Key points
- The global context has changed since the Paris Agreement was signed over 10 years ago. The continued emission of greenhouse gases means the most ambitious climate pathways that keep warming to 1.5°C are out of reach.
- It is certain we will see some level of temporary temperature overshoot above 1.5°C – the extent of which depends on our actions. Even in the most optimistic scenario, requiring fossil fuel production to fall 4-5% per year starting immediately, we have already locked in warming of at least 1.7°C this century.
- Dangerous impacts are already being seen at present day warming of around 1.4°C, and continuing along the current policy path would lead to a minimum temperature increase of 2.6°C. The duration and extent of warming above 1.5°C before a return is key to determining the severity of impacts.
- To return to 1.5°C following overshoot, some level of carbon removal is required. However, approaches remain expensive and unproven at the scales proposed, reiterating the need to prioritise deep, rapid emission cuts now.
- While geoengineering approaches that aim to manipulate the Earth’s climate to reduce the peak of warming are increasingly discussed, there is no scientific evidence or deployment framework to support their feasibility or safety.
- Some impacts of overshoot will be irreversible, including those due to climate tipping points. Some tipping point thresholds have already been crossed, and the exact nature and timing of others is unclear. A precautionary approach should be pursued to limit warming as much as possible.
- Climate change is happening in the context of other uncertainties – pandemics, other climatic phenomena, like El Niño, war, price shocks – that can help or hinder climate action.
- Just as we have scientific certainty about the cause of climate change, there is consensus on how to limit further warming and bring temperatures back down to 1.5°C: a fossil fuel phaseout, rapid electrification, cuts to methane and some level of carbon removal.
1.5°C without overshoot is gone
The global context has changed significantly since the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was established in 1991 and the Paris Agreement was signed in 2015.
We are entering a new era of climate scenarios and increasing limits to possible ambition. Since the Paris Agreement was signed, global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have continued to rise. The most ambitious scenarios – of keeping to 1.5°C without overshoot – are no longer feasible. At the same time, emissions have not risen as fast as the most extreme projections assumed, driven in part by falling renewable energy costs and expanding climate policy – making the worst-case scenario of extreme emission levels also implausible.
This means the world needs to adapt to a new reality. “Overshooting 1.5°C is no longer a hypothetical scenario – it is something the world must now navigate,” according to IIASA Energy, Climate, and Environment Program Director, Keywan Riahi.1The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) is an international research institute that advances systems analysis and applies its research methods to identify policy solutions. In 2026, the first scientific report from a UN body on overshoot was published, examining the implications of 1.5°C overshoot and the choices that remain available.
What do climate scientists mean by overshoot?
Overshoot refers specifically to temperature overshoot – a period in which global temperatures temporarily exceed a specified global warming threshold, such as 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, before potentially returning to lower temperatures.
Scientists suggest temperatures can be brought back down through drawdown, which refers to an actively managed decline in GHG emissions.
The magnitude (how much the specified level is exceeded) and the duration (how long it is exceeded for) differ across climate pathways.
The science is clear about many aspects of climate change, its impacts and temperature overshoot. It is also clear about what we need to do to maintain our best chance of limiting warming and – vitally, given it will define our new reality for centuries and millennia – the magnitude and duration of overshoot. There is less certainty about the extent of some impacts, tipping-point thresholds and the use of carbon removal in practice, which re-emphasises the need to keep temporary overshoot to a minimum and prioritise an immediate, rapid and sustained fossil fuel phaseout.
There is an unequivocal link between emissions and warming
Scientists have stated that climate change is unequivocally driven by human activities. Human influence over recent decades has warmed the climate system at a rate that is unprecedented over the last 2000 years.
Atmospheric CO2 and methane concentrations are rising. In 2025, atmospheric concentrations of CO2 were higher than at any time in at least the last 2 million years and methane concentrations were higher than at any time in at least 800,000 years. The increase in annual CO2 concentrations recorded in 2024 was the largest since modern measurements began in 1957.
This has resulted in continued warming, the rate of which is increasing at 0.27°C per decade.2Over 2016–2025. “Global surface temperature has increased faster since 1970 than in any other 50-year period over at least the last 2000 years,” according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) – the world’s authoritative body on climate science.
