year. At COP26, 39 countries went further and committed to end direct international support for all unabated fossil fuel energy projects. The Glasgow Climate Pact, summarising key agreements from COP26, called on countries to phase down unabated coal power for the first time.

2022

In 2022, building on the commitments from the previous year, G7 countries pledged to phase out generation of unabated coal power domestically, while G20 states agreed to accelerate the phase-down of unabated coal power. Ahead of the COP27 summit in Egypt, India said it wanted to expand the agreement made at COP26 and reach a deal on phasing down all unabated fossil fuels. This proposal gathered significant support from around 80 countries, including the EU, US, Canada and Australia. However, the final summit agreement only repeated the commitment from COP26 to accelerate the phase-down of unabated coal power, with Saudi Arabia and Russia reportedly strongly opposed to any broader deal on fossil fuels.

2023

This year, G7 countries committed to work towards ending the construction of new unabated coal fired power generation and to accelerate the phase-out of unabated fossil fuels. However, G20 countries failed to agree on a similar proposal to phase down all unabated fossil fuels – only agreeing to phase down unabated coal power.

Heading into COP28, the battle over unabated fossil fuels is now centre stage in the UN climate talks. This year’s COP President Sultan Al Jaber wants the summit to accelerate work that leads to an “energy system free of unabated fossil fuels in the middle of this century” and support “a responsible phase down of unabated fossil fuels”. The EU is backing this in its negotiating position for COP, recognising the need for a global phase-out of unabated fossil fuels. However, the bloc has noted that abatement technologies currently only exist at limited scale and should be used for hard to abate sectors. The US is slightly less committed, saying only that it aims for a ‘shift away’ from unabated fossil fuels rather than a phase-out. A coalition of 131 major global companies have also thrown their weight behind the phase-out of unabated fossil fuels.

The 16-country High Ambition Coalition is calling on governments to go further at COP28 and agree to a full phase-out of all fossil fuel production and use, noting that current abatement technologies will play a minor role in reducing emissions and they should not be used to delay climate action. At the other end of the spectrum, the same countries that blocked an agreement on an unabated fossil fuel phase-out at the G20 and last year’s COP – such as Saudi Arabia, Russia and China – could remain staunchly opposed to any reference to fossil fuels at COP28.

While there are significant gaps between the negotiating positions of countries heading to COP28, it is clear that debates on the phasing down or phasing out of fossil fuels, abated or unabated, will be central to negotiations.

Differing definitions of unabated fossil fuels

There are currently a range of differing definitions of ‘unabated’ fossil fuels:

  • Dictionary definitions highlight the breadth of potential interpretations of the term abatement, varying from a ‘reduction in the amount or degree’ to ‘putting an end to’.
  • US Special Envoy for Climate John Kerry has said that the term means “something different to different people” and that countries’ intentions aren’t all the same. In his view, abatement means “capturing the emissions to keep you on a track to reach the Paris goals. Very straightforward.”
  • The International Energy Agency (IEA) defines unabated fossil fuels as the use of those fuels for combustion without carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS).2CCUS includes the use of carbon technology where captured carbon dioxide is used, for example in other industrial processes, whereas CCS refers only to where captured carbon is stored.
  • The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines them as “fossil fuels produced and used without interventions that substantially reduce the amount of GHG emitted throughout the life cycle; for example, capturing 90% or more CO2 from power plants, or 50–80% of fugitive methane emissions from energy supply.”

Agreeing this definition in the IPCC report was itself controversial and contested. According to one of the IPCC report’s lead authors “A few [countries] came out very aggressively wanting this abated, unabated language in there right in front of fossil fuels, because otherwise, we just want a fossil fuel phase out or phase down. Fundamentally, it’s about a political collision between those parties that want to keep using fossil fuels and those parties that want to phase them out completely.”

The dangers of an ambiguous definition

An ambiguous definition of unabated fossil fuels could have huge implications for future warming, since fossil fuel emissions could be nearly completely halted or just reduced. On top of this, there are risks around the term allowing for low carbon capture rates or excluding upstream emissions.

Carbon capture rates

The IEA and Kerry’s definitions of unabated fossil fuels are problematic as they both refer to carbon capture – but not all CCS projects capture high rates of carbon. As a recent study pointed out, not having a clear definition of abatement could allow for carbon capture rates as low as 50%.

This is very relevant given the track record of CCS projects to date. There are currently only 41 CCS facilities operating worldwide, and many of those have achieved relatively low capture rates. For example, the estimated capture rates at some high-profile CCS projects are:

  • 65% at Boundary Dam, a coal power plant in Washington State, US
  • 45% at Gorgon, a gas processing facility on Barrow Island, Australia
  • 39% at Quest, an oil refinery in Alberta, Canada
  • Under 10% at Century Gas Processing Plant in Texas, US
Upstream emissions

Upstream emissions – which come from the extraction and production of fossil fuels – are not included in the IEA and Kerry’s definitions of unabated fossil fuels, despite accounting for almost 15% of total energy-related greenhouse gas emissions. This figure includes emissions of methane, a greenhouse gas far more powerful than carbon dioxide. The global energy industry is responsible for an estimated 37% of human-caused methane emissions. The IEA does not incorporate upstream emissions into its definition, despite stating that significant reductions in operational and methane emissions from the energy sector are necessary to reach net-zero emissions by 2050.3The IEA’s Net Zero Emissions scenario provides a pathway for the global energy sector to achieve net-zero carbon dioxide emissions by 2050. A definition of abatement that only looks at carbon capture, without addressing upstream emissions, misses a significant share of global fossil fuel emissions.

Key components of a science-based definition

Based on the latest reports from the IPCC, IEA and academic literature, the following key components are needed for a rigorous, science-based definition of abatement:

  1. High carbon capture rates: There must be near-total capture of fossil fuel combustion emissions, with carbon capture rates of at least 90-95%. If carbon capture technology successfully and consistently reaches this rate, then the definition should be reviewed and increased to further reduce residual emissions. Carbon capture technology is not feasible for mobile or small emitters, such as in transport or domestic gas boilers and stoves. The IEA does not see any role for CCS in the use of oil in its net zero scenario, only for gas and coal.
  2. Geological storage: Once captured, carbon dioxide must be stored underground permanently. Alternative uses of captured carbon dioxide, such as increasing rates of oil extraction or for short-lived products like fizzy drinks, are incompatible with a science-based definition of abatement as the carbon is not permanently removed.
  3. Near total containment of upstream and transport emissions: Emissions from the production and transport of fossil fuels, including methane emissions, need to be virtually eliminated. This should include methane intensity levels of 0.5% at the very most, and ideally 0.2% or lower – which large parts of the oil and gas industry claim to have achieved.4Methane intensity refers to the amount of methane that is leaked or released into the atmosphere as a percentage of the total amount of gas sold. Together with post-combustion capture, this should ensure that the definition of abatement includes all Scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions from fossil fuels.5Scope 1 emissions are direct emissions from sources owned or controlled by a company, Scope 2 are indirect emissions from the energy it uses, and Scope 3 includes emissions the company is indirectly responsible for in its value chain, including from the use of the products it sells.
  4. Monitoring, reporting and verification: To ensure that these standards are met, there needs to be rigorous monitoring of all facilities and infrastructure along the fossil fuel supply chain. This data should be publicly reported, and verified by third parties where possible.

Since the term ‘unabated’ has become central to international climate negotiations, it is vital that countries agree on a rigorous science-based definition of the term. If there is no agreement on what unabated fossil fuels are, then any agreement to phase them out is arguably meaningless, as each country could impose their own interpretation. It could lead to countries and companies implementing policies that are interpreted as being in line with a phase out of unabated fossil fuels, but that undermine progress towards the Paris Agreement goal of limiting warming to 1.5°C.

The need to rapidly and substantially reduce the use of unabated fossil fuels to limit warming to 1.5°C is clear. In the IEA’s Net Zero Emissions scenario, total use of coal, oil and natural gas falls by 87% by 2050, while the IPCC makes clear that reaching net-zero energy emissions will require “minimal” use of unabated fossil fuels.

  • 1
  • 2
    CCUS includes the use of carbon technology where captured carbon dioxide is used, for example in other industrial processes, whereas CCS refers only to where captured carbon is stored.
  • 3
    The IEA’s Net Zero Emissions scenario provides a pathway for the global energy sector to achieve net-zero carbon dioxide emissions by 2050.
  • 4
    Methane intensity refers to the amount of methane that is leaked or released into the atmosphere as a percentage of the total amount of gas sold.
  • 5
    Scope 1 emissions are direct emissions from sources owned or controlled by a company, Scope 2 are indirect emissions from the energy it uses, and Scope 3 includes emissions the company is indirectly responsible for in its value chain, including from the use of the products it sells.

Unpacking 2023’s unprecedented heat  

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Key Points:

  • Scientists predict that 2023 will be the hottest year to date, with record-high temperatures observed on land and in the sea.
  • June, July, August, September and October this year were the hottest months since records began in the mid-1800s.
  • These temperature extremes are occurring against a backdrop of a planet that has already warmed to unprecedented levels. Every fraction of a degree of warming at the global level increases the odds of additional and often extreme climate impacts, such as heatwaves and severe rainfall.
  • The long-term build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere from burning fossil fuels is the main factor driving increases in earth’s temperature.
  • The speed at which the earth is warming is accelerating at unprecedented levels, and record high greenhouse gas emissions are primarily to blame.
  • Other natural and human-caused factors are acting on top of a high baseline global temperature, edging us towards record-breaking heat at increasingly fast rates as the warming trajectory of the planet continues upwards. Those factors include:
    • A developing El Niño
    • Natural and human-caused variability in Atlantic sea surface temperatures
    • An unusual volcanic eruption
    • Reduced Saharan dust and particulate emissions
    • Reduced sulphur emissions from shipping fuels
    • Record low sea ice levels
    • The 11-year solar cycle
  • Overshooting the Paris Agreement goal of limiting warming to 1.5°C – even temporarily – could have devastating impacts by catalysing large and often irreversible changes to climate systems.
  • At current emissions rates, we may only have six years left until we blow our remaining carbon budget to keep warming below 1.5°C.
  • The impacts of climate change will only worsen until we stop putting more greenhouse gases into the atmosphere than can be removed by the planet.

Temperature extremes in a warming world

Record heat in 2023

June, July, August, September and October this year were unambiguously the hottest months since records began in the mid-1800s, according to data from tens of thousands of meteorological stations across the world.1Scientists are confident that this is the warmest decade in the last 125,000 years. Scientists are now confident that 2023 will be the hottest year on record to date, despite initial predictions that it could be the fourth-hottest year.

September’s heat was particularly unusual, with the highest temperature anomaly – an indication of how divergent temperatures are from the long-term average – ever recorded for any month. One climate scientist described this unprecedented 0.5°C anomaly, which made September around 1.8°C hotter than pre-industrial levels, as “absolutely gobsmackingly bananas”.2Depending on the dataset used, the level of warming may be 1.7°C or 1.8°C. The impacts of this year’s heat were felt across the world: Africa, Europe, North America, South America and Antarctica all had their hottest September on record. Alongside higher land temperatures, sea surface temperatures have been at record high levels since April this year.

