For an equitable transition away from fossil fuels, advanced economies must phase out faster

by

Key points:

  • The Brazilian Presidency of COP30 has proposed an ‘Action Agenda’ which includes accelerating the energy transition through an equitable transition away from fossil fuels.
  • The IEA’s Net Zero Emissions (NZE) scenario provides a model of how this could be achieved, with emissions from the use of oil and natural gas falling faster in advanced economies.
  • Advanced economies need to reduce emissions from oil by 40% by 2030, compared to 20% for emerging and developing economies. For gas, the difference is even greater, with a 33% reduction for advanced economies and a 4% reduction for emerging economies.
  • Maintaining ambitious targets is crucial, with models such as the IEA’s Net Zero Emissions scenario highlighting the impact failure to reduce emissions in recent years will have on future emission levels.

COP30 and the equitable transition away from fossil fuels

In 2023, the world’s governments committed for the first time to address the main cause of climate change, the use of fossil fuels. Specifically, the UN COP28 climate summit outcome called for the: 

“Transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade, so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science.”

The Brazilian Presidency of this year’s COP30 climate summit has proposed an ‘Action Agenda’, which includes advancing progress on the COP28 commitment. It calls for “the acceleration of the global energy transition” and “transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems in a just, orderly and equitable manner”.

This briefing assesses what international equity means in practice for the transition away from oil and gas, in the context of the COP30 Action Agenda.

Equity at the foundation of international climate action

Equity, the principle of achieving fairness in a way that seeks to address existing inequalities, lies at the heart of international agreements on climate change. It is the first principle of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which states:

“The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.” (emphasis added)

This principle recognises both a country’s historical contribution to climate change, of which developed countries bear the greatest responsibility, and its economic capabilities, which are greater for developed countries.

Countries reaffirmed their commitment to this principle in the landmark 2015 Paris Agreement. In 2025 the International Court of Justice unanimously found that this commitment constitutes a clear legal duty for states:

“States have a duty […] to use all means at their disposal to prevent activities carried out within their jurisdiction or control from causing significant harm to the climate system and other parts of the environment, in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.” (emphasis added)

To turn this principle and legal duty into practice, advanced economies must phase out the use of oil and gas faster than emerging and developing countries, and in line with the 1.5C temperature goal of the Paris Agreement.

Advanced economies must move faster to phase out the use of oil and gas

The International Energy Agency (IEA) outlined its interpretation of these principles of international law in its Net Zero Emissions (NZE) scenario, which models how countries could meet the Paris Agreement goals. The scenario, first produced in 2021 and revised in 2023, sees CO2 emissions from advanced economies fall to net zero by around 2045, five years ahead of the rest of the world achieving its net-zero emissions goal (see Figure 1).1The IEA defines Advanced economies as the OECD regional grouping and Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta and Romania.

In the NZE scenario’s timeline to net zero, advanced economies need to reduce emissions from the use of oil by 40% by 2030, compared to a 20% reduction for emerging and developing economies. The difference is even more stark for gas, with advanced economies needing to achieve a 33% reduction in emissions, compared to 4% for emerging and developing countries.2ZCA analysis of data from the IEA World Energy Outlook 2024. Emerging and developing economies emissions reductions calculated by subtracting advanced economies emissions from world totals.

Figure 1

The differentiated responsibilities modelled in the IEA’s NZE makes it a useful analytical basis for the different pace of action required for advanced and developing economies as part of an equitable transition away from fossil fuels in the COP30 Action Agenda.

Failure to act is leading to less ambitious reductions by 2030

Since the IEA first published the NZE scenario, global CO2 emissions have risen by 11% from 2020 to 2023, according to its World Energy Outlook. Since the scenario envisioned an immediate reduction in emissions, subsequent editions accommodated this reality with an upward revision to the starting point for future reductions. As a result, the annual updates to the NZE scenario have progressively reduced the level of ambition for emissions reductions by the end of this critical decade.