We have already locked in some warming and climate impacts
We are already experiencing significant and unprecedented impacts at current warming, which was recorded as 1.37°C above pre-industrial levels, on average, in 2025.3This is a single year figure. The Paris Agreement refers to “long-term temperature increase”, of which a period of twenty or thirty years is generally used to define the climate. If warming continues at the current rate, the 1.5°C threshold is expected to be reached around 2030. Even if we stopped emitting GHGs today, past emissions have locked us into warming that overshoots 1.5°C.
Existing climate policies put us on track for around 2.6°C of warming above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century – a level of warming which is extremely dangerous and, on our current trajectory, represents the likely minimum of future warming. If global CO2 emissions remain at 2025 levels, the remaining carbon budget – which gives a 50% chance of keeping warming to 1.5°C – will be exhausted in just over three years.
An optimistic scenario combining full implementation of all conditional national targets and net-zero pledges projects 1.9°C of future warming by 2100. Even with an immediate and rapid shift away from fossil fuel use, we have already locked in a temporary warming peak of at least 1.7°C this century.
Every fraction of a degree matters, and returning warming to 1.5°C will enable millions of lives to be saved and avoid damages worth trillions.
Impacts and extreme events can be attributed to climate change
Attribution science is used to assess the likelihood that an impact, such as an extreme weather event, is due to human-caused climate change. Attribution science is rapidly evolving, with the number of studies on the topic doubling since 2012. In the past decade, improvements in climate models, longer observational records and statistical techniques have enhanced the ability of researchers to detect the influence of climate change.
Scientists assess attribution by comparing two modelled scenarios – one in which climate change has occurred and one in which it hasn’t – to understand how likely an event would have been in either context. For example, the nighttime temperatures reached in the June 2026 European heatwave would have been a hundred times less likely in 2003. Attribution also makes it possible to connect excess heat-related deaths occurring during climate change-driven heatwaves. In the record-breaking 2022 European summer heatwave, 38,154 excess deaths were attributed to climate change.
Of more than 900 attribution studies covering almost 1,000 extreme weather events and trends, 77% were made more likely or severe due to climate change.
Attribution studies can now be conducted rapidly, within days of events. As these studies place a direct link between fossil fuel emissions and climate impacts, they are also increasingly used in court to hold companies to account.
Figure 1
The duration and extent of temperature overshoot define impacts and how much we can bring future temperatures down
Overshoot refers to a temporary peak in temperatures, followed by an actively managed decline to 1.5°C through mitigation. In recent years, as 1.5°C feasibility came under increasing threat due to inadequate emission cuts, scientists began the work of trying to understand the implications and what our next best-case Paris Agreement-aligned scenarios would be.
Most modelled projections suggest that overshoot will need to be limited to 1.8°C, otherwise it will be too difficult to return to 1.5°C by the end of the century, which risks a permanent breach of the 1.5°C temperature goal. At the same time, limiting overshoot to below 1.7°C no longer seems feasible.
The severity, frequency and length of climate impacts, such as heatwaves, droughts and floods, are dependent on the duration and extent – how long and by how much – we overshoot 1.5°C. For example, the IPCC estimates that the area of global land at risk of changing from one ecosystem type to another – such as a forest changing to a grassland – doubles at 2°C of warming compared to 1.5°C. Another analysis finds the frequency of agricultural drought increases from 24% in a 1.5°C scenario with little to no overshoot to 31% in an overshoot scenario that reaches just below 2°C by the end of the century.
Temporary temperature overshoot can result in impacts that cannot be reversed by returning to 1.5°C. For example, exceeding a temperature threshold for even a short period may push species beyond their tolerance limits, causing extinction, migration and knock-on effects for entire ecosystems. For the ocean, which absorbs and releases heat more slowly than the atmosphere, overshoot is projected to leave marine ecosystems less habitable for centuries – long after atmospheric temperatures have returned to 1.5°C.
Pursuing all efforts that give us the best chance of sticking to the 1.5°C target, or as close to it as possible, also brings economic benefits. Allowing temperatures to overshoot now defers the costs of mitigation, but does not avoid them. Ultimately, climate impacts from temperature overshoot will lead to significantly higher mitigation costs and economic losses this century.4While higher initial investments are needed to keep temperatures down, this is outweighed by the economic benefits later in the century.