The average temperature for 2023 will very likely be more than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. A breach of the Paris Agreement goal would require temperatures to be sustained above 1.5°C for at least 20 years, so this does not mean we have blown our chance. However, the fact that we are increasingly seeing average monthly temperatures above this goal signals that we are getting closer.3The Paris Agreement – a legally binding international treaty on climate change – set a goal to limit “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels” and pursue efforts “to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.”

Global warming fuels extremes

Temperature extremes such as those recorded this year are occurring in a planet that has already warmed to unprecedented levels – the past eight years were the warmest on record. The speed of this warming has accelerated over the last decade, reaching an unprecedented rate of more than 0.2°C over 2013–2022. Scientists attribute this to record-high greenhouse gas emissions and reduced aerosols – particles in the atmosphere that scatter or absorb the sun’s radiation. Every fraction of a degree of warming at the global level increases the odds of additional, and often extreme, impacts at regional and local levels. With the increased build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, heatwaves are becoming hotter and more frequent. As emphasised by climate scientist Sarah Perkins-Kirkpatrick, “It only takes a small change in average temperature for the frequency of extremes to completely blow out, which is what we’ve seen in the Northern Hemisphere recently”.

The global temperature is an average taken from across the world, with actual temperatures at different locations ranging from much lower to much higher, meaning the impacts of warming are unequally distributed. For example, average July temperatures in some parts of northern Canada this year were more than 7°C above the 30-year average.4Parts of northern Canada fall within the Arctic, which has been warming at four times the rate of the global average over the last four decades. This extreme heat, combined with unusually dry conditions, fuelled unprecedented wildfires in the region, highlighting how temporary spikes in temperature combined with longer-term elevated warming can have devastating consequences.5The extent of burned area by the end of July was twice as high as the previous record for the whole of 1995. “Summer 2023’s record-setting temperatures aren’t just a set of numbers – they result in dire real-world consequences,” said NASA Administrator Bill Nelson.

Events such as wildfires may have knock-on effects that fuel further warming: the fires in Canada this year have released record-high carbon emissions, risking the creation of a self-perpetuating cycle that speeds up warming, known as a positive feedback loop.6More than double the wildfire emissions of a previous record-high year. Warmer, drier conditions as a result of climate change create the conditions for wildfires, and wildfires further fuel climate change by releasing stored carbon and reducing the carbon sink capacity of forests as they burn down, which then creates warmer and drier conditions, ultimately locking us into more warming.

Climate is complex

While the overall warming trend does not come as a surprise to scientists and matches projections by climate models, the extent to which temperature records have been broken this year – particularly the 0.5°C September anomaly – is remarkable. This is because temperature records are typically broken by margins of 0.1 or 0.2°C. To better understand this anomaly, scientists scrutinised over 150 outputs from climate models to work out the chances of a 0.5°C September anomaly. They found that the chance is very low – roughly 1 in 10,000 in any given September.

Some models may not be fully capturing certain processes that add to warming. Recent developments in policy, leading to reduced pollution for example, have occurred faster and in different places than previously anticipated. Similarly, the impacts of natural processes – which are infinitely complex – can be difficult to predict: a volcanic eruption in the South Pacific last year was unusual in that it may have had a warming effect rather than a cooling effect due to an uncharacteristically low level of sulphur dioxide.

The Earth’s climate system is made up of complex dynamics and interactions among various natural and human-caused processes. Exact future temperatures are hard to predict, and will become harder as the world warms and weather becomes harder to forecast. However, we do know that rising heat will have catastrophic consequences, and we should do everything in our power to limit overall warming as soon as possible.

Interplay between long-term warming and natural variability

Air temperatures on earth have a natural degree of variability due to factors such as changes in solar radiation, ocean-atmosphere interactions and volcanic eruptions. This inherent variability means that even if there was no global warming, average global temperatures would not be identical from year to year. However, it is clear that global warming – fuelled by the long-term build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere from burning fossil fuels – is driving the persistent upward trend in global average temperatures since industrial times, and that the natural variability of the climate system has had very little impact on this trend.

Contributors to temperature spikes

Though global warming is a gradual process that can’t solely explain the sharp uptick in temperatures observed this year, a number of other factors – such as an emerging El Niño, an unusual volcanic eruption in the South Pacific, and decreased sulphur dioxide emissions from shipping – are acting on top of a high baseline global temperature, edging us towards record-breaking heat at increasingly fast rates as the warming trajectory of the planet continues upwards (Figure 1).7Compared to the 1970-2014 period, climate models project global warming to be 40% faster in the period between 2015 and 2030. These other factors are responsible for the variability in temperatures – such as spikes in heat – witnessed at daily, monthly or yearly scales, but are not driving the persistent long-term warming trend. It just so happens that they are occurring all at once in an increasingly hot world. The exact contribution of these other factors to temperature spikes is highly variable and uncertain, with some playing very small roles.

Figure 1: Factors contributing to global temperature change over the last 10 years
Source: Berkeley Earth, August 2023 Temperature Update, 2023.
El Niño

El Niño is a natural climate phenomenon occurring every two to seven years whereby sea surface temperatures in the Pacific Ocean are warmer than average, causing short-term increases in global average temperatures as heat is pushed from the ocean into the atmosphere. El Niño events are often correlated with the hottest years on record. The previous hottest year on record, 2016, was during a “super El Niño event” – one of the three strongest in history. There is a growing scientific consensus that human-caused warming has, at least partly, made El Niño more variable and difficult to predict.
Some scientists have speculated that El Niño has been one of the main drivers of extreme heat this year, particularly as there was a rapid transition earlier this year from its cold counterpart La Niña, which has been in effect during the past three years.8The last La Niña event was a rare ’triple-dip’ event lasting three years, which was associated with various impacts and natural disasters around the world. Others are more cautious, pointing out that El Niño was only in its early phase at the onset of the record-breaking heat this year and that its biggest impacts are only anticipated in February to April next year. Temperatures typically respond around three months after El Niño peaks, which is only expected around the end of this year. There will likely be greater clarity on the role of El Niño in early 2024.

Warming oceans

Even before El Niño officially started this year, global average sea surface temperatures were already 0.1°C higher than the previous record, with marine heatwaves detected around the world. As the Pacific Ocean represents around half of the world’s ocean area – and El Niño originates in the Pacific – what happens in the Pacific will tend to have a significant impact on global sea temperatures.

Warming has also been exceptional in the North Atlantic Ocean, which in June was a record 0.5°C warmer than the long-term average, with localised extreme marine heatwaves of up to 5°C higher than average recorded. Natural variability in sea surface temperatures linked to the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation – a cyclical pattern of warm and cool sea surface temperatures – may partly explain these warmer temperatures. Research also shows that much of the heat stored in the subtropical North Atlantic is in deeper waters, with currents redistributing this heat to other regions of the ocean – believed to be a key driver of North Atlantic warming. At the same time, lower than average wind speeds in the northeastern Atlantic mean there is less mixing of colder ocean water from lower depths, causing sea surface temperatures to rise. Low winds also resulted in fewer dust particles – which scatter solar radiation back into the atmosphere before it can warm the ocean – being blown off the Sahara over the ocean. Similarly, reduced particulate pollution in North America and Europe, driven by policies on air quality, may have had a similar effect by reflecting less radiation.

It is important to remember that these processes – whether El Niño or reduced Saharan dust – are happening on top of an already warming ocean: more than 90% of global heat caused by greenhouse gas emissions has been absorbed by the ocean.9As oceans continue to warm, they will take up less heat from the atmosphere and cause global average surface temperatures to rise further. “Over the long term, we’re seeing more heat and warmer sea surface temperatures pretty much everywhere…[t]hat long-term trend is almost entirely attributable to human[s]”, said Gavin Schmidt, the director of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies. Unlike this long-term trend, changes in wind speeds or particulate pollution typically have very small impacts on longer-term temperature averages but do contribute to sudden spikes in temperature.

Low sea ice levels

Decades of warming has led to lower than average sea ice in Antarctica and the Arctic. Low sea ice levels may increase local warming, and at the same time, local warming may lower sea ice levels. Lower sea ice reinforces warming because less ice means less solar radiation reflected back into space and more radiation absorbed by the ocean, causing further warming and delaying sea ice growth. However, scientists are uncertain of the extent to which the lower sea ice influenced the warm conditions observed in Antarctica this year.

Volcanic eruption in the South Pacific

The lower sea ice and higher earth temperatures observed this year may have been influenced by the eruption of an undersea volcano in January 2022, which increased the amount of water vapour in the upper atmosphere, where it potentially acted as a powerful greenhouse gas and trapped heat. The additional warming caused by this eruption is not yet known, with some scientists speculating that its contribution is likely quite small, and others suggesting that more analysis is needed to fully understand the impacts.

Sulphur regulations

Researchers have suggested that regulations imposed on emissions of sulphur – a harmful air pollutant emitted by marine fuels – from shipping since 2020 could have also contributed to temperature spikes this year. This is because sulphur particles – which are harmful to human health – reflect radiation back into the atmosphere or block sunlight by forming ‘pollution clouds’, and their reduction has a warming effect. Estimates suggest that the cuts in particulate emissions from shipping regulations are equal to two additional years of human-caused greenhouse gas emissions at current rates. However, scientists caution that while a reduction in sulphur emissions may boost warming by around 0.045°C over the next few decades, it is unlikely to have any major influence on long-term global warming. 

As a counterbalance to temporary spikes in warming as aerosols are cleaned up, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recommends reducing human-caused methane emissions. While carbon dioxide remains in the atmosphere for a long time – up to 1,000 years – before breaking down, methane has a much shorter lifespan of around 12 years.10If we were to stop all methane emissions right now, global warming caused by methane would be halved in around 20 years. Methane also has more warming power as it absorbs more energy than carbon dioxide. This means that reductions in warming can be quickly achieved with methane emission cuts – reducing methane emissions from the energy sector alone could avoid up to 0.1°C of warming by mid-century.     

Solar fluctuations

Another natural phenomenon contributing to global temperatures is fluctuations in the output of the sun as part of the 11-year solar cycle. During this cycle, the average temperature of the earth increases by around 0.05°C. The current solar cycle is heading towards its peak, with the latest evidence suggesting that the sun’s activity has already reached levels not seen for 20 years. The current solar cycle is expected to peak between January and October 2024 – around the same time that the warming impacts of El Niño are expected to be greatest.

Overshooting 1.5°C of warming

The 2015 Paris Agreement aims to avoid “unleashing far more severe climate change impacts, including more frequent and severe droughts, heatwaves and rainfall”. The point in time where we breach 1.5°C of warming is getting dangerously close. Latest estimates show that we may only have six years left of emissions at current levels before our carbon budget runs out.

In the IPCC’s report on the impacts of 1.5°C of global warming, 90% of the emissions scenarios that limit warming to 1.5°C by 2100 include a period of ‘temperature overshoot’. Temperature overshoot describes when global average temperatures exceed 1.5°C (or 2°C) of warming before returning to that level at some point in the future. In most of the IPCC pathways – which describe different levels of greenhouse gas emissions for reaching a certain level of warming – global average temperatures exceed the target for at least one decade and up to several before dropping back down – achieved through the deployment of carbon dioxide removal.11Many pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C rely on the deployment of carbon dioxide removal technologies, which are ‘uncertain and entail clear risks’.