For advanced economies that need to take the lead in reducing emissions, the 2022 NZE required natural gas emissions to fall by 45% by 2030, from 2021 levels. By 2024 this had fallen to a less ambitious 33% reduction from 2023 levels. For oil, the corresponding figures were a 48% cut in emissions in the 2022 NZE, falling to a 40% cut from 2023 levels in the 2024 NZE.3The IEA first published a breakdown of emissions pathways by region in the 2022 World Energy Outlook, so data is not available from the original 2021 report.

Figure 2

Figure 3

One reason for this lowering of ambition for emission reductions through 2030 is that the IEA has maintained a consistent rate of decline for advanced economies – 7% for oil and 6% for gas – even as the baseline level of current emissions has risen. This means that, rather than meeting the reality of rising emissions with rising ambitions for the pace of reduction this decade, the absolute level of emissions reduction has fallen with each annual revision of the NZE data. 

These changes demonstrate the need for urgent action – with delays not only causing greater emissions now, but also leading to either higher levels of emissions or the need for even more rapid reductions in emissions into the future.

  • 1
    The IEA defines Advanced economies as the OECD regional grouping and Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta and Romania.
  • 2
    ZCA analysis of data from the IEA World Energy Outlook 2024. Emerging and developing economies emissions reductions calculated by subtracting advanced economies emissions from world totals.
  • 3
    The IEA first published a breakdown of emissions pathways by region in the 2022 World Energy Outlook, so data is not available from the original 2021 report.

$8.7 trillion invested in the oil and gas industry since the Paris Agreement

by

Key points:

  • USD 8.7 trillion has been invested in oil and gas in the ten years since the Paris Agreement was signed, representing a major block to achieving greater global progress on reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
  • The oil and gas industry has only spent around USD 113 billion on clean energy since the Paris Agreement, despite widespread commitment by the industry to a “net zero future”. For every dollar the industry invested in clean energy, it spent 46 dollars on upstream oil and gas supply.
  • More than half a trillion dollars has been spent on exploring for new oil and gas reserves, despite studies showing that new fields are not compatible with the goal of limiting warming to 1.5°C.
  • Since the Paris Agreement was signed, investment in renewables has more than doubled, while fossil fuel investments have remained static. Achieving the Paris Agreement goals requires both the scaling up of clean investment and the phasing out of fossil fuel investment.
  • The industry has described carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) as a “crucial enabler” of the energy transition, but has invested just over USD 15 billion in the technology since the Paris Agreement. For every dollar invested in CCUS, the oil and gas industry has invested 32 dollars exploring for new sources of oil and gas.

Progress since Paris

When the Paris Agreement was signed in 2015, the world was on course for more than 4°C of warming by the end of the century. Ten years later, the world is projected to be headed for 2.7°C of warming based on current policies, and could limit the rise to 1.9°C in a best-case scenario. However, global greenhouse gas emissions have not yet peaked, and even the most optimistic 1.9°C of warming fails to achieve the Paris Agreement’s goals of limiting warming to “well below” 2°C. One of the most significant reasons that more has not been achieved is inaction by the oil and gas industry.

Sustained fossil fuel investment

Clean energy investment, as defined by the International Energy Agency1Investment figures are ZCA calculations from data from IEA World Energy Investment 2025. The IEA defines clean energy as renewable power, battery storage, electricity networks, clean fuels, direct air capture, fossil fuels with CCUS, other clean power and end-use including energy efficiency., has risen 70% since the Paris Agreement, with renewable investment more than doubling, rising 108%. Yet over the same period, fossil fuel investment has fallen by only 4%, remaining consistently around USD 1 trillion per year (see figure 1). The rise in clean energy investment is not enough to achieve the Paris Agreement goals, investment in fossil fuels must also fall. 

In the ten years since the Paris Agreement, USD 8.7 trillion has been invested in the oil and gas industry. Of that total, nearly two-thirds, USD 5.7 trillion, has been invested in upstream oil and gas, drilling and extraction. More than half a trillion dollars have been spent on exploring for new oil and gas supplies in conventional fields, despite multiple studies showing that new oil and gas supplies would push the world past the 1.5°C goal of the Paris Agreement.