Some amount of carbon will need to be removed from the atmosphere
Since GHG emissions are already too high, all modelled pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C or 2°C in the most recent IPCC reports include the removal and storage of carbon from the atmosphere – highlighting a theoretical need for some level of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) in the future. However, IPCC scientists warn that the limited amount of carbon removal that will be possible must be reserved for ‘hard-to-abate’ activities that absolutely cannot be decarbonised, and for drawing down excess emissions as part of the effort to bring temperatures back down after overshoot.
Carbon removal is currently unfeasible at scale, while relying on future large-scale CDR is incredibly risky and uncertain. Existing carbon removal technologies are unproven and face significant implementation challenges, requiring significant investment in research and development to make them feasible. These technological approaches are, and will likely remain, very expensive, according to the IPCC.
To date, carbon removal deployment has held roughly steady at around 2.2 billion tonnes (Gt) of CO2 annually, with land-based approaches – afforestation, reforestation and forest management – accounting for virtually all of it (over 99.9%).
Yet the scale required looks very different. Keeping temperatures on track to peak at 1.7–1.8°C before falling back to 1.5°C by 2100 would depend on removals rising 80% to 3.9 GtCO2 per year by 2035, then climbing roughly fourfold from today’s levels to about 8.8 GtCO2 per year by 2050, according to evidence on the ‘CDR gap’ in the 2026 The State of Carbon Dioxide Removal report.5The State of Carbon Dioxide Removal: Third Edition (2026), page 217
This reiterates the need to implement readily available mitigation measures and pursue deep, rapid emission cuts now, rather than relying on future carbon uptake.
Limited carbon removal is available without significant trade-offs
While there is scientific certainty that some level of carbon removal will be needed to bring warming back to 1.5°C, there are hard limits and trade-offs associated with relying on the implementation of CDR technologies and practices. For example, there are limits to the ability of the land and oceans to continue acting as carbon sinks as temperatures rise before they become carbon sources, as well as limits to geological storage of carbon.
Additionally, consideration of ecological and social constraints of ecosystem restoration means that the amount of land that could be used for nature-based carbon removal is likely only 2.6 GtCO2 per year – not much more than today.
As carbon removal will need to be implemented at levels significantly above current deployment, there is uncertainty about the extent to which the trade-offs outweigh the benefits. The “available information on side effects [of CDR approaches] is too sparse for a systematic, quantitative review across methods, or across potential side effects domains,” according to The State of Carbon Dioxide Removal report.6The State of Carbon Dioxide Removal: Third Edition (2026), page 235 Additionally, deployment of CDR may also compete for resources with measures used to directly reduce GHG emissions7The State of Carbon Dioxide Removal: Third Edition (2026), page 252 – for example, energy-intensive approaches compete with the demand for carbon-free energy.
While the costs of CDR are difficult to estimate, due to knowledge gaps and future uncertainty, many approaches are estimated to cost over USD 100 per tonne, and up to USD 1,000 or more.8The State of Carbon Dioxide Removal: Third Edition (2026), page 236 To deploy CDR at the annual billion-tonne levels suggested to return to 1.5°C will cost trillions of dollars, posing potential financial constraints.9The State of Carbon Dioxide Removal: Third Edition (2026), page 255
There is also uncertainty about how the atmosphere will respond to carbon removal. It is often assumed that removing one tonne of CO2 is exactly opposite and equivalent to the impact of adding one tonne of CO2.
A 2021 paper published in Nature Climate Change used an Earth system model to assess the impacts of adding and removing equal amounts of CO2, finding that the impacts were not symmetrical. This makes it difficult to predict the exact impacts of adding or removing CO2.
There is no certainty around the use of geoengineering
Geoengineering, which refers to interventions that aim to modify the climate and temporarily reduce peak warming during overshoot, has increasingly featured in discussions about how to respond to continued rising emission trajectories and dangerous warming.
This includes approaches such as solar radiation management (SRM), which aim to reduce the amount of sunlight reaching the Earth’s surface and therefore global surface temperatures. This can be done by injecting aerosols into the atmosphere to increase reflectivity – mimicking the impact of volcanic ash following an eruption – which can lead to a period of temporary cooling. Other approaches include brightening clouds or introducing mirrors in space.