The magnitude – how much the specified level of warming is exceeded – and the duration – how long that level of warming is exceeded – differ across scenarios. Keeping the magnitude and duration of overshoot as low as possible is critical if we are to avoid the worst climate impacts to people and the planet. Every fraction of a degree of overshoot increases the severity, frequency and duration of climate impacts, such as heatwaves, as does whether we meet temperature targets early in the century or not. In addition, the closer we stick to 1.5°C, the better the economic outcome. Climate impacts from temperature overshoot will lead to higher mitigation costs and economic losses later in the century.12While higher initial investments are needed to keep temperatures down, this is outweighed by the economic benefits later in the century.

Tipping points

Scientists warn that overshooting 1.5°C – even temporarily – could have devastating and irreversible impacts. Numerous ‘tipping points’ could be crossed with just 1.5°C of warming. These are critical thresholds at which the global climate system tips into another state, triggering feedback loops and catalysing large and often irreversible changes to the climate.

One tipping point is the drying of the Amazon rainforest, caused by deforestation, fires and less rainfall, which could transform this critical carbon sink into a savanna. This would not only impact the millions of people and animals living in the region, but would result in billions of tonnes of carbon dioxide being released into the atmosphere – further fuelling global warming – as well as less rainfall and changes to global climate patterns. 

In addition to triggering tipping points, overshoot could temporarily push thousands of species beyond the range of temperatures at which they can survive. For some species, life may not fully recover after overshoot: even temporary overshoot could cause irreversible extinctions and lasting damage to tens of thousands of species, with knock-on effects for entire ecosystems. If we are to limit warming to 1.5°C with limited or no overshoot, deep, rapid and immediate reductions in emissions are essential.

Solutions

Cutting emissions

Emissions are at an all-time high and are rising, with atmospheric carbon dioxide levels higher than they have been for at least four million years. Continued warming means land and ocean carbon sinks will become increasingly less effective at slowing the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. If reductions in emissions are achieved now, there would still be a lag in the warming response of the earth.13If we stopped all greenhouse gas emissions today, there’s still a 42% chance that we would overshoot 1.5°C. However, pursuing strict mitigation measures to keep warming under 1.5°C with limited or no overshoot would substantially reduce climate risks over the next 20 years and allow societies and ecosystems to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. To do this, net carbon dioxide emissions would need to be reduced by 48% by 2030, according to the IPCC.

The fastest and cheapest way to deliver emissions cuts is to reduce our reliance on fossil fuels for energy and switch to renewable-powered electricity. To limit warming to 1.5°C with limited or no overshoot, the use of coal would need to be reduced by 100%, oil by 60% and gas by 70% by 2050.14This is assuming no carbon capture, storage and utilisation. There would need to be increased electrification of energy, with almost all electricity coming from zero-carbon or low-carbon sources. Since 2010, solar and wind power have become cost-competitive with fossil fuels globally – the current average levelised cost of solar photovoltaic is almost one-third less than the cheapest fossil fuel.15The levelised cost is the price at which electricity should be sold for the system to break even at the end of its lifetime. In 2022, electricity fuel costs of USD 520 billion were saved as a result of renewable capacity added since 2010. Rapid renewables deployment – around 1,000 GW per year until 2030 – will be critical for keeping warming to 1.5°C.

Reducing methane

One promising solution for rapidly reducing global warming involves cutting emissions of methane – which has contributed around one-third of global warming since pre-industrial times. Methane concentrations in the atmosphere have been rising dangerously quickly since around 2007, and have reached record levels in recent years. Due to its short lifespan, cutting methane emissions offers the “single fastest, most effective way to slow the rate of warming right now”. It is also one of the cheapest ways to reduce warming. By using cost-effective measures such as reducing leaks from pipelines, shutting down abandoned oil wells and reducing livestock numbers, human-caused methane emissions could be reduced by up to 45% by 2030, avoiding nearly 0.3°C of warming by the 2040s.16UNEP, Global Methane Assessment, 2021. Pg 8. https://www.unep.org/resources/report/global-methane-assessment-benefits-and-costs-mitigating-methane-emissions According to the IPCC, a reduction of 34% is needed by 2030, along with cuts to other greenhouse gas emissions, to achieve 1.5°C with limited to no overshoot without relying on carbon dioxide removal.

Agriculture, and particularly livestock farming, is the single largest source of methane emissions from human activity, and livestock emissions are expected to increase by up to 16% by 2030. Through reducing livestock numbers, improving livestock nutrition and breeding, and reducing food loss and waste, significant reductions in warming from methane can be achieved in the next few decades. According to the International Energy Agency, technology to reduce methane emissions from fossil fuel operations – which account for around 40% of methane emissions from human sources – already exists and could cut around 70% of emissions from this sector.

Carbon dioxide removal

Proposed solutions for reducing warming can be nature-based, such as planting trees which store carbon in their tissues, or growing crops, burning them for energy, and storing the released carbon. There are also technological solutions, such as machines that suck carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and store it long term, called direct air capture and storage. Collectively, these approaches are referred to as carbon dioxide removal (CDR).

There are major uncertainties with both nature-based and technological solutions: forests burn down, risking the release of stored carbon, and there is limited space for planting trees. Growing energy crops requires large areas of land, which could potentially endanger biodiversity through the conversion of natural land or threaten human food security by supplanting food crops. Machines for drawing carbon from the atmosphere are not yet fully developed and are expensive, and none of these solutions have been shown to work at the scale needed. The world’s largest direct air capture plant only saves us 3 seconds of emissions per year. Atmospheric physics and the changing nature of forests as carbon sinks are also not fully understood, but current evidence suggests that CDR may not compensate for emissions on a like-to-like basis. The reduction in atmospheric carbon dioxide achieved by deploying CDR may be less than 10% of the carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere from an equal amount of emissions.

Forest carbon offsets – under which companies or individuals can purchase credits for preserving a forest or planting a tree that is equal to the amount of carbon to be offset in order to achieve their net-zero pledges – have been shown to be ineffective and are marred by alleged greenwashing and dubious accounting methods.

The uncertainty around the effectiveness of these technologies offers a strong incentive for ramping up climate action in the near-term to reduce our reliance on them. However, because emission reductions have been so delayed, some amount of CDR will be necessary to meet 1.5°C, together with decarbonisation of energy and electricity, electrification, and deep emissions cuts, particularly of methane. In IPCC pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C with limited or no overshoot, CDR is only used in sectors for which no mitigation measure is available and to counterbalance historical emissions. The longer we delay emissions cuts, the more we will have to rely on unproven technologies to reduce warming and risk large-scale, irreversible impacts on society and nature.

Immediate, meaningful action now can bring benefits within our lifetime. Bold pledges and policies, stricter net-zero standards, and strengthened accountability are needed to deliver real and immediate emissions cuts.

Bangladesh’s reliance on LNG increases heat stress, finance and energy risks

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Key points:

  • Bangladesh has increased reliance on LNG since starting imports in 2018, relying on the fuel for 22% of the country’s gas demand. Since then, Bangladesh has failed to meet its targets for increasing renewable generation, which now accounts for just 2% of the country’s electricity.
  • This reliance on imported LNG means the impacts of the current energy crisis have been acute, with widespread power cuts hitting both industrial production and the availability of air conditioning during hot weather.
  • The energy crisis is set to continue, with LNG prices forecast to remain high throughout 2023 and up to the late 2020s, with similar consequences. 
  • The global LNG industry is accelerating climate change, to which Bangladesh is highly vulnerable. 
  • Heat stress from fossil fuel expansion will have severe impacts on human health, labour productivity, income and overall economic growth of the country. 
  • Extreme weather and rising sea levels are already affecting the country and, by 2050, there could be nearly 20 million internally-displaced climate migrants.
  • Bangladesh has the potential for major expansion of renewable generation, but is not on track to increase capacity in the near-term. To provide cheaper, cleaner, more reliable power, the government of Bangladesh and international finance should prioritise scaling up renewable power.

LNG has boomed while renewables have stagnated 

Bangladesh has traditionally relied on gas as its main source of electricity generation, supplied from domestic extraction since the early 1960s. Gas made up 59% of Bangladesh’s energy supply in 2020 and fuels more than two-thirds of electricity generation. However, the country’s reserves of gas are declining, while electricity demand is increasing – in 2022, the government estimated that domestic gas supplies would last for less than 11 years.

In 2016, the government set out a plan to address this shortfall, laying out a vision for a huge growth in imports of liquified natural gas (LNG). The plan set a target of starting LNG imports in 2019 at a level that would meet 17% of the country’s gas demand, rising to 40% in 2023, 50% in 2028 and 70% in 2041.

The first stage of this vision was largely achieved, with the country signing two long-term contracts to import gas from Qatar, with LNG imports starting in the 2018/19 financial year and nearly doubling in 2020/21. In 2021, Bangladesh also started buying LNG from the spot market – where gas is bought for immediate delivery and prices are far more volatile than those bought under long-term contracts. By 2022, LNG imports accounted for 22% of the country’s total gas demand.

While the government achieved ambitious targets for increasing LNG, it was nowhere near as successful in meeting its targets for renewables. In 2008, the government set a target of meeting 10% of electricity demand with renewable sources by 2020, with similar targets included in the 2016 power plan. By 2022, renewables generated just 2% of Bangladesh’s electricity, according to analysis by the Centre for Policy Dialogue, making up just 3.75% of installed capacity.

Reliance on LNG left Bangladesh exposed to the energy crisis

The country’s increased reliance on imported LNG, combined with very low domestic renewable generation, has left Bangladesh highly vulnerable to global energy supply shocks. This risk became a reality in 2021 and 2022, when global LNG prices increased dramatically, first as Russia reduced gas exports to Europe and again following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 

In the year running up to the invasion, Asian LNG prices rose by 390% before rising a further 48% in the five months after the invasion – reaching a peak more than ten times higher than prices in the same month in 2020. The benchmark price for LNG averaged USD 34 per million metric British Thermal Units (MMBtu) in 2022, compared to USD 15/MMBtu in 2021. 

As well as facing significantly higher prices for LNG imports, Bangladesh also saw reductions in the LNG supplied through its long term contracts from Qatar, according to analysis by the Centre for Policy Development.

Faced with such high prices, Bangladesh stopped making spot market purchases of LNG in July 2022. As a result, the country faced widespread power cuts in the second half of the year. In mid-July, 20% of the country’s electricity demand was not met due to gas shortages, with the country cutting power on 85 of the 92 days up to the end of October, according to analysis by Reuters. At its worst point in October, blackouts affected 75%-80% of Bangladesh, leaving 130 million people without power, as a third of the country’s gas power units faced a gas supply shortage. The electricity that could be supplied also came at a huge cost – electricity generation costs rose by 47% from financial year 2020-21 to 2022.

The impacts of this on Bangladesh have been significant. Industrial production, including the garment sector, fell by a reported 25%-50%, placing further pressure on the country’s balance of payments. 