Figure 1

The oil and gas industry has continued to profit from this ongoing investment. In 2022, when oil and gas prices were high in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the industry as a whole made USD 4 trillion in profit. Since the Paris Agreement was signed the big six investor-owned oil and gas companies – BP, Chevron, Eni, ExxonMobil, Shell and TotalEnergies – have collectively made USD 621 billion2 Net income. Data for Q1 2016 – Q2 2025, from Bloomberg Terminal, accessed 23 October 2025..

The oil and gas industry hasn’t transitioned to clean investment

The vast majority of the oil and gas industry has committed to a “net zero future consistent with the Paris Agreement.” Despite such goals, the industry has only spent around USD 113 billion on clean energy since the Paris Agreement, 1.4% of total investment in oil and gas over this period3Calculation based on 2016-2024 data, as a detailed breakdown of oil and gas spending on clean energy in 2025 was not included in the IEA World Energy Investment report. The IEA defines clean energy investment as solar PV, wind, CCUS, bioenergy, energy storage, low-emissions hydrogen and ‘other’.. In the upstream sector alone, the industry spent 46 dollars on oil and gas supply for every dollar it spent on clean energy.

A study of the largest 250 oil and gas companies – which together are responsible for 88.3% of global oil and gas production – found that only 49 were operating renewable energy projects, responsible for about 1.4% of operational global renewable energy capacity. 

The industry’s clean energy investment is also slowing, having fallen by around 25% between 2023 and 2024, to under USD 22 billion.

Figure 2

The oil and gas industry has publicly thrown its weight behind carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) as a “crucial enabler for the energy transition”. Despite perceiving the technology as crucial, the industry has spent just over USD 15 billion on the technology since the Paris Agreement4For the period 2016-2024. IEA data is not yet available for 2025.. For every dollar the industry has invested in CCUS, it has invested 32 dollars in exploration for new sources of oil and gas supply. The IEA describes CCUS as being “not on track”, with carbon capture capacity set to reach only 40% of the level needed in its Net Zero Emissions by 2050 scenario. 

Despite the industry’s enthusiasm for CCUS, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has found that it is one of the most expensive options for reducing emissions from energy supply, with the least potential for reducing emissions in the near term. In addition, more than 80% of current CCUS capacity is being used for enhanced oil recovery, which increases hydrocarbon extraction.

  • 1
    Investment figures are ZCA calculations from data from IEA World Energy Investment 2025. The IEA defines clean energy as renewable power, battery storage, electricity networks, clean fuels, direct air capture, fossil fuels with CCUS, other clean power and end-use including energy efficiency.
  • 2
     Net income. Data for Q1 2016 – Q2 2025, from Bloomberg Terminal, accessed 23 October 2025.
  • 3
    Calculation based on 2016-2024 data, as a detailed breakdown of oil and gas spending on clean energy in 2025 was not included in the IEA World Energy Investment report. The IEA defines clean energy investment as solar PV, wind, CCUS, bioenergy, energy storage, low-emissions hydrogen and ‘other’.
  • 4
    For the period 2016-2024. IEA data is not yet available for 2025.

Australia’s climate finance to Southeast Asia lags behind China  

by

Key points

  • Southeast Asia is a key partner for both China and Australia. China’s voluntary climate finance to the region was around ten times Australia’s USD 1.2 billion in obligatory funding. 
  • Based on the NDCs of ASEAN countries, Australia should provide around USD 5.4 billion of climate finance to Southeast Asia by 2030. So far, it has delivered less than a quarter of its expected bilateral finance to Southeast Asia. 
  • At COP30, talks will likely focus on the New Quantitative Finance Goal, where developing countries, including Australia, must provide at least USD 300 billion in climate finance annually to developing countries. 

China outpaces Australia in ASEAN climate finance

Southeast Asia is one of the fastest-growing and climate vulnerable regions, where climate finance is a crucial mechanism in supporting decarbonisation and adaptation. 