Such approaches could, in theory, temporarily lower overshoot peak temperatures for a few years until emissions are lowered, preventing major tipping points triggered by further warming. However, geoengineering simply masks the warming effects of GHGs; it does not remove them from the atmosphere.
Geoengineering approaches would therefore require continuous deployment to achieve their intended effects, which could result in a ‘termination shock’ if abruptly discontinued – leading to devastating impacts on ecosystems.
Currently, there are significant research gaps in even the most advanced approaches, with many potential unknown serious impacts. Meanwhile, there is no existing technology available for implementing any geoengineering at scale. Deployment of geoengineering measures is also estimated to cost billions of dollars, while the lack of governance processes for deployment, or even testing, poses significant challenges.
Scientific evidence does not support SRM as a viable climate solution, according to a 2026 UN Environment Programme (UNEP) report. Its authors warn that “SRM research remains limited, largely theoretical, highly uncertain, based on idealized scenarios that overlook major deployment uncertainties and concentrated in a handful of countries. The evidence base still offers only a limited understanding of SRM’s potential impacts on climate, ecosystems and societies.”
Additionally, there are equity implications, as the location of SRM deployment may have regional impacts that could benefit some areas over others.
Impacts of overshoot may be irreversible
At 1.37°C of warming, we are already experiencing severe and unprecedented environmental, social, economic and cultural impacts that will intensify as temperatures rise (see Table 1). Some of these impacts – such as exposure to dangerous heat – may be reversed if warming returns from a temporary peak temperature overshoot. Others will have longer-lasting or permanent impacts – such as sea-level encroachment on land and loss of biodiversity, as well as excess heat-related deaths, which have already occurred due to climate change.
Additionally, increases in global temperatures, even if temporary, risk the creation of positive feedback loops. These are self-perpetuating cycles that speed up warming and can trigger climate ‘tipping points’, after which an Earth system transforms into an alternative stable state that is completely different to its original state.
Tipping points are large-scale and often irreversible changes. A single tipping point can have cascading and catastrophic effects regionally and globally. Examples include the shift of the Amazon from a rainforest to a savanna and the melting of the polar ice caps. In the Amazon, initial tree loss – from deforestation or wildfires – reduces the regional rainfall generated by the trees, leading to more trees dying and further drying out of the region. Similarly, as the polar ice caps melt, less sunlight is reflected and the ocean water absorbs more heat, which drives temperatures higher and melts even more ice.
Once a threshold has been crossed, tipping points can be fast-onset, meaning they occur suddenly – in a matter of decades – or slow-onset, with changes occurring over much longer timescales – likely over many centuries. While the onset of either type of tipping point can be abrupt, the duration of the transition into the alternative stable state determines whether it is fast- or slow-onset. Examples of fast-onset tipping points include Amazon savannisation and coral reef die off, whereas the collapse of the Antarctic ice sheet is a slow-onset tipping point.
The science is clear: rising temperatures increase the risk of crossing tipping point thresholds – even temporary overshoot of 1.5°C increases the risks of critical tipping points by 72% compared to scenarios with no overshoot. However, uncertainty about exact thresholds remains, as well as the scale and speed at which tipping points are likely to occur.
Given the scale of what is at stake, and the significant scientific uncertainty about how much longer we can continue to push the boundaries of the Earth system, the evidence is clear that we need to take a precautionary approach. Keeping the duration and extent of overshoot as low as possible is critical, and rapid decarbonisation is key.
The climate and biodiversity crises are deeply interlinked
The climate crisis is not occurring in isolation. Warming and climate impacts are exacerbating the unprecedented loss of biodiversity, while the reduced resilience of natural ecosystems worsens climate change. For example, the protection of forests is essential to conserve species habitat and diversity, and at the same time is crucial in Earth system cycles, including water and nutrient cycling, as well as in carbon sequestration for climate mitigation and providing protection from climate impacts, such as extreme weather events.
One goal cannot be achieved without considering the other. Climate strategies that overlook biodiversity, such as monoculture plantations optimised for carbon uptake, can weaken the ecosystem resilience they rely on, just as conservation efforts that ignore shifting climate conditions will not be effective at protecting habitats. The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework and the Paris Agreement now explicitly reference each other, reflecting a growing recognition that these two crises need to be tackled jointly.