Up to a quarter of the country’s power demand comes from air conditioning, so cutting off power supplies left people – particularly older people, disabled people and children – at greater risk of heat stress, with temperatures in places exceeding 40°C. 

Bangladesh’s energy crisis is set to continue

Asian LNG importers such as Bangladesh are currently experiencing a reprieve from the record high prices of 2022, with regional prices currently lower than all of 2022 and on a par with mid-2021. In February, the country re-started purchases on the spot market with a purchase from TotalEnergies at USD 19.78/MMBtu, with the country aiming to keep purchases below USD 20/MMBtu this year.

But this drop in prices is not forecast to last. After a steep drop in 2022, Asian gas demand is expected to rise by around 3% in 2022 due to the lifting of China’s zero-Covid policy, which, combined with Europe’s increased demand for LNG, will put upward pressure on prices:

Fig. 1: Historic and forecast Asian LNG prices
Source: International Monetary Fund, S&P Global, Reuters

Global LNG prices are set to remain high at least until 2025 or 2026, when new LNG supplies are set to come onto the market. Bangladesh is reported to be looking for new long term LNG supply contracts, however there is very limited availability and competition from European buyers prepared to pay high prices. Until then, maintaining or growing Bangladesh’s recent levels of LNG imports will have to rely on expensive and highly volatile spot markets.

The impacts of such high prices on Bangladesh look set to continue. In January 2023, the government increased gas prices to commercial users by between 14% and 179% (household prices were left unchanged). This presents a significant challenge for the garment sector, which makes up more than 80% of the country’s export earnings. Producers must either pass on higher production costs to international buyers or face falling sales and profits. Power sector subsidies reached BDT 297 billion (USD 2.74 billion) in the financial year 2021-22, and are likely to rise further in 2023. It is highly likely that Bangladesh will experience further blackouts due to a shortage of LNG, with knock-on impacts on the availability of air conditioning during heatwaves and the productivity of the economy.

Despite the outlook for LNG prices, Bangladesh is planning to double its LNG import capacity with a more than 150% increase proposed, according to Global Energy Monitor (GEM). LNG imports are forecast to rise by more than 350% between 2020 and 2030, according to analysis by the Centre for Policy Development. This increase goes hand in hand with an expansion of gas power installation. The country has 11.5 GW of gas power currently installed, another 2.3 GW under construction and further 33.3 GW proposed, according to GEM.

LNG investment: Finance and stranded asset risks

Asia is expected to witness a surge in gas infrastructure investments, with the total investment in proposed projects reaching USD 379 billion. Bangladesh has one of the most extensive expansion plans, with USD 16.5 billion of investment in new gas infrastructure. This investment includes the construction of LNG terminals, pipelines and new power plants.

Table 1: Bangladesh planned investment for fossil gas infrastructure
Source: Global Energy Monitor, 2021

The reliance on gas for energy development raises concerns about the country’s large and unsustainable debt burden. Building additional gas infrastructure for the power sector, often under the guise of a ‘bridging fuel’, entails high financial risks to a developing country, particularly as the levelized costs of electricity from renewable energy are lower than for gas and will continue to fall. As the competitiveness of renewable energy prices persists, Bangladesh’s pivot toward gas will result in a poor investment and wasting valuable capital. For example, Bangladesh is reportedly currently facing a hefty debt bill of USD 2 billion every year from the power sector’s mega projects, specifically fossil fuel development. Amidst the global transition towards clean energy, gas infrastructure could potentially become stranded assets, posing a significant financial risk to Bangladesh, leading to broader and more severe socio-economic problems.

LNG expansion is accelerating climate change

While the lack of power increases the health risks from heatwaves in Bangladesh, increasing the use of LNG is also accelerating climate change, which will make extreme weather events in the country more severe and frequent.

Natural gas is the fastest growing source of CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, responsible for more than half the increase in the last five years. Worldwide, a 173% increase in LNG export capacity is in development, an expansion that puts the Paris Agreement climate goals at serious risk. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has found that emissions from existing and planned unabated fossil fuel infrastructure would push the world past 1.5°C of warming, unless they are phased out early.

The extraction and transportation of gas emits methane, a powerful greenhouse gas that is responsible for around a quarter of the 1.1oC of warming the world has already experienced since pre-industrial times. Transporting gas as LNG is also emissions intensive due to the energy required to super-cool the gas. In the US alone, the seven LNG terminals currently operating have the equivalent emissions to almost nine coal power stations. 

If all LNG terminals globally had the same emissions intensity as those in the US, together they would have the same emissions as 46 coal power stations, with emissions greater than Malaysia’s and the Philippines’ coal fleets combined. An analysis of multiple studies of US LNG shipped to Europe found that “emissions from the extraction, transport, liquefaction, and re-gasification of LNG can be almost equal to the emissions produced from the actual burning of the gas, effectively doubling the climate impact of each unit of energy created from gas transported overseas.

Increasing impacts of climate change

Bangladesh is widely recognised as being one of the most vulnerable countries to the impacts of climate change, largely due its natural geography on a low-lying delta with a high risk of cyclones, extreme rainfall, flooding and droughts, combined with high population density. Fifty-six per cent of the population – more than 90 million people – live in areas with a high exposure to climate change, compared to a global average of 14%. Thirty-three per cent of the population – more than 53 million people – face very high exposure to climate change, compared to just 6% globally.

These risks are not just a future possibility, but are already impacting Bangladesh. Between 2000 and 2019, the country experienced 185 extreme weather events due to climate change. Tropical cyclones are estimated to cost Bangladesh USD 1 billion annually, and around 20 million people are already having their health affected from saltwater-polluted drinking water linked to sea level rise. In 2022 alone, over 7.1 million Bangladeshis were displaced by climate change, according to the World Health Organisation.

Fig. 2: Proportion of population exposed to climate risks
Source: USAID

These impacts are set to get worse as the climate warms. The IPCC has found that wind speeds and rain rates of tropical cyclones will increase as global temperatures rise. By 2050, Bangladesh could have up to 19.9 million internal climate migrants, according to the World Bank, almost half the projected internal climate migrants for the whole of South East Asia. By 2100, one third of the population of Bangladesh could be at risk of displacement. 

The extent of these impacts will be determined by the speed at which the world can reduce greenhouse gas emissions – the science is clear that an immediate and rapid reduction in the use of gas is required to avert the worst impacts of climate change.

Impacts of heat stress due to fossil fuel and LNG expansion in Bangladesh and around the world

Bangladesh is predicted to experience more frequent and severe heatwaves, which have been shown to increase mortality rates by as much as 31.3% for every 1°C increase in the universal thermal climate index. 

Heat stress can exacerbate respiratory problems, such as asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), which are already common in Bangladesh due to air pollution. These can result in reduced productivity, increased absenteeism and long-term health issues.

Vulnerability to heat-related diseases is exceptionally high among people over 65, who often have underlying medical conditions. Children are also vulnerable to heat events, due to their susceptibility to vector-borne diseases, as are individuals with low literacy levels who may not be fully aware of the dangers of extreme heat events.

Vulnerable communities are also more likely to experience economic impacts from heat stress, such as lost wages from illness or decreased productivity. Low-income households may also struggle to pay for cooling, or live in housing without adequate ventilation or insulation, increasing the risk of heat stress and heat-related illness.

Psychological impacts of heat

Recent research has highlighted the impact of climate change on mental health in Bangladesh, revealing a link between elevated temperatures and mental health-related morbidity and mortality. A Lancet Countdown report projected deadly heat problems for densely populated areas, such as Dhaka and Chattogram, where the urban heat island effect exacerbates the vulnerability of residents. 

Vulnerability to mental health impacts is particularly acute for older populations, women, individuals with physical disabilities or illnesses, and households experiencing economic shocks. 

Heat impacting productivity at work

The warming planet will increase the health and well-being risks associated with working in hot and humid conditions. This is especially true for low and middle-income tropical countries like Bangladesh, where a significant proportion of the population are manual workers in agriculture and construction. Workers exposed to heat stress are at risk of a range of health impacts, including dehydration, heat exhaustion, heat stroke and other heat-related illnesses. 

Extreme heat exposure is also affecting working hours, resulting in a significant loss of labour. The International Labour Organization (ILO) has identified Bangladesh as one of the South Asian countries that faces a high risk of lost working hours due to heat stress, especially in the agricultural sector. At present temperatures, the country loses 254 hours of labour per person annually due to heat exposure. This figure increases significantly to 573 hours of labour loss per person annually if the temperature rises by 2°C.  

Workers are less able to perform physical tasks in high temperatures and humidity, leading to decreased output, increased downtime and reduced economic efficiency, which in turn can reduce income and economic growth. Additionally, the costs of providing medical care and preventative measures to reduce heat stress can be significant. 

Fig. 3: Heat exposure and working hours lost
Source: Parsons, L. A., Shindell, D., Tigchelaar, M., Zhang, Y., & Spector, J. T. (2021).
Table 2: Working hours lost to heat stress, by sector and country, southern Asia, 1995 and 2030 (projections)
Source: ILO, Working on a Warmer Planet (2019)

According to the ILO, heat stress caused more than 5% of GDP loss in Thailand, Cambodia, and Bangladesh in 1995. By 2030, heat stress could have a similar impact on GDP in Thailand, Cambodia, India and Pakistan. Bangladesh is projected to lose around 4.9% of its GDP to heat stress by 2030 – a potential loss of USD 95.75 billion. The significant impact of these losses on the country’s population and economy underscores the urgency of implementing measures to mitigate the effects of extreme heat on working conditions and productivity.

Renewable energy offers a better alternative

In contrast to the huge growth in LNG import capacity and gas power generation, the pipeline for renewable energy projects in Bangladesh is very limited. In its 2021 climate submission to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Bangladesh aimed to increase renewable energy capacity by just 0.9 GW by 2030 and only 4.1 GW if the country receives international financial support. This would lead to renewables generating just 4% of the country’s electricity by 2030. In the same submission, Bangladesh proposed increasing gas capacity by 5.6 GW with international financial support, reaching a total capacity over three times higher than that for renewables.

Fig. 4: Proposed gas and renewable capacity by 2030
Source: Bangladesh 2021 Nationally Determined Contribution submission to the UNFCCC

Unless significant policy changes are introduced, the growth in renewables in Bangladesh is set to be very limited. According to the National Solar Energy Roadmap, under a business-as-usual scenario, the country would only have 2.4 GW of solar power installed by 2030 and 6 GW by 2041, with solar making up the majority of the country’s renewable generation.

Despite the limited pipeline for new projects, Bangladesh has the potential to greatly increase the deployment of renewable energy. In 2021, the government launched the Mujib Climate Prosperity Plan (MCPP), setting out a vision of how the climate-vulnerable country could become resilient and prosperous through adapting to and mitigating climate change. The MCPP laid out different scenarios for the potential deployment of renewable energy. In the most ambitious, the country would reach a 30% share of renewable energy by 2030, with a capacity of 16GW, rising to 40% in 2040 with a capacity of 40GW. The Sustainable and Renewable Energy Development Authority (Sreda) has also reportedly proposed a target of generating 5 GW from wind power by 2030, up from virtually none today.