China delivered around USD 12 billion in bilateral climate finance to Southeast Asia between 2012 and 2021, 10 times Australia’s USD 1.2 billion over the same period. The gap underscores China’s growing influence in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a bloc that is the largest trading partner for China and second largest trading partner for Australia.  

Our new analysis, based on OECD and WRI data, looks at climate finance flows to Malaysia, Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Timor-Leste, Myanmar and Thailand. It shows the efforts of Australia’s new government to increase its climate finance support to these key regional partners in recent years, such as a USD 2 billion investment fund.

Australia should provide around USD 5.4 billion of climate finance to Southeast Asia by 2030, based on the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) of ASEAN countries – the national climate action plans submitted by governments to the UN (see Methodology below). So far, it has delivered less than a quarter of its expected bilateral climate finance to Southeast Asia’s decarbonisation efforts. 

Australia provided most climate finance to Indonesia (USD 585 million), while China provided most climate finance to Malaysia (USD 5 billion) followed by Indonesia (USD 4 billion), between 2012 and 2021.

Why is this important now? 

As a UNFCCC Annex II country, Australia is required to contribute to the delivery of at least USD 300 billion annually by 2035 in climate finance, as agreed in the new collective quantified goal (NCQG) at COP29 last year. 

Developed nations committed to take the lead by providing finance for developing countries’ climate action. China, though not obliged, provided around USD 4.5 billion of climate finance per year from 2013 to 2022 – equivalent to 6.1% of the total amount given by developed countries across the same period, according to the WRI. Amid debate over expanding the number of required donors to the climate finance goal, China has confirmed its contributions will remain voluntary. 

This discussion is now urgent – talks ahead of COP30 are focusing on two things: how to raise the NCQG’s more ambitious target of USD 1.3 trillion per year from a wider set of climate finance sources, and how much is needed by developing countries (excluding China) to supplement their domestic resources to adequately provide for the energy transition, adaptation measures, and responses to loss and damage.

Methodology 

Datasets


This analysis uses historical climate finance to Southeast Asia between 2012 and 2021 from

Australia’s attributed bilateral finance requirement to meet ASEAN NDCs by 2030 is estimated by taking:

  • the UNFCCC calculation of the volume of climate finance needed for Southeast Asia, as determined from NDCs, as USD 422.16 billion up to 2030; 
  • the multi-year average, post-Paris contribution of bilateral public finance to total climate finance from developed to developing countries as 37% from 2017 to 2022, according to the OECD; and
  • the WRI’s climate finance calculator result (with donor base set to UNFCCC Annex II countries) giving Australia’s bilateral share of Southeast Asia’s climate finance, normalising for historical emissions and economy size. 

Delivering indicators for the Global Goal on Adaptation can drive climate action

by

Key points:

  • Climate impacts such as heatwaves, extreme weather events and sea-level rise are already taking a severe toll on many communities and causing billions of dollars in damages each year. The need for increased investments in adaptation measures is greater than ever.
  • The many ways climate change can impact communities mean that tracking the implementation and efficacy of adaptation measures has, so far, proven difficult.
  • The Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) is one of the key elements to deliver at COP30. This central framework aims to set specific, measurable targets for adaptation action and define indicators to track how far and how well those measures are implemented. Around 100 draft indicators have been shared to be agreed on at COP30 in Belém. 
  • Having quantifiable metrics for adaptation projects can help incentivise governments and businesses to make investments and take action.
  • Financing for adaptation has been shown to attract high returns on investment, as well as offering broad-ranging social, environmental and other non-monetary benefits. 
  • However, adaptation action remains critically underfinanced. COP30 presents an opportunity for countries to discuss how to close the adaptation financing gap, and is a critical time to do so, as many climate finance pledges from developed countries are about to expire.

What is the Global Goal on Adaptation?