Climate change is happening in the context of other uncertainties
When climate change interacts with economic, political or natural shocks, the impacts compound, creating what is known as a ‘polycrisis’. Despite scientific certainty around many elements of climate change, the way these overlapping shocks unfold is inherently unpredictable and they can either help or hinder climate action.
For example, since the closure of the Strait of Hormuz in early 2026, which triggered a global oil shock, there has been a policy shift towards renewables. In the first 100 days following the closure of the Strait, 25 countries and the EU announced a wide range of clean energy and electrification policies, investments and initiatives.
In contrast, the impacts of inflation, high interest rates and strained supply chains following the invasion of Ukraine and the Covid-19 pandemic contributed to the derailing of global wind power projects in 2023, with Danish wind giant Ørsted citing compounding economic shocks as the reason for its cancellation of two flagship US offshore projects.
At the same time, the sudden loss of Ukrainian wheat exports in 2023 overlapped directly with extreme, El Niño-driven climate shocks, creating a compounding crisis that destabilised global food supply. There is now concern that the current 2026 ‘super’ El Niño, compounded by rising oil prices, fertiliser shortages and inflation, may lead to a similar outcome, highlighting how deeply vulnerable our systems are while global emissions – and their warming impacts – remain high.
The 2026 El Niño – already the strongest on record by some measures – is also temporarily raising temperatures higher as emissions increase, meaning we are likely experiencing our last year below 1.5°C.
We know how to bring temperatures down
Just as we know the cause of climate change, we also know how to prevent and reverse future warming and reduce its impacts. The actions are clear – with most tools and technology already available to us – and can enable warming to return to below 1.5°C following a temporary, limited temperature overshoot.
This is outlined in the highest possible ambition (HPA) scenario developed by Climate Analytics. The scenario – broadly aligned with the findings from UNEP’s Emissions Gap Report 2025, the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) World Energy Outlook 2025, and a statement from the world’s leading climate modellers – emphasises the following efforts:
- Rapid electrification of power, transport and much of industry, so that nearly two-thirds of energy demand needs are met with clean electricity by 2050.
- Rapid and immediate phase out of fossil fuels, so that advanced economies are fossil-free by 2050, and the global economy is fossil-free by 2070. This requires cutting fossil fuel production 4-5% each year until 2030.
- Sharp fall in methane emissions, so that by 2030 methane emissions have decreased overall by 20% relative to 2020 levels, and by 50% in the energy sector.
- Scale up of carbon removal, to bring temperatures down from peak levels and reduce the duration of the 1.5°C overshoot. Even if carbon removal is rolled out at only half the assumed pace, the world could still get back to below 1.5°C, provided emissions are cut quickly. However, an overshoot of greater duration and extent would come with added risks and uncertainties.
In this scenario, global CO2 emissions reach net zero before 2050 and global GHG emissions reach net zero in the 2060s.
The Climate Analytics HPA scenario is similar to other scenarios of overshoot and return to 1.5°C. For example, the Net Zero Emissions (NZE) Scenario in the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2025 projects peak emissions by 2050 with temperatures at around 1.65°C, provided the goals of doubling efficiency and tripling renewables capacity by 2030 are met, along with more than 80% methane emission cuts by 2035 and some CDR.
While these goals are a big feat, past progress has shown us that rapid advances are possible. Solar and wind energies have become the cheapest sources of electricity, with clean energy equipment now less than half the price it was 10 years ago. The price of batteries has also dropped by more than 99% since 1991.
Additionally, between 2015 – when the Paris Agreement was signed – and 2023, countries representing almost half (46%) of global GDP increased their economies while cutting CO2 emissions, highlighting that economic growth can be decoupled from continued pollution.
Many climate policies are no- or low-regret actions, meaning they deliver additional benefits – beyond GHG emission reductions – that are large enough to cover the cost of implementation and that remain cost-effective even if climate change is less severe than anticipated.
For example, investing in nature protection delivers many non-climate benefits that improve ecosystem resilience while buffering against climate impacts and reducing disaster risk – yielding net benefits even in the absence of climate change. At the same time, reforming environmentally harmful subsidies, such as those for fossil fuels, can deliver net benefits – freeing up funds that could finance universal access to water, sanitation and electricity in many countries.
This briefing was updated on 3 November 2026 with the inclusion of UNEP’s report “Limiting Overshoot – Navigating exceedance of 1.5°C and pathways towards return”