Renewable energy represents a far better alternative to gas to meet Bangladesh’s growing electricity demand. Renewable energy is cheaper than gas – in late 2022, the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) estimated that the cost of energy from rooftop solar and utility scale solar are BDT 5.5 and BDT 7.6, well below the current average electricity generation cost of BDT 10. Worldwide, new solar is estimated to be between 11% and 40% cheaper than the cost of new gas plants. Renewable energy is also more reliable than bidding for LNG supplies in a volatile and competitive international market, where buyers in richer regions like Europe can outbid Bangladesh. 

Despite these advantages of renewable energy, the country is well off course to meet the ambitious targets in the MCPP. If the country had followed the most ambitious pathway in the MCPP for solar power deployment, Bangladesh could have reduced the volume of its spot market LNG imports by 25% between 2022 and 2024 compared to the current trajectory, saving USD 2.7 billion, according to analysis by Ember.

Fig. 5: Solar power projection and Bangladesh’s spot LNG purchases
Source: Ember

Bangladesh has now set a target of achieving 40% renewable energy by 2041, but is not currently on course to grow its share of renewable energy in the near future. Expanding LNG imports and gas power generation is set to come at a significant cost to Bangladesh, and is far from guaranteed to be able to supply reliable power to the country. The costs of these projects would be better spent supporting an immediate and rapid increase in the deployment of solar and wind power, to provide cheap reliable power to the country. International donors and financial institutions should also dramatically increase the level of financing available for renewable energy projects – between 2000 and 2020, renewables only received 17% of the USD 10.9 billion in public finance for electricity generation in Bangladesh.

In March 2023, the government of Bangladesh is expected to publish its Integrated Energy and Power Master Plan, updating the 2016 power sector plan. This review gives Bangladesh the opportunity to learn the lessons of the ongoing global gas price crisis, revise down the planned expansion of gas power and LNG imports and instead focus on rapidly scaling up wind and solar power.

Analysis of US methane & fossil fuel announcements at COP27

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Key points:

  • The proposed 87% reduction in methane emissions from oil and gas by 2030 in the US Methane Reduction Action Plan is more ambitious than the IEA and the average of IPCC scenarios to limit warming to 1.5oC
  • However, US methane emissions from the oil and gas sector are more than double those in the US government’s own official figures, and are still rising, according to Climate TRACE.
  • The Joint Declaration from Energy Importers and Exporters on Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Fossil Fuels aims “to minimise flaring, methane, and CO2 emissions across the fossil energy value chain to the fullest extent practicable.”
  • Limiting warming to 1.5oC requires a rapid reduction in fossil fuel use as well as in methane and supply chain emissions. 
  • However, the US accounts for 41% of the world’s LNG capacity that is currently under development (either proposed or in construction). US gas production is forecast to increase by 9% between 2021-2030, but to align with the IEA Net Zero Emissions scenario, gas production would need to reduce by 25% over this period.

Importance of methane reduction

Ambitious domestic oil and gas methane reduction

US oil and gas methane emissions more than double official figures

  • Officially-reported methane emissions in the US are significantly underestimated
  • According to the latest official US data, total reported methane emissions from the oil and gas sector in 2020 were 212 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent. 11https://cfpub.epa.gov/ghgdata/inventoryexplorer/#energy/naturalgasandpetroleumsystems/allgas/gas/all
  • Our analysis of data released this week from Climate TRACE – which is sourced independently and primarily based on direct observations of activity – suggests oil and gas production actually emitted 17.4 million tonnes of methane, or 519 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent, more than double the official figure. 12https://climatetrace.org/downloads conversion from CH4 to CO2e using GWP100 of 29.8, from IPCC AR6 WG1 Table 7.15
  • Similarly, US EPA data show US methane emissions from oil and gas fell by 2% between 2015-2020, whereas Climate TRACE data suggest they actually rose by 34% over the same period. 13https://cfpub.epa.gov/ghgdata/inventoryexplorer/#energy/naturalgasandpetroleumsystems/allgas/gas/all
  • If the 87% reduction is achieved on actual emissions, as measured by Climate TRACE, this would have a significant impact. However, if measurement and reporting remain weak and inaccurate, claimed reductions may have little relationship with real-world methane emissions.

US expansion of gas production and LNG exports threatens global climate targets

Key takeaways from the three working group reports of the IPCC sixth assessment

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Key points

  • Climate change is unequivocally caused by human activities as a result of burning fossil fuels, industrial processes and land use change and it is a threat to human well-being and planetary health.
  • Losses and damages from climate change will increase rapidly with further warming, in many cases creating risks that people and nature will be unable to adapt to. If emissions are cut at the rate currently planned, the resulting temperature rise will threaten food production, water supplies, human health, coastal settlements, national economies and the survival of much of the natural world.
  • To prevent further warming, urgent emission reductions across all sectors and rapid scale up of electrification are needed to reduce emissions and keep warming to 1.5°C by the end of the century. However, even the most ambitious scenarios indicate global temperatures will temporarily overshoot 1.5°C.
  • Models from the Working Group 1 and 3 report both indicate that deep reductions in other greenhouse gases, particularly in methane emissions, will help lower peak warming. 
  • Any further delay in concerted global action on adaptation and mitigation will miss a brief and rapidly-closing window of opportunity to secure a liveable and sustainable future for everyone.

IPCC’s sixth assessment cycle 

Between 2020 and 2022, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released three reports from its sixth assessment cycle covering the latest science on the physical state of the global climate (Working Group 1, WGI), the impact of climate change (Working Group 2, WGII) and mitigation of climate change (Working Group 3, WGIII). 

The sixth assessment cycle (AR6)  included 782 scientists, who worked on a voluntary basis, with 67 countries contributing to create the most authoritative assessment of climate change to date. 

This briefing summarises key themes that run through these three reports: 

  • The human-driven impact of climate change
  • The cause and current trajectory of our climate crisis
  • The speed and scale of the transformation required to achieve a safe(r) climate

Climate change is happening all around us 

The term “unequivocal” was used in both WG1 and WG2 to describe the scientific consensus that the climate is changing as a result of human activity, representing a threat to human well-being, societies and the natural world.1WG1, SPM A.1, WG2, SPM D.5.3. Human actions have warmed the climate at a rate that is unprecedented in at least the last 2,000 years, increasing the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events across the world. 2WG1, SPM1.WG2,SPM B.1.1 The physical impact of climate change is causing substantial damages and, in some cases, irreversible losses.3WG2,SPM B.1.1 

The WG2 report emphasised that we have a brief and rapidly-closing window of opportunity to secure a liveable future. Additionally, WG3 stressed that without urgent, effective and equitable mitigation, climate change increasingly threatens the health and livelihoods of people around the globe, ecosystem health and biodiversity.4WG2, SPM D.5.3 and WG3, SPM D.1.1

National commitments made by governments prior to COP26 are not enough to limit warming to 1.5°C and are likely to lead to global warming of 2.8°C by 2100. 5WG3, SPM B.6.WG3, SPM C.1.1. Both WG1 and WG3 reports agreed that even in the most ambitious emissions reduction scenario, it is more likely than not that global warming will reach 1.5°C by 2030 and overshoot to 1.6°C, before dropping back down.6WG1 Table SPM1, WG3, SPM Table SPM 2

The WG2 report described the devastating impacts of our current emissions pathway:

  • Food production and food security will be threatened by even a small amount of additional warming, which will cause increases in the severity and frequency of heatwaves, droughts and floods, along with sea-level rise7WG2, SPM B.4.3.
  • If warming reaches 2°C, there will be significant increases in ill-health and premature death as a result of more extreme weather and heatwaves, and disease spread8WG2, SPM B.4.4.
  • The extinction risk for unique and threatened species will be at least 10 times higher if temperature rise continues to 3°C, compared with if it is limited to 1.5°C.9WG2, SPM B.6.4.

Reliance on fossil fuels is the root cause of climate change 

Human activities around fossil fuel combustion, industrial processes, land use change and forestry have caused greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to increase dramatically since pre-industrial times, and emissions were higher between 2010-2019 than in any previous decade.10WG3, SPM B.1, Footnote 6WG3, SPM B.1. Of the GHGs, CO2 has contributed the most to recorded warming to date, followed by methane.11WG1, Figure SPM2.WG1 D.1.7, Figure SPM2
In 2019, coal contributed to 33% of all human-related CO2 emissions, followed by oil (29%) and gas (18%).12WG3, Technical Summary, Figure TS.3. Public and private finance continue to flow into fossil fuels and, as a result, GHG emissions continue to rise across all sectors and subsectors, and most rapidly in transport and industry. 13WG3, Technical Summary, page 23.WG3, SPM B.5.4. Between 2019-2020, investment in fossil fuels was greater than that for climate adaptation and mitigation.14WG3, SPM B.5.4. In the power sector, fossil fuel-related investment was, on average, USD 120 billion a year. An average of USD 650 billion were invested in the oil supply and USD 100 billion in coal supply.15WG3, Chapter 15, 15.3.3. In comparison, actual global public finance flow for adaptation was USD 46 billion.16WG3, Chapter 15, 15.1.1.

Delayed climate action in reducing our reliance on fossil fuels is partly the result of a concerted effort to generate rhetoric and misinformation that undermines climate science and disregards risk and urgency.17WG2, Chapter 14, 14.3.1. This is particularly true in the US, where despite scientific certainty of the anthropogenic influence on climate change, misinformation and politicisation of climate change science has created polarisation in public and policy domains.18WG2, Chapter 14, 14.3.1.

People who have contributed the least to the existing climate crisis are likely to be the most vulnerable and least able to adapt. The richest 10% of households contribute about 36%-45% of global GHG emissions. About two thirds of the top 10% richest households live in developed countries.19WG3, Technical Summary, page 21. But increased heavy rain, tropical cyclones and drought will force more people from their homes, particularly in places that are more vulnerable and have less ability to adapt.20WG2 SPM B.4.7. 

Urgent, transformative change is needed to limit global warming

To limit warming to 1.5°C, we need to drastically reduce our reliance on fossil fuels for energy production and switch to widespread electrification using renewable energy generation. 21WG3, SPM C.3.2.WG3, SPM C.3.2. Changing how electricity is generated is especially important in transitioning our energy system, and in scenarios limiting warming to 1.5°C (with no or limited overshoot), the electricity sector reaches net-zero CO2 emissions globally between 2045 and 2055.22WG3, Chapter 6, Executive summary. In these scenarios, electricity supply rises to 48%-58% of final energy use by 2050 (in comparison to 20% in 2019).23WG3, Chapter 6, Executive summary. A combination of widespread electrification of all energy demand and a shift to renewable electricity systems that emit no CO2 will create co-benefits such as better health and cleaner air.24WG3, SPM C.4.1, SPM E.2.2.

We also need to have strong, rapid and sustained reductions in methane emissions. Models show that reducing methane emissions by a third by 2030 is needed to create a net cooling effect. 25WG3, SPM C.1.2.WG2, SPM D.1.7. Deep GHG emission reductions by 2030 and 2040 – particularly reductions of methane emissions – lower peak warming, reduce the likelihood of overshooting warming limits and lead to less reliance on net negative CO2 emissions that reverse warming in the latter half of the century.26WG2, SPM C.2.