The UNFCCC considers adaptation a critical element of the long-term response to climate change (see Box 1). The Global Goal on Adapation (GGA) is the central framework for addressing adaptation within international climate negotiations. It aims to develop universally-understood and accepted targets for adaptation and to define how progress is measured and reported. 

Although the GGA was established as part of the 2015 Paris Agreement, countries only agreed on an overarching framework for adaptation action in 2023. So far, seven broad thematic targets and four dimensional targets have been decided on (explored further below), with the work due to be completed and ready for adoption by November 2025. 

The missing piece that will help countries to work with the GGA is agreement on a set of adaptation indicators. There are approximately 100 draft indicators to be discussed and agreed upon at COP30, narrowed down from an initial list of 9,529 suggestions.

Box 1. Why prioritise adaptation?

Climate impacts are already severe and global. In 2024, the majority of datasets put the world’s surface temperature at above 1.5°C, a level of warming that resulted in stronger heatwaves, extreme weather events and sea-level rise, among other impacts.

‘Adaptation’ refers to the process of making adjustments to better anticipate and cope with the many harmful effects of climate change. Adaptation seeks to reduce vulnerability, improve resilience and minimise damage; it is one of the central pillars of climate action, alongside mitigation and loss and damage. 

It is estimated that nearly half of the global population – 3.6 billion people – are highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Between 1993 and 2022, nearly 9,500 extreme weather events resulted in the loss of more than 765,000 lives, as well as direct economic losses of almost USD 4.2 trillion.

Many African countries already report spending up to 9% of their GDP on coping with ever-more extreme weather patterns. The UN estimates that between 2025-2035, the average annual cost of all developing countries’ adaptation needs will reach USD 365 billion.

Why do we need indicators for adaptation?

For climate mitigation, there are clear targets for the global and national action needed to keep global temperature rise within safe limits. We know how many tonnes of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions we need to stop emitting by when. Countries set informed national targets and track progress towards mitigation goals as part of their nationally determined contributions (NDCs).

Adaptation is more complex. It’s about how people, places, ecosystems and economies are being impacted by climate change, now and in the future. Each community has its own level of vulnerability and exposure to climate change, and so will feel the impacts differently. When dealing with such vastly wide-ranging, diverse, regionally varied and at times unpredictable impacts, there are a number of ways in which progress on adaptation could be tracked. In this complex landscape, the GGA seeks to offer a universal framework for monitoring and evaluating adaptation progress.

Acting on adaptation can achieve more than preventing the worst impacts of climate change – it can help spur better environmental, social and economic outcomes across the globe. In a letter from the COP30 presidency, COP30 President Designate André Aranha Correa do Lago writes that “the GGA is not merely a negotiation item – it is an economic and moral compass. … Finance ministers and development banks must treat adaptation as a core policy instrument, not as charity.”

What are the proposed indicators?

The GGA will offer globally-relevant adaptation indicators  for countries to work towards, assess and report on. Currently, around 100 draft indicators have been shared for negotiation at COP 30. 

Crucially, the indicators cover both outcomes (for example, access to safe water or reduced mortality from heat) and the means of implementation (such as finance, technology and capacity-building). These are grouped under the seven thematic targets, which track progress on adaptation outcomes, and four dimensional targets, which cover how work on adaptation will be implemented (see Table 1).

Table 1. Targets under the GGA and examples of proposed indicators

CategoryTargetExample of proposed indicator
Thematic targets Water supply and sanitationChange in water stress levels over time
Food and agricultural productionProportion of Parties that have integrated climate risks into national food security 
Health impacts and health servicesChange in the annual rate of reported heat-related occupational injuries and deaths
Ecosystems and biodiversityExtent of ecosystems that contribute to climate resilience covered by protected areas and other effective area-based conservation measures
Infrastructure and human settlementsProportion of informal settlement upgrading programmes that (i) include climate change adaptation and (ii) are locally led and co-designed
Poverty eradication and livelihoodsProportion of population living below the international poverty line in areas highly exposed to climate-related hazards
Cultural heritage and knowledgePercentage of at-risk cultural and natural heritage sites with adaptation measures implemented
Dimensional targetsImpact, vulnerability, risk assessmentNumber of Parties that have established multi-hazard early warning systems
PlanningNumber of Parties with adopted national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies
ImplementationAnnual adaptation finance expenditure
Monitoring, evaluation, and learningNumber of Parties that have designed a system for monitoring, evaluation and learning for their national adaptation efforts

Source: UNFCCC (2025) Potential indicators for the targets of the GGA framework proposed by the expert group_2025-09-08

How will the GGA indicators be used?