Global use of coal, oil and gas (without CCS) is reduced by 100%, 60% and 70% respectively by 2050 in pathways that successfully limit warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot.27WG3, SPM C.3.2. If not phased out, existing and planned fossil fuel infrastructure (without CCS) will make limiting warming to 1.5°C impossible.28WG3, SPM B.7

Rapid and deeper near-term GHG emissions reduction through to 2030 will lead to less reliance on carbon dioxide removal (CDR) in the longer term, but it is likely that we will need some CDR to counterbalance residual GHG emissions from hard-to-abate sectors.29WG3, SPM C.2.2, SPM C.3

CDR is not a ‘get out of jail free card’, especially at higher levels of warming because the ability of land and ocean sinks to sequester carbon will be greatly reduced at higher temperatures.30WG1, Figure 7 CDR also has limited ability to preserve existing ecosystems. If temperature rise passes 1.5°C, entire ecosystems will be irreversibly lost (including polar, mountain and coastal ecosystems, and regions that would be affected by ice-sheet and glacier melting),  even if temperatures are later reduced with measures to remove CO2 from the atmosphere.31WG2, SPM B.6.1

Some progress is being made

The WG3 report made it clear that there are mitigation options available in all sectors that could together halve global GHG emissions by 2030.32WG3, SPM C.12.1 Growing numbers of countries have seen the advent of cheap renewables that will power electric vehicles, heat pumps and other smart, emissions-free technologies. 

From 2010–2019, there were sustained decreases in the unit costs of solar energy (85%), wind energy (55%) and lithium-ion batteries (85%), and large increases in their deployment – for example >10x for solar and >100x for electric vehicles (EVs).33WG3, SPM Figure SPM 3 PV, onshore and offshore wind can now compete with fossil fuels on the levelised cost of energy in many places and electricity systems in some countries and regions are already predominantly powered by renewables.34WG3, Figure SPM 3, C.4.3 Large scale battery storage on electricity grids is increasingly viable.35WG3, Chapter 6, Executive summary

Electric vehicles are increasingly competitive against internal combustion engines, and it is the fastest growing segment of the automobile industry, having achieved double-digit market share by 2020 in many countries.36WG3, SPM Table TS.1  Electrification of public transport has been demonstrated as a feasible, scalable and affordable option to decarbonise mass transportation. 

There is also some green shoots evidence of climate policy beginning to have a positive real-world impact on emissions reductions that can be built on, for example:

  • At least 18 countries have now sustained production-based GHG and consumption-based CO2 emissions reductions for longer than 10 years.37WG3, SPM B.3.5
  • By 2020, over 20% of global GHG emissions were covered by carbon taxes or emissions trading systems, although coverage and prices have been insufficient to drive deep reductions.38WG3, SPM B.5.2
  • There are now ‘direct’ climate laws focused on GHG reduction in 56 countries covering 53% of global emission in 2020, and climate litigation is on the rise.39WG3, SPM B.5.2, E3.3
  • 1
    WG1, SPM A.1, WG2, SPM D.5.3.
  • 2
    WG1, SPM1.WG2,SPM B.1.1
  • 3
    WG2,SPM B.1.1
  • 4
    WG2, SPM D.5.3 and WG3, SPM D.1.1
  • 5
    WG3, SPM B.6.WG3, SPM C.1.1.
  • 6
    WG1 Table SPM1, WG3, SPM Table SPM 2
  • 7
    WG2, SPM B.4.3.
  • 8
    WG2, SPM B.4.4.
  • 9
    WG2, SPM B.6.4.
  • 10
    WG3, SPM B.1, Footnote 6WG3, SPM B.1.
  • 11
    WG1, Figure SPM2.WG1 D.1.7, Figure SPM2
  • 12
    WG3, Technical Summary, Figure TS.3.
  • 13
    WG3, Technical Summary, page 23.WG3, SPM B.5.4.
  • 14
    WG3, SPM B.5.4.
  • 15
    WG3, Chapter 15, 15.3.3.
  • 16
    WG3, Chapter 15, 15.1.1.
  • 17
    WG2, Chapter 14, 14.3.1.
  • 18
    WG2, Chapter 14, 14.3.1.
  • 19
    WG3, Technical Summary, page 21.
  • 20
    WG2 SPM B.4.7.
  • 21
    WG3, SPM C.3.2.WG3, SPM C.3.2.
  • 22
    WG3, Chapter 6, Executive summary.
  • 23
    WG3, Chapter 6, Executive summary.
  • 24
    WG3, SPM C.4.1, SPM E.2.2.
  • 25
    WG3, SPM C.1.2.WG2, SPM D.1.7.
  • 26
    WG2, SPM C.2.
  • 27
    WG3, SPM C.3.2.
  • 28
    WG3, SPM B.7
  • 29
    WG3, SPM C.2.2, SPM C.3
  • 30
    WG1, Figure 7
  • 31
    WG2, SPM B.6.1
  • 32
    WG3, SPM C.12.1
  • 33
    WG3, SPM Figure SPM 3
  • 34
    WG3, Figure SPM 3, C.4.3
  • 35
    WG3, Chapter 6, Executive summary
  • 36
    WG3, SPM Table TS.1
  • 37
    WG3, SPM B.3.5
  • 38
    WG3, SPM B.5.2
  • 39
    WG3, SPM B.5.2, E3.3

IPCC Sixth Assessment Report: Mitigation of climate change

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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has released the third of its four-part, Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) in April 2022. The Working Group III (AR6 WGIII) report is the most comprehensive review of how we can mitigate climate change since the 5th assessment (AR5) in 2014, and the IPCC’s three recent special reports (SR1.5 in 2018 and the 2019 SRCCL and SROCC). 1WGIII will be third of  four separate reports published in the AR6 cycle. ‘The Physical Science Basis’ which detailed the current state of the climate was published on 9 August 2021 and the second report ‘impacts, adaptation and vulnerability’ was released in March 2022.

The report has been ratified after a plenary negotiation in which governments formally approved the summary for policymakers, ensuring high credibility in both science and policy communities. The report covers a broad spectrum of topics, from mitigation pathways and in-depth sectoral analysis to finance, international cooperation, net-zero and carbon dioxide removal. For the first time in IPCC history, chapters dedicated to technology, innovation and demand-side measures are included.

This briefing covers some of the major developments in our knowledge of mitigation since the IPCC’s AR5 was published in 2014. Today, mitigation literature largely reflects the 2015 Paris Agreement, increasing net-zero commitments and the growing need for action from non-governmental stakeholders including businesses, industry and financial institutions.

1. Since AR5 greenhouse gas emissions have continued to climb

We are nowhere near on track to achieve the Paris targets of keeping warming below 2°C, and ideally 1.5°C. Current national climate plans (NDCs) will see us warm by about 2.7°C this century, or possibly even higher 2These numbers are based on pre-Glasgow estimates. If you add all pre-Glasgow net-zero pledges to the NDCs this brings the world on track for 2.2°C, according to UNEP (or about 2.1°C in IEA assessments), page 12, section 7 of the 2021 Emissions Gap Executive Summary..  If CO2 emissions continue at current rates, we will exhaust the remaining 1.5°C carbon budget in the early 2030s 3Most recent estimates show that only 440 Gt CO2 is left from 2020 to stand even a 50% chance of 1.5°C. Global emissions were over 40 Gt CO2 in 2019, and if annual emissions are similar in the next decade it will be used up in the 2030s.. The energy infrastructure from planned and current fossil fuels alone commits us to about 846 GtCO2 (more than double what’s left in our 1.5°C carbon budget) and every year we add more carbon-intensive infrastructure than we decommission. 

Of the greenhouse gases (GHGs), CO2 causes most warming due to its high concentration and long lifetime in the atmosphere. Despite efforts to reduce emissions, our burning of fossil fuels adds more CO2 to the atmosphere, pushing the cumulative atmospheric concentration to unsustainable highs. Between 1850-2019, coal, oil and gas accounted for ~66% of cumulative CO2 emissions, with land-use change responsible for about 32%. 

But since AR5, there has been greater recognition of increasing emissions of methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O). Both are potent GHGs that trap about 34 and 300 times more heat than CO2 respectively (over a 100 year period). Methane is responsible for almost a quarter of human-caused warming to date, and concentrations are increasing faster now than at any time since the 1980s. Today, methane emissions are two-and-a-half times above pre-industrial levels. The AR6 WGI SPM authors emphasised that “strong, rapid and sustained reductions” in methane emissions would have the dual impact of limiting “the warming effect resulting from declining aerosol pollution” and improving air quality.

Between 2008-2017, agriculture and waste contributed most to the rise, followed by the fossil fuel industry. However, estimating by exactly how much, and from where, methane emissions are increasing is a topic of continued research and debate. For example, some researchers have found that the role of North American shale gas (so called “fracking”) has been significantly underestimated in calculating the global methane emissions. 

Emissions of N2O have risen 20% from pre-industrial levels, with the fastest growth observed in the last 50 years, mainly due to nitrogen additions to croplands through fertilisers. 

In 2018, global GHG emissions were about 57% higher than in 1990 and about 43% higher than in 2000. Emissions continued to rise in 2019, when they reached about 59 GtCO2e. But in 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic led to a historical large drop in CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industry. During the height of global lockdowns, daily emissions dropped by 17% compared to 2019, levels not seen since 2006, and people around the world were allowed a short respite from deadly air pollution. Since then, emissions have rebounded, and were the highest yet last year. However, research has shown that rebuilding the economy in a more green, sustainable, just and climate-centred way represents a far greater opportunity than the short, lockdown-triggered emissions break, which will have little impact in the long run.

2. Without a drastic boost in climate ambition, our hopes of  achieving the Paris Goals of 1.5°C and 2°C without “overshoot” are out of reach

We are increasingly likely to “overshoot” average global temperatures of 1.5°C and 2°C (meaning that global average temperature temporarily (on order of decades) exceeds the temperature target before reducing again. This can only occur if atmospheric GHG concentrations are lowered – and this is through carbon dioxide removal (CDR), which is by no means a given (see below)). Growing research shows that, for the same end of century temperature increase, overshooting is likely to lead to more climate damages (some of which are irreversible) – like biodiversity loss and extreme weather – than if we get there with no overshoot 4Zickfeld, K. and Herrington, T., 2015. and; Ricke, Katharine L., and Caldeira, K., 2014 and; Tachiiri, K., Hajima, T. and Kawamiya, M., 2019.. 

Delaying mitigation means we will have to cut more emissions each year to stay Paris-aligned by 2030. We already knew the dangers of delayed mitigation in 2014, when the IPCC stated that scenarios with high emissions through to 2030 would have higher long-term economic costs, and would “substantially increase the difficulty of the transition” and “narrow the range of options consistent with… 2°C”. Today, average annual emissions cuts needed to stay below 1.5°C are four times higher than they would have been if collective mitigation and ambition started in 2010, according to UNEP. This highlights the need to act fast.