At the international level, countries have not previously agreed on a shared set of indicators for adaptation. Once signed off, the GGA and its indicators will serve as the benchmark for assessing both how well countries are coping with climate impacts and how effectively they are implementing measures to adapt to their effects.

This will provide a clear and reliable benchmark for both developed and developing countries to understand progress on adaptation and to identify where efforts need to be ramped up. This would resolve long-standing contention around the lack of reliable tracking and transparency.

Ultimately, countries’ updates on their progress towards meeting the adaptation targets will feed into the UN Global Stocktake process, providing analysis on areas where they are making progress and where they are lagging behind. In time, this should provide the first full picture of how countries are preparing for extreme weather events and their consequences (for example, supply chain disruptions).

The inclusion of indicators on finance will be essential for the national and international-level tracking of adaptation funding and will help shape discussions on how much should be channelled towards adaptation action. The indicators will also provide strategic support at the country level, informing the development of National Adaptation Plans. 

The indicators will also support other initiatives, such as the Belem Health Action Plan. Due to be announced at COP30, the Plan aims to foster collective action around preventing, detecting and responding to growing health-related climate challenges.

How well are countries preparing for climate adaptation?

National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) are the main way in which countries outline how they are preparing for and adapting to climate impacts. NAPs will be an important channel for achieving the indicators set out in the GGA, although countries will require guidance and assistance to integrate these measures into their planning processes. Some countries have also developed sectoral NAPs, which identify vulnerabilities and set adaptation priorities for specific sectors, such as agriculture, water resources, or infrastructure.

Increasingly, countries are developing national policies on adaptation, with 171 countries having at least one national adaptation planning instrument, such as a policy, strategy or plan, in place.

According to the latest official progress report, 67 developing countries and 13 developed countries have submitted NAPs. 121 developing countries have successfully applied for funding to support the development of their NAPs and other types of adaptation planning. Further evaluation of NAP progress and a discussion on next steps will be on the agenda at COP30.

How will the GGA encourage governments and businesses to act?

Right now, most pledges on adaptation are broad, promising to “build resilience”, “protect livelihoods”, or similar statements. But after the introduction of agreed, quantifiable indicators at COP30, governments will need to show measurable progress. Ideally, this development will prompt governments to integrate adaptation targets into a range of national plans and budgets. Research indicates that public investment in adaptation can, in turn, attract private investment. 

Adoption of the GGA and its indicators will not radically shift government or business policy overnight; it will take time to filter down to ministries and departments. The initial stages of other UN processes have demonstrated that some poorer countries will struggle with capacity gaps unless they receive support. In time, likely by the mid-2030s, we will have a clearer picture of how countries are preparing for climate impacts.

For mitigation, tracking progress in renewable energy has been relatively straightforward to date, thanks to the availability of relevant data at the country and global levels. National-level information on clean energy is used to assess where renewable energy sources are growing. In turn, businesses can use data to inform their investment decisions.

Adaptation action is likely to be one of the world’s major investment opportunities over the coming decades, as the effects of climate change increasingly push countries to prepare for a range of impacts. The more data countries can provide on how, where, and when these investments are being made, the stronger the global dataset of investment opportunities and funding gaps will be, which in turn presents a set of best practices for adaptation.

What are the benefits of investing in adaptation?

Today, more research is highlighting the wide-ranging benefits of financing adaptation projects – a picture which was previously not always clear. A 2025 study by the World Resources Institute (WRI) analysed 320 adaptation and resilience investments across 12 countries, totalling USD 133 billion. It found that every dollar invested in adaptation and resilience may generate more than ten dollars in benefits over ten years – including avoided losses, economic benefits, and social and environmental benefits.

These benefits might, for example, be seen in fewer people being affected by extreme weather events, but also in job creation, a healthier population, better transport, reduced soil erosion, greater social benefits for women, and increased carbon uptake, among many others. WRI found that USD 133 billion in investment may result in benefits of around USD 1.4 trillion – which is likely an underestimation, as many benefits are not monetised. Investment in adaptation has also been shown to bring benefits to a community even when a climate shock does not occur.

Investment is also necessary to adapt to worsening climate impacts on health. For example, rapid warming has led to a 23% increase in heat-related deaths since the 1990s, resulting in an average of approximately 546,000 deaths per year in 2012–21. The changing climate is also playing a role in increasing the transmission of infectious diseases such as dengue.

Other reports highlight the risks posed by climate impacts and estimate the finance required for adaptation. A 2021 report found that investing USD 68 billion in agriculture, water and infrastructure globally each year would prevent around 78 million people from starving or experiencing chronic hunger caused by climate change impacts. Estimates from a 2025 report suggest USD 443 billion is needed each year for small-scale family farmers – who produce around half of the world’s food calories – to adapt to the impacts of climate change.

The wide-reaching benefits of sufficient investment in adaptation include preventing drought-driven crop failures that have caused malnourishment in millions of people, protecting global supply value chains and billion-dollar food industries, as well as safeguarding the employment of those working in the agricultural sector. Additional analysis suggests investing USD 350 billion in adaptation each year could create 280 million jobs in emerging markets and developing economies over the next decade.

When will the GGA take effect, and will it be enforced?

COP30 in Belém will serve as a critical checkpoint on adaptation and specifically on the GGA, where countries will review the framework and its early progress. In 2028, a comprehensive review of progress towards the GGA will take place during the second Global Stocktake.

By 2030 – the initial time horizon for achieving measurable progress under the GGA’s 11 targets – countries should be able to demonstrate strengthened adaptive capacity, reduced climate vulnerability and improved resilience across key systems. Subsequent stocktakes in the early 2030s will inform the next phase of adaptation ambition.

Submitting communications on adaptation is mandatory under some UNFCCC reporting mechanisms. However, like other mechanisms under the Paris Agreement, implementation is nationally determined and voluntary – countries are not legally required to meet adaptation targets or outcomes. Countries have also agreed that reporting on the indicators remains voluntary, so as not to add to reporting burdens.

Is the GGA backed by finance?

Adaptation has consistently been underfinanced: it currently receives around one-third of public climate finance, with the majority going towards mitigation. Other estimates looking at all sources of climate finance suggest as little as 3% went towards adaptation in 2023.

In the COP26 summit outcomes, developed countries were urged to at least double the adaptation financing going to developing countries from 2019 levels by 2025. Achieving that goal would mean reaching around USD 40 billion in public adaptation funding by the end of the current year. However, funding was only tracked at USD 26 billion in 2023, meaning the goal is likely to be missed if current trends continue.

The world’s adaptation finance needs are now estimated at between USD 310 and 365 billion a year for developing countries – 12-14 times the current finance flows. In 2024, the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) agreed at COP29 went some way to acknowledging the sheer level of climate finance needed. Parties set the ambition of at least tripling funding for developing countries to USD 300 billion per year by 2035, with the ultimate goal of providing USD 1.3 trillion per year in climate finance within the same timeframe.

However, the NCQG does not suggest how much of that finance should be allocated towards adaptation. 

At COP30, discussions will continue on how to “close the adaptation-finance gap”. With the objective of doubling adaptation finance from developed nations coming to an end in 2025, countries and civil society are considering what should come next for adaptation financing, for example, if a specific target for adaptation is situated within the agreed financial goal of USD 300 billion a year. At the same time, countries need to step up their contributions to dedicated existing funds, such as the Adaptation Fund. 

Follow Us