Investment levels are also nowhere near to what we need to stay Paris aligned. The 2015 Paris Agreement recognised the key role finance plays in both mitigation and adaptation – it placed investors and financial commitments centre stage for climate policy and action. However, climate finance has only increased slightly since AR5, reaching about USD 579 billion in 2018/2017. This is about ten times less than the estimated USD 6.3 trillion needed every year by 2030 to stay Paris aligned. 

Since AR5, the split between public and private climate finance has remained relatively stable (about 44% public and 56% private in 2018). Private finance has, however, outpaced public finance in the energy sector, and increasingly so in transport, reflecting a more mature renewable energy market and the fact that projects are now perceived to be less risky. The private sector is expressing increasing concern over the risks of climate impacts, but climate-related financial risks remain underestimated by financial institutions and decision makers 5Some disclosure measures, like the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure (TCFD) may also be largely ineffective, as the assumption that transparency will automatically lead investors to ‘rationally’ respond by moving climate finance from high- to low-carbon assets could be oversimplified..

3. The richest 1% emit more than twice the poorest 50%

Since AR5, there has been increased interest in the ‘national responsibility’ for climate change, as well as the links to other sustainability, development and social issues. The US is responsible for about 20% of cumulative historical emissions, followed by China, Russia, Brazil and Indonesia. Just looking at national emissions does not, however, complete the picture, as the unequal size, wealth and carbon intensity of populations need to be factored in. Looking at emissions relative to population size, developing countries tend to have lower per-capita emissions and, if emissions are normalised to population, China, Brazil and Indonesia do not even make the top 20. 

The richest 1% worldwide emit more than twice the combined share of the poorest 50%, according to UNEP. Activities that emit a lot, but only benefit a few, include flying and driving SUVs. For example, if emissions from SUVs were counted as a nation, it would rank 7th in the world. As COVID-19 caused carbon emissions to fall last year, the SUV sector continued to see emissions rise. In 2018, only 2% to 4% of people got on an international flight, and 1% of the global population are responsible for about half of CO2 emitted from all commercial flights. The aviation industry is responsible for 2.4% of global emission, as such these 1% users could be contributing about 450 million tonnes of CO2 each year – about the same as South Africa’s annual emissions. 

Research, including last month’s landmark AR6 WGII report, shows that climate change affects people differently by gender, race and ethnicity, and these all link to economic vulnerability. Marginalised groups have less access to energy, and use less. For example, women’s carbon footprints are generally lower than men’s, mostly due to reduced meat consumption and driving, though this varies across nations 6See reference 1, 2 and 3. But, even though women generally emit less, their inclusion in policy making can lead to better climate policy. Climate groups are now recognising that disadvantage is the result of many interacting systems of oppression.

4. But there is hope: since AR5 national and corporate net-zero commitments have exploded and renewable energy has continued to outperform forecasts

Since AR5, there has been a substantial growth in climate policy, legislation and treaties at both international, national and sub-national levels. Most importantly, in 2015, the Paris Agreement was signed. The Paris Agreement Article 4 seeks to achieve a “balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases”, which can be interpreted as net zero greenhouse gas emissions (not just CO2). Renewable energy has also continued to massively outperform forecasts, making it a post-AR5 success story. Just in 2020, the amount of new renewable electricity capacity added rose by 45% to 280 gigawatts, the largest year-on-year increase since 1999 (more in box below), while costs have fallen sharply in that time. And, more recently, the concept of ‘net-zero’ entered the policy arena in full force. 

In 2014, the IPCC was not directly using net-zero language, but concluded that limiting the cumulative emissions of GHGs to zero was key to stopping climate change. In 2018, the IPCC outlined that to limit warming to 1.5°C, CO2 emissions would need to fall by about 45% in 2030 (relative to 2010 levels), and global net-zero had to be reached around 2050. WG1 of AR6 (released in August 2021) outlined the need not only for a cut in CO2 emissions, but also strong reductions in other GHGs 7IPCC AR6 WGI D.1. In 2019, the UK became the first G7 economy to legislate for net-zero. Today, 136 countries with 85% of the world’s population, covering 88% of global emissions have set net zero targets, although the targets and timing of how they are delivered remain under criticism for being too vague. This 2021 paper sets out ways that governments could begin to add clarity and accountability; issues considered key to delivering net zero GHG emissions, in pursuit of the Paris targets.

What does achieving net-zero actually look like?

There are many scenarios assessing how we can get to net-zero, and we await the IPCC’s assessment to get an up-to-date, global view. However, some of the key points likely to appear are summarised here. 

Achieving the Paris goals requires rapid mitigation across the full range of GHGs. Scientists have shown that, even if CO2 emissions are Paris-aligned, ignoring methane emissions will lead to overshooting the Paris agreed temperature goals, while abating N2O emissions would help achieve the temperature targets as well as a suite of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 

Renewable electrification is key. A consistent success story since AR5 is the rapid deployment and falling costs of Renewable Energy (RE), such as solar, wind and batteries, which have massively outpaced and exceeded the expert expectations outlined in AR5. But we still need to ramp up. The amount of solar PV and wind deployment has to be twice what has already been announced globally to stay on a 1.5°C trajectory, according to the IEA. We also need to boost funding to clean energy solutions, as many of the technologies needed for hard-to-abate sectors are still in development and annual investment into clean energy needs to triple to USD 3.6 trillion through 2030. 

Fossil fuel use needs to decline dramatically. Global coal emissions needed to have peaked in 2020, and all coal-fired power plants need to be shut by 2040 at the latest, a Climate Analytics analysis based on the IPCC’s 2018 report shows. For OECD nations, all coal use should be phased out by 2031. This was echoed by the IEA in 2021 – it concluded that for net-zero, all unabated coal and oil power plants need to be phased out by 2040. Increasing energy efficiency is also key. In the IEA’s net-zero compliant scenario, the energy intensity of the global economy decreases by 4% a year between 2020 and 2030 – more than double the average rate of the last decade.  

Some degree of carbon removal is needed. Net-zero is achieved when the emissions going into the atmosphere are balanced by those removed. It is possible to achieve global net-zero while still allowing for emissions in some sectors – as long as these ‘hard to abate’ emissions are also being removed and permanently stored. Methods of removal range from enhancing natural carbon drawdown through reforestation, restoration and the protection of nature, to ‘negative emissions technology’ like direct air capture (DAC) and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). In the last few years, more attention has been paid to the ‘net’ part of net-zero, as pretty much all published scenarios that bring us within 1.5°C or 2.0°C rely on some form of CDR. 

Transforming the Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) sector is crucial. Today, it accounts for nearly a quarter of global GHG emissions and sectoral emissions have been climbing in recent years. Livestock production and rice cultivation are the main culprits. The sector is also a carbon sink, as plants and biomass draw CO2 from the atmosphere when they grow. Transforming the sector can both reduce emissions – for example, by changing farming and livestock methods – as well as remove emissions from the atmosphere, including measures like planting more (and protecting existing) forests. However, reforestation and better land management alone will not be enough. Some estimates suggest that transforming the AFOLU sector could at most account for 30% of the mitigation needed to stay below 1.5°C. However, the recent hype that planting trees and investing in land can solve the climate crisis is risking delayed mitigation and greenwashing.

Urban planning needs to consider carbon emissions from the get go. The current scale and speed of urbanisation is unprecedented in human history, and since AR5 it has become even more clear that urban areas contribute the majority (about 70%) of the global footprint, posing an enormous challenge for climate mitigation. New urban planning presents a unique opportunity to reduce carbon lock-in. 

Many more aspects of mitigation and gaps in our knowledge will be explored by the IPCC in this report. For example, the IPCC will dedicate a chapter to demand-side mitigation for the first time, which will explore how behaviour and lifestyle changes can reduce emissions, like shifts in diets, transport, buildings and the efficient use of materials and energy. In general, scientists agree that systemic infrastructural and behavioral change will be part of the transition to a low-carbon society, but the feasibility and mitigation potential of demand-side measures remain a knowledge gap.

5. Looking ahead, transparency is key

Net-zero targets should not be seen as end-points, but rather as milestones on the path to negative emissions, milestones that require detailed roadmaps as well as short-term goals. NGOs, scientists and the public continue to demand mitigation plans and net-zero targets that are clear and transparent, asking policymakers, businesses and financiers to clarify the scope, fairness and approach to decarbonisation. 

Over the past years, integrated assessment models (IAMs) have been a critical tool for climate policymakers, but they have also come under intense scrutiny due to issues like the huge reliance on CDR, especially BECCS, in many scenarios. However, over reliance on IAMs have been criticised given its opaque design and economic assumptions which can result in modelling outcomes that overemphasise CDR. 

In a 2020 paper, the co-chairs of the upcoming WGIII report outlined how the IPCC has taken steps to increase transparency this time around. They said the new report will contain some notable criticisms of IAMs, including the uncertainties, CDR and limits to land. It is, however, important to note that the IPCC itself is not advocating for any scenarios, including those with large amounts of CDR. Instead, the IPCC findings are a reflection of the state of climate modelling, as well as previous emissions pathways and scenario research.

Is it possible to stay Paris aligned without carbon removal?

Many of the scenarios used in earlier IPCC reports (including the special report on 1.5C) relied heavily on negative emissions in the second half of the century. Modelled negative emissions were primarily achieved by inputting a large amount of BECCS and/or forest protection/planting in the future scenarios. 

The numbers for future CDR are often huge, though they vary across models and scenarios. For example, in the IPCC’s special report on 1.5°C, the cumulative carbon removal needed by the end of the century was estimated to be somewhere between 100 and 1000 billion tonnes of CO2. For perspective, we emit more than 40 billion tonnes a year now, so even in the very lowest scenario we would have to remove more than two years’ worth of global CO2 emissions. 

Academics and NGOs have also pointed to the fact that all methods of carbon removal come with side effects and trade-offs that are context and method dependent – such as the huge land areas needed for BECCS, or energy requirements for Direct Air Capture with Carbon Storage (DACCS) (a technology  which some scientist predict could remove tens of GtCO2 by the end of century). Land-based carbon removals also come with other trade-offs, such as increased competition for agricultural land and disruption of biodiversity. There has also recently been an increased recognition that unrealistically high carbon removal projections could be encouraging delayed action and greenwashing. 

In this report, the IPCC intends to explain the limitations and trade-offs of carbon removal carefully, while assessing the amount of CDR in many of the scenarios. There has also been a new wave of scientific literature looking at how to achieve the Paris goals with no carbon removal whatsoever. These pathways show us that net-zero without the ‘net’ (let’s call it ‘true zero’) requires much more rapid transformations of the energy system and larger near-term emissions cuts. These scenarios also lead to multiple other benefits (so-called ‘co-benefits’) like avoiding drastic land-use change, as well as benefiting food systems, biodiversity and the environment in the long-term.

6. Further reading and academic papers

1. Since AR5 greenhouse gas emissions have continued to climb

Explainers and reports 

Selected academic research studies and reviews  

2. A lack of ambitious mitigation has made us increasingly likely to ‘overshoot’ the Paris Goals of 1.5°C and 2°C.

Explainers and reports 

Selected academic research studies and reviews  

3. The richest 1% emit more than twice the poorest 50% 

Explainers and reports 

Selected academic research studies and reviews  

4. But there is hope: since AR5 national and corporate net-zero commitments have exploded and renewable energy has continued to outperform forecasts

Explainers and reports 

Selected academic research studies and reviews  

5. Looking ahead, transparency is key  

Explainers and reports 

Selected academic research studies and reviews  

  • 1
    WGIII will be third of  four separate reports published in the AR6 cycle. ‘The Physical Science Basis’ which detailed the current state of the climate was published on 9 August 2021 and the second report ‘impacts, adaptation and vulnerability’ was released in March 2022.
  • 2
    These numbers are based on pre-Glasgow estimates. If you add all pre-Glasgow net-zero pledges to the NDCs this brings the world on track for 2.2°C, according to UNEP (or about 2.1°C in IEA assessments), page 12, section 7 of the 2021 Emissions Gap Executive Summary.
  • 3
    Most recent estimates show that only 440 Gt CO2 is left from 2020 to stand even a 50% chance of 1.5°C. Global emissions were over 40 Gt CO2 in 2019, and if annual emissions are similar in the next decade it will be used up in the 2030s.
  • 4
    Zickfeld, K. and Herrington, T., 2015. and; Ricke, Katharine L., and Caldeira, K., 2014 and; Tachiiri, K., Hajima, T. and Kawamiya, M., 2019.
  • 5
    Some disclosure measures, like the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure (TCFD) may also be largely ineffective, as the assumption that transparency will automatically lead investors to ‘rationally’ respond by moving climate finance from high- to low-carbon assets could be oversimplified.
  • 6
    See reference 1, 2 and 3
  • 7
    IPCC AR6 WGI D.1

IPCC WGIII report: Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS)

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This briefing summarises the main insights in the IPCC Working Group III report on Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS). The focus is on potential and feasibility of BECCS in climate mitigation, rather than the broader bioenergy sustainability topics.

Key points

  • BECCS can help to mitigate climate change, but it is not a silver bullet solution.
  • BECCS could have positive impacts, but there are many uncertainties, particularly when considering environmental and socio-economic issues.
  • BECCS is one of the heavily relied upon CDR methods used in climate models, but an area twice the size of Egypt could be needed to deploy BECCS in 2100 in pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C. Very large scale deployment would threaten food production and security, and damage ecosystems.
  • Delaying mitigation would put a lot of pressure on CDR, requiring large-scale deployment of BECCS to reduce the temperature overshoot, causing substantial land use change. Earlier mitigation would be essential to reduce the pressure on land and its associated impacts.

Bioenergy and BECCS: The basics

Bioenergy refers to energy products, such as fuels or electricity, that come from organic sources (e.g. waste, wood or crops). 1 Chapter 7, p. 77 It is often promoted as a ‘climate neutral’ solution, as in theory these organic sources only release the carbon dioxide (CO2) they had already absorbed when burnt. But, this characterisation depends on many assumptions, such as the type of feedstock used. Bioenergy could also help deliver other mitigation options, such as carbon sequestration from integrating trees into crop systems (e.g. agroforestry) that provide the feedstock for bioenergy.

When combined with carbon capture and storage (CCS), bioenergy is seen as a carbon dioxide removal (CDR) option. This is because the CO2 emitted is then captured and stored in geological, terrestrial, or ocean reservoirs, or in manufactured products. BECCS may also reduce net GHG emissions by displacing the use of fossil fuels with renewable biomass in the production of heat, electricity and fuels. 2Chapter 7, p. 77, Chapter 6. p.93

Benefits and risks of BECCS

The IPCC is careful when talking about BECCS. It stresses that it is a crucial CDR option, but its potential depends on many social and environmental considerations (e.g. the choice of feedstock, management practice, and deployment strategy and scale). The report does not assess all these options in-depth.

BECCS could have positive impacts, the IPCC says. But only if some strategies are followed to enhance its benefits, such as adopting management practices that protect carbon stocks. 3 Chapter 7, p.81 The use of feedstocks that do not need land (e.g. municipal organic waste or harvest residues) could also provide bioenergy at a significant, but limited, scale. 4 Chapter 7, p.78, Chapter 6, p. 40 These can reduce negative impacts associated with land use. Selecting crops that can produce both protein feed and biofuels could also reduce pressure to convert lands. 5Chapter 12, p. 103 Some technologies could generate co-benefits, such as anaerobic digestion of organic waste and wastewater, and those that convert indigestible biomass like algae into food and feed. 6Chapter 12, p. 103

If BECCS is poorly planned, however, it can “have adverse socio-economic and environmental impacts, including on biodiversity, food and water security, local livelihoods and on the rights of Indigenous Peoples, especially if implemented at large scales and where land tenure is insecure”. 7 SPM, p.47 Major scale-up of bioenergy production, for example, will need more than wastes/residues and cultivation on marginal lands. This will require more land and water, harming biodiversity and, potentially harming food security. Thus, “bioenergy systems may fail to deliver near-zero emissions depending on operating conditions and regional contexts”. 8Chapter 6, p.42

The IPCC says “it is therefore not possible to precisely determine the scale of bioenergy and BECCS deployment at which negative impacts outweigh benefits”. 9Chapter 7, p.77-78 “As a result, bioenergy carbon neutrality is debated… and the lifecycle emissions of BECCS remain uncertain and will depend on how effectively bioenergy conversion processes are optimised”. 10Chapter 6, p.42 The future of BECCS also depends on the roll-out of CCS technologies, it adds. 11Chapter 7, p.96 and chapter 7 , p. 6

Mitigation potential of BECCS

Bioenergy and BECCS can represent an important share of the total mitigation potential, the IPCC says, but conclusions on how big a share vary due to the large diversity of studies and their assumptions about where and how BECCS is deployed (e.g. the associated land use). 12Chapter 7, p.7 13Chapter 7, p.79 The IPCC concludes that:

  • The range of recent estimates for the technical bioenergy potential when constrained by food security and environmental considerations is 5–50EJ/yr by 2050 for bioenergy that uses residues for feedstocks, and 50–250 EJ/yr by 2050 for a dedicated biomass production system. 14Chapter 7, p.6 For context, 250 EJ/yr is equivalent to 20%–30% of global primary energy demand.
  • The global technical CDR potential for BECCS by 2050 (i.e. considering only the technical capture of CO2 and storage underground) is estimated at 0.5-11.3 billion tonnes of CO2 a year (GtCO2 a year). 15Excluding economic costs and/or sustainability concerns 16Chapter 12, p. 55.”These potentials do not include avoided emissions resulting from the use of heat, electricity and/or fuels provided by the BECCS system”. But, when considering cost effectiveness (less than USD100 per tonne of CO2-eq), the potential is reduced to 0.2- 9.9 GtCO2 a year. 17Chapter, 7, p.45 Currently, only 40 million tonnes of CO2 is captured a year via CCS, meaning we would need nearly a 150-fold increase in CCS capacity for this amount of BECCS. Moreover, most of the captured carbon today is used for enhanced oil recovery (EOR), rather than permanent geological storage. This undermines emissions cuts as emissions from burning recovered oil could more than offset the benefits of capturing the carbon dioxide in the first place, by a factor of up to three.

Therefore, the IPCC urges caution about these estimates as they reflect only biophysical and technological conditions. These estimates can be reduced when factoring in economic, environmental, socio cultural and institutional constraints. For example, the mitigation effect of BECCS could be reduced if models start to include the diminishing ability of land to remove CO2 from the atmosphere due to future climate change.

The role of BECCS in mitigation pathways

There has been “fervent debate” on the use of bioenergy with CCS in mitigation scenarios. 18Chapter 3.2.2 Reliance on it has been criticised for causing biodiversity loss, undermining food security, creating uncertain storage potential, excessive water use as well as creating the potential for temperature overshoot. 19Chapter 3, box 3.4 The overall land for bioenergy production is modelled to take place in tropical regions, where croplands for bioenergy displace land for food production (cropland and pasture) and other natural land. For example, in the 1.5°C mitigation pathway in Asia, bioenergy and forested areas together increase by about 2.1 million square kilometres – an area the size of Saudi Arabia – between 2020 and 2100, mostly at the cost of cropland and pasture. 20Chapter 7, figure 7.14 BECCS is also typically associated with delayed emissions reduction in the near-term. 21Chapter 3, box 3.4

Among CDR methods, BECCS is one the most common in climate models (i.e. integrated assessment models, or IAMs) to limit temperature rise to 2°C or lower. 22Afforestation and reforestation is also widely used. See here for more info. Currently, few models represent other options, such as biochar or soil carbon sequestration. In fact, all illustrative mitigation pathways (IMPs) from the WG3 report primarily BECCS (for comparison with other land CDR options and discussion of BECCS in models, see here).

Across the scenarios reviewed by the IPCC, in those likely to limit warming to 2°C or lower, the cumulative volumes of BECCS reach 328 (median values) GtCO2  respectively for the 2020-2100 period. Translated to annual volumes, the IPCC sees BECCS removing about 2.75 GtCO2 a year. 23 Chapter 12, p. 40 To put this into perspective, scientists predict that up to 10 GtCO2 will need to be removed annually to reach global emissions targets by 2050.

Many IAM pathways include large increases in cropland area to supply biomass for bioenergy and BECCS, with 199 (56-482) million hectares in 2100 in pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot. 24Chapter 3, p.6 To put this into perspective, 102 million hectares of land – an area the size of Egypt – have been converted to cropland since the start of the 21st century. 

Delaying mitigation would increase pressure on land because it would require large-scale deployment of CDR in the second half of the century to reduce temperature overshoot. The main CDR measures are BECCS and afforestation and reforestation because climate models use these measures as proxies for land-based mitigation. This will cause substantial land use change in 2050. Early mitigation reduces the amount of land required for this, though at the cost of larger land use transitions earlier in the century. Earlier action could also reduce climate impacts on agriculture and other land-mitigation options. 25Chapter 3, p.66

  • 1
     Chapter 7, p. 77
  • 2
    Chapter 7, p. 77, Chapter 6. p.93
  • 3
     Chapter 7, p.81
  • 4
     Chapter 7, p.78, Chapter 6, p. 40
  • 5
    Chapter 12, p. 103
  • 6
    Chapter 12, p. 103
  • 7
     SPM, p.47
  • 8
    Chapter 6, p.42
  • 9
    Chapter 7, p.77-78
  • 10
    Chapter 6, p.42
  • 11
    Chapter 7, p.96 and chapter 7 , p. 6
  • 12
    Chapter 7, p.7
  • 13
    Chapter 7, p.79
  • 14
    Chapter 7, p.6
  • 15
    Excluding economic costs and/or sustainability concerns
  • 16
    Chapter 12, p. 55.”These potentials do not include avoided emissions resulting from the use of heat, electricity and/or fuels provided by the BECCS system”.
  • 17
    Chapter, 7, p.45
  • 18
    Chapter 3.2.2
  • 19
    Chapter 3, box 3.4
  • 20
    Chapter 7, figure 7.14
  • 21
    Chapter 3, box 3.4
  • 22
    Afforestation and reforestation is also widely used. See here for more info.
  • 23
     Chapter 12, p. 40
  • 24
    Chapter 3, p.6
  • 25
    Chapter 3, p.66